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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN:
A CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL AND 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
This thesis is a case study of the political economy of Iran from 
1963 to the present. It analyzes the interactions of the political and 
economic spheres, and the effects of those interactions on political 
development within Iran. For this study, political development is 
viewed in terms of a system's capacity to respond to economic and 
political demands placed upon it by the population. Various theories 
of political economy are reviewed in the first chapter, and their 
applicability to Iran’s system is discussed throughout the work. The 
interaction between existing economic and political systems in Iran, 
their transformation over time, and the resulting changes in the 
capacity of Iran's leadership to deliver economically and politically 
are the focus of this study.
A historical analysis is employed to compare the politico- 
economic approaches and degree of development under the regime 
of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi Shah from 1963 to 1979, with the post­
revolutionary theocratic regime from 1979 to the present. The 
analysis focuses on the interaction of economic conditions, political 
decisions, and global economic and political factors. Overall, it is 
argued that development has been lacking both as a result of 
environmental circumstances and of decisions made by Iran's 
leaders. The historical analysis is valuable because it provides a 
basis from which to speculate on the future political economy and
development of Iran. For Iran, development depends on sustained 
economic growth and adoption of a method of distribution in which 
economic gaps are narrowed. In addition, development requires that 
political demands of the population be addressed; this means 
creating avenues for interest articulation and political participation 
by the masses. The current leadership is aggressively pursuing 
economic growth; if they are successful, the political demands of the 
population will increase and the stability of the country will depend 
on successfully responding to these demands.
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1INTRODUCTION
The focus of this thesis is an analysis of how economic 
conditions, political decisions, and the environment (domestic and 
global) have interacted to shape the political economy of modern 
Iran, which in turn has affected the degree of development in this 
country. Development is an ambiguous concept. Scholars have been 
theorizing for several decades in an attempt to distinguish what 
makes one country more "developed" than another country. In the 
first chapter of this thesis a conceptual and theoretical framework is 
given in order to facilitate a better understanding of political 
economy and political development. A number of approaches to 
political economy are reviewed and their applicability to Iran is 
briefly examined. Further examination of how Iran has used these 
politico-economic methods is detailed as the paper progresses. After 
the review of political economy studies, a framework for political 
development is provided. For the purposes of this paper, 
development is defined in terms of a state's ability to satisfy the 
economic and political needs and demands of its population. Having 
provided the conceptual and theoretical framework for the paper, 
the following chapters use this framework to analyze Iran’s political 
economy from 1963 to the present.
Chapter two examines Iran from the first year of the reform 
program of the Shah, known as the White Revolution to the 
revolution of 1979. The White Revolution’s main point of change was
2land reform. The Shah's program of land reform was primarily 
designed to decrease the power of landlords and to modernize Iran's 
agricultural sector, rather than to redistribute the lands to the 
peasants. The 1970's in Iran were characterized by a huge increase 
in oil revenues, followed by a slump, and by the Shah's 
modernization program. The Shah made a number of poor economic 
and political decisions, that combined with environmental 
circumstances, to make the 1979 revolution inevitable.
Chapter three examines post-revolutionary Iran, during 
Ayatollah Khomeini's decade as the leader of this country. This ten 
year period was dominated by an environment shaped by the 
revolution, the war with Iraq, and declining oil revenues. The 
leadership was characterized by factionalism, but Khomeini 
maintained his position as the final arbiter in the regime until his 
death in 1989. The political and economic systems of the two 
regimes were different in a number of ways, but there were 
similarities, too; in particular, it is demonstrated that both regimes 
showed very little development in terms of satisfying the economic 
and political demands of the population. The Khomeini regime might 
be characterized as more popular or more legitimate in the eyes of 
the masses, than the Pahlavi regime, but both used repressive 
methods to deter political opposition and the economic systems 
under both declined rather than seeing growth.
The fourth and final chapter of this thesis examines Iran in the 
two years since Khomeini's death, and speculates on the future 
prospects for this county. The pragmatic faction within the regime 
has generally prevailed in the past two years, and policies have
3focused on postwar reconstruction. The changes in the political 
economy that are taking shape at the present time may allow for 
further development in Iran with practical planning and favorable 
environmental conditions. Using this historical analysis of the 
political economy of Iran, I have attempted to demonstrate that 
development in Iran is certainly possible, but that there has to be a 
willingness on the part of the leadership for this development to take 
place. In the long term, if steps are not taken to satisfy the economic 
and political demands of the people, the kind of instability that led to 
the 1979 revolution may be seen again.
4THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Since the 1960's, Iran has undergone a series of 
transformations in various areas, including agricultural, industrial, 
economic, and political. While these changes were generally 
designed to improve the country, Iran remains a politically and 
economically developing nation. This thesis will analyze the 
interrelationships of politics and economics and their effect on 
political development in Iran. After developing a conceptual and 
theoretical framework, the thesis will examine the political economy 
of Iran from the time of the White Revolution up to the present.
Much of the Western analysis of Iran has been inaccurate, 
particularly over the past two decades. In the 1970's many Western 
analysts believed Iran to be very stable, despite evidence to the 
contrary. Accounts of the revolution have often been oversimplified, 
describing it as a revolt against modernization. In addition, the 
factionalism of the post-revolutionary years has been largely 
misunderstood. In this historical analysis the development of Iran 
will be examined primarily in terms of the changes, or lack thereof, 
in Iran's political economy; obviously there are elements other than 
the political economy that factor into development, but due to
5limitations this study will focus primarily on political and economic 
v ariab les .
A conceptual and theoretical framework of modernization and 
political development and of political economy is necessary to 
proceed with this study. Numerous analysts have improperly 
described the 1979 Revolution as a revolt against the modernization 
programs of the Shah, when in reality the overwhelming 
W esternization that accompanied modernization and the absence of 
political development were much more important factors than was 
modernization. Since these three concepts overlap, they have often 
been used improperly in analysis. Political development must be 
distinguished from other connected concepts in order to analyze 
Iran’s level of development. In addition, a conceptual and theoretical 
framework for political economy must also be employed in order to 
examine development in terms of political economy. Analyzing the 
interaction of the political and economic spheres and the policies 
chosen by the leadership of Iran will indicate the degree of 
development which Iran has achieved.
This thesis will show that the decisions which Iran's leaders 
have made over the past three decades have affected that country's 
development. An examination of the interaction between the 
environment and the decisions made since the White Revolution 
reveals the reasons for the Shah’s downfall, Khomeini’s rise to power, 
and Iran’s general lack of development. Chapter one of this thesis 
gives a conceptual and theoretical framework for political 
development and political economy. This framework will be used 
throughout the thesis to analyze the changes in Iran's political
6economy and the effects this has on development. Chapter two 
examines Iran from the time of the adoption of the reform program, 
known as the White Revolution, up to the 1979 Revolution. In 
particular, the economic and political environment of this time period 
and the decisions made by the Shah's regime will be analyzed, 
especially in regard to their relationship with Iran's development. In 
chapter three the transition from the revolution to the Islamic 
Republic, led by Khomeini, will be studied. In particular, the 
decisions made by Khomeini's regime will be examined in light of the 
revolution, oil revenues and the war with Iraq. Finally, chapter four 
will look at Iran since Khomeini's death and will examine the 
prospects for further development in Iran.
To become a "modern, developed nation" has been an objective 
of the various regimes in Iran throughout this century. Reza Shah 
adopted several of the same measures in Iran that Ataturk had used 
to modernize Turkey, including attempting to reduce the influence 
the religious establishment had in politics. In the early 1950's,
Iranian Prime M inister Muhammad Mossadeqh tried to gain 
independence from Britain and the Soviet Union in order to 
modernize and develop Iran. Mohammad Reza Shah used the oil 
money in the 1970's in his drive to make Iran one of the top five 
powers in the world. Finally, Khomeini offered an Islamic alternative 
to the Western model of development that the Shah had pursued.
7M odernization and P olitical D evelopm ent
Modernization and political development are "analytically 
distinct but actually interrelated" processes, 1 which are related to 
the political and economic systems of a nation. According to Samuel 
Huntington's summary of David Lerner's work, the principal aspects 
of modernization are "urbanization, industrialization, secularization, 
democratization, education, and  media participation."2 The study of 
modernization and political development has been fraught with 
conceptual ambiguity and Western bias. Throughout the nineteenth 
and most of the twentieth centuries analysts saw Western Europe as 
providing the "linear map of man's progress from tradition to 
m o d e rn ity ."3 It was generally assumed that the advanced, liberal 
democracies had arrived and that their past provided a map for 
other countries to follow in their struggle to modernity. As a result, 
analysts often simply examined the histories of the "developed 
nations" and told Third World nations to follow the same steps. This 
oversimplified advice did little to aid the nations in their search for 
m odern ity .
Over the years, many definitions of modernization have been 
offered. In the late 1960's, Samuel P. Huntington stated that 
modernization requires both social mobilization (changes in the
1 James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, Politics in the Middle East, (Boston and Toronto: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1979) 6.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, Order in Changing Societies,  (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1968) 32.
3 James S. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative Politics: The Quest fo r  
T h eo ry  (Lanham, MD and London: University Press o f  America, Inc., 1981) 
48 -4 9 .
8aspirations of individuals, groups and societies) and economic 
development (changes in capabilities).4 Once the process of 
modernization begins there is a fundamental shift in values, attitudes 
and expectations within society. Huntington refers to this as 
modernization at the psychological level. Traditional man expects 
continuity in nature and society; he does not believe man can change 
or control either one. Modern man, however, accepts the possibility 
and desirability of change. This shift in values, attitudes and 
expectations accompanies modernization under all circum stances.5
There is a plethora of definitions of modernization in 
development literature. Some analysts feel that Huntington's overall 
conceptualization of modernization has a conservative Western bias 
(namely his focus on stability and participation). In an attempt to
move away from this bias and to further the understanding of this
phenomenon, James A. Bill and Carl Leiden state that "modernization 
is most concisely defined as the process by which man increasingly 
gains control over his environment."6 The technological and scientific 
revolutions that many societies have undergone are important 
aspects of modernization, but this process is not limited to these 
changes. The increasing control man has over his natural and social 
environments in modernizing society has three dimensions: 1)
technological - the industrialization process; 2) organizational - the 
differentiation and specialization of structures and functions; and, 3)
4 Huntington, 34.
5 Huntington, 32.
6 Bill and Leiden, 3.
9attitudinal - the cultural secularization or rationalization of society.7 
These attitudinal changes are due to the changes in lifestyle that are 
caused by the increasing capacity to change the environment. 
Modernizing man develops a cause/effect (rational) orientation from 
understanding the environment (an example is modern man’s 
understanding that typhoons are caused by shifting ocean tides and 
winds, rather than by a supernatural phenomena).
Another characteristic of modernization is that it is "a process 
in which expectations necessarily race beyond their satisfaction."8 
Once modernization begins, the attitudinal changes that accompany it 
produce expectations that society cannot immediately satisfy. When 
man comes to believe that government is a product of man rather 
than God, expectations of government change. The cause/effect 
(rational) orientation that modernizing man develops often results in 
expectations of change in sociey, such as political participation. This 
is often where the issue of political development is raised. However, 
before addressing development, it is important to realize the extent 
to which Western bias has affected modernization.
Much of the theorizing concerning modernization and 
development has been biased in that it has focused on Western 
systems as the final product of these processes. However, not only 
have the conceptualizations and theories regarding modernization 
been biased, but so too has the process of modernization. The 
adoption of Western traits, norms and values has generally
7 Bill and Hardgrave, 63.
8 Bill and Leiden, 3.
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accompanied the process of modernization; this is often referred to as 
"Westernization". However, the developing countries of the world 
want modernization while they do not want Westernization. This is a 
point that many Western analysts have failed to recognize, including 
those analysts that believed the Iranian Revolution to be a fight 
against modernization. Many within the developing world believe 
that while it is inevitable that their culture will change due to 
modernization, it is not inevitable that their's must become a 
Westernized culture. One Iranian writer has referred to this 
adoption of components of Western culture as "Westoxication." 
Consequently, it is very important to distinguish between 
modernization and Westernization. The developing world wants to 
gain more control over its environment, but it does not want to lose 
its unique history and culture to the developed world. An example 
of this is the opposition to the West that is accompanying the 
growing nationalism in the developing world. For quite some time 
now, modernization and political development have been mired 
down in Western bias, and it has been difficult to separate the 
former two from the latter.
As noted above, the two processes of modernization and 
political development are analytically distinct, but in practice are 
interrelated. According to Bill and Hardgrave "development is most 
usefully understood in terms of a system's response capacity in 
relationship to demands."9 The increasing control over the 
environment and the consequent attitudinal changes that result from
9 Bill and Hardgrave, 67.
11
the modernization process produce demands on the system to which 
it must respond. Here the relationship between the two phenomena 
is apparent.
M odernization has provided the thrust behind increas ing  
demands on political systems throughout the world. To 
effectively respond they must enhance their capacity to 
meet these demands — one way or another.10
The capacity to respond, not the method of response, is the key
element in Bill and Hardgrave's understanding of political
developm en t.
The earlier studies of political development were generally
influenced by the work of Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell. In
Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Almond and 
Powell state - "When we speak of level of political development, we 
really are dealing with three interrelated variables - role 
differentiation, subsystem autonomy, and secularization. There is a 
tendency for these processes of change to vary together."11 
According to the authors, developed systems are characterized first
by structural differentiation which is the differentiation of new
political functions and the development of specialized structures to 
perform these functions. In filling the roles to perform these new 
functions, developing societies begin to value achievement over 
ascription. In addition, increasing subsystem autonomy is a key 
element of developing systems. Groups that function independently
10 Bill and Hardgrave, 67.
11 Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative P olitics: A 
D eve lopm en ta l  A pproach ,  (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 
1966) 306.
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from the government and are able to influence that government are 
a distinguishing component of developed systems according to the 
authors. Finally, while structural differentiation and subsystem 
autonomy are the structural components of development, cultural 
secularization is the attitudinal/cultural component of development. 
The rationalization of authority, or viewing government as a product
of man, rather than as a creation of God, is necessary for
development according to Almond and Powell. The framework given
by these two scholars was used for many years to measure the
political development of nations until valid criticism minimized the 
role of this framework.
There are several problems with Almond and Powell's work. 
First, there is a Western bias. The reliance on subsystem autonomy 
as a distinguishing component of political development suggests that 
all non-dem ocratic-pluralist systems are not developed. In 
examining a developing country like Iran, which is not likely to 
adopt a W estern democratic-pluralist system, this W estern bias 
suggests that there is no hope of Iran developing. In addition, 
cultural secularization as a key element of development takes away 
from the role that religion has played and may continue to play in 
development. For example, Catholicism in Latin America and Islam 
in the Middle East, particularly Iran, may be important components 
of political development. A final criticism comes from Bill and 
H ardgrave:
What they (Almond and Powell) have done in focusing on 
differentiation and secularization is to define political 
developm ent in terms of m odernization. Developm ent
1 3
defined in terms of the vehicles of capability rather than 
in terms of capability itself necessarily leads to the rather 
c lum sy d is tin c tio n  betw een positive  and negative  
development ...12
Bill and Hardgrave's point here is that defining development in terms 
of the vehicles of capability necessarily limits and confuses one’s 
understanding of political development. Bill and Hardgrave’s 
definition of development in terms of capacity to respond to 
demands alleviates the problems that Almond and Powell encounter. 
At the same time, Bill and Hardgrave’s definition is ambiguous. 
Knowing the limitations of Almond and Powell’s work allows one to 
apply some of their ideas to a development framework without 
encountering the same criticism.
A second work that furthered the study of political 
development was Samuel Huntington's book Order in Changing 
Societies. Huntington's focus for development is institutionalization.
Political modernization involves the extension of political 
consciousness to new social groups and the mobilization 
of these groups into politics. Political developm ent 
involves the creation of political institutions sufficiently 
adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent to absorb 
and to order participation of these new groups and to 
promote social and economic change in the society.13
While Huntington’s focus is on institutions, he relies on certain 
elements of Almond and Powell (although Huntington places these 
elements under political modernization rather than political
12 B ill and Hardgrave, 73.
13 Huntington, 266.
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development). Huntington says political modernization includes 
rationalization of authority and differentiation of new political 
functions. Huntington adds a new dimension to political 
development theory, defining institutions as "stable, valued, 
recurring patterns of behavior," and institutionalization as "the 
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and 
s ta b ility ."14 The focus on institutionalization as the key element of 
development is an improvement on Almond and Powell's framework, 
since it focuses on general institution-building as a method of 
developm ent rather than specifying dem ocratic-pluralism  as 
necessary for development, but there are criticisms of Huntington, 
too.
Huntington's focus on stability is problematic - political 
development is not necessarily a stable process. Critics of his work 
contend that Huntington is too concerned with the status quo, making 
his work overly conservative. In addition, just as Bill and Hardgrave 
criticized Almond and Powell for defining development in terms of 
the "vehicles of capability", one could accuse Huntington of the same 
mistake, since institutions can be considered the vehicles of 
capability rather than the capability itself. As such, specific 
recom mendations for development might include institution- 
building, but institutions will not be considered necessary for 
defining development in this paper.
14 Huntington, 12.
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Bill and Hardgrave's ideas on response capacity have been 
referred to, but have not been entirely explained. According to the 
au th o rs ,
D ev elo p m en t dem ands an in te g ra tiv e , re sp o n siv e , 
adaptive, and innovative capacity. Capacity involves sheer 
m agnitude  or scope in po litica l and governm ental 
p e rfo rm a n c e ; r a t io n a l i ty  in a d m in is tra t io n  and
effectiveness in the implementation of public policy.15
By defining political development in terms of capacity to respond to 
demands, rather than structural differentiation and subsystem 
autonomy or institutionalization, the authors have avoided the 
criticisms of the previously discussed scholars; however, their 
ambiguity makes it practically impossible to produce an operational 
definition and thus to determine the level of political development of 
a particular country. Viewing development in terms of response 
capacity means that as a state develops it is able to deliver when the 
populations makes demands. Delivering involves satisfying economic 
and political demands of the people.
According to Bill and Hardgrave, "Political development must 
involve then both the will and the capacity to initiate, absorb, and 
sustain continuous transform ation."16 A key point here is the 
inclusion of the system's ability to initiate transformation, rather 
than simply respond to it. For Bill and Hardgrave political 
development is understood as the capacity of the political system not
15 B ill and Hardgrave, 73.
16 Bill and Hardgrave, 75.
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only to absorb and sustain change, but also to be able to introduce 
and generate it.
In examining the modernization and political development of 
Iran, this study will view political development as it is defined by 
Bill and Hardgrave, focusing on the political and economic aspects of 
the system's capacity to initiate, absorb, and sustain transformation. 
Iran's system obviously lacked the capacity to absorb and sustain 
transformation in the late 1970's, or the revolution would not have 
taken place. Development in terms of response capacity means 
having the capability to satisfy the economic and political demands 
of the popultion. The basic needs of a developing society include life 
sustaining necessities such as food and shelter for the population. In 
addition, sustained economic growth can be considered necessary for 
development. Economic growth provides the system with the ability 
to initiate and absorb certain types of transformation and to provide 
the population with relative economic demands. For example, 
economic growth can help to meet the material demands of the 
population, which often increase as modernization takes place.
Finally, development depends on the capacity of the system to 
respond to the population's political demands and/or needs. Often 
these demands include avenues within the system for interest 
articulation and political participation. There is no specific form of 
interest articulation or political participation that is necessary, as 
long as the political demands of the population are satisfied.
Effective response capacity to political demands can be 
somewhat measured by examining the nature and strength of the 
opposition to the regime. If the opposition is violent and it is strong
1 7
among the population, it would indicate that the regime has not 
delivered in a manner satisfactory to the people. Political 
development viewed in terms of response capacity depends on the 
environment within which the society functions, and on the decisions 
of the governing body. The environment and the decisions affecting 
the political and economic spheres of a state often contribute to 
determining the degree of development of that state.
In the case study of Iran, the interrelated nature of 
modernization and political development and political economy is 
apparent, particularly looking at the policies of the 1970's. Just prior 
to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, James Bill and Carl Leiden stated 
that satisfying material demands (in the Middle East) may 
temporarily alleviate economic discontent, but eventually there 
"must be an enduring capacity to satisfy continually and effectively 
the social and political needs of all groups and classes in the 
so c ie ty ."17 The Iranian Revolution was, at least in part, a response to 
the regime's failure to satisfy the social and political needs of the 
groups and classes in Iran. The interrelationship of the politics and 
economics of Iran, and its effects upon the political development of 
this country is the subject of this study.
P olitica l Econom y
It is obvious that modernization and political development 
involve numerous facets in society; for this study, the development
17 Bill and Leiden, 15.
of Iran will be examined in terms of political economy. While it has 
been recognized for quite some time that the political and the 
economic sphere are somehow interconnected, there is no single 
accepted theory of political economy. The concept itself is 
ambiguous. Some scholars, especially political scientists, underscore 
the political basis of economic actions whereas others, particularly 
economists, focus on the economic basis of political actions. For 
example, according to Alan Richards and John Waterbury, political 
economy examines the formulation of public policies that shape the 
allocation of resources within societies and the political consequences 
that flow therefrom .18 This conception of political economy is 
politically based, whereas the Marxist conception views politics as 
being determined by the economic system. According to Marx, there 
is a political superstructure that is entirely dependent on the 
economic substructure of society. For the purposes of this paper 
however, the definition of political economy must take into account 
the interaction and interdependence of the economic and political 
systems, both international and domestic. According to Frieden and 
Lake “international political economy is the study of the interplay of 
economics and politics in the world arena." In the most general 
sense and for the purposes of this paper, "the economy can be 
defined as the system of producing, distributing, and using wealth." 
Politics will be viewed as "the set of institutions and rules by which
18 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy o f  the M iddle East: 
State, Class and Economic Development  (Boulder: W estview Press, 1990) 2.
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social and economic interactions are governed."19 This focus on the 
interdependence of the two areas is applicable not only at the 
international level, but also at the domestic level. In the case of Iran, 
the nation’s dependence on oil sales on the international market 
demonstrates the high degree of interdependence of the two levels.
In this introductory chapter an evaluation of four major 
approaches to the study of international political economy will be 
presented as well as a brief summary of their applicability to Iran. 
The four approaches that will be examined include liberalism,
Marxist and dependency theories, economic nationalism and 
economic internationalism. Since this chapter can only briefly 
examine these methods of studying political economy, further 
reading in each might include: Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes o f  the Wealth o f Nations (liberalism); Karl Marx, 
Capital: A Critique o f  Political Economy (Marxism); Andre Gunder 
Frank, Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (dependency 
theory); Friedrich List, The National System o f  Political Economy 
(economic nationalism); and Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare 
State: Economic Planning and its International Implications (economic 
internationalism). Of these four, elements of liberalism, dependency 
theories and economic nationalism will be most useful in the study of 
Iran's political economy.
The first approach is liberalism. Based primarily on the 
writings of Adam Smith, liberalism develops from the assumption
19 Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake, International P o li tica l  Economy:  
Perspective on Global Power and Wealth (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) 1.
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that individuals are actuated by their desire to better their condition 
through material gain. Smith viewed individuals as rational, utility- 
maximizing actors who are capable of making cost-benefit 
c a lcu la tio n s.20 Smith argued, assuming perfect competition, that 
individuals acting in their own economic interest would, as a 
collectivity, maximize collective well-being. Consequently, Smith 
placed primary emphasis on the “free and unfettered operation of 
the market for social well-being.”21 Smith argued that there was an 
invisible hand that would guide the market. In its original 
formulation, liberalism stressed laissez-faire capitalism, the rights of 
property, limited government, and social Darwinism.22 It is 
primarily this liberal approach upon which the global market 
economy has been structured.
There are several criticisms of liberalism that must be taken 
into account. First, Smith in particular and liberalism in general, 
focus on economic motives to the exclusion of others, including 
culture and politics. In addition, perfect competition may work in 
theory but it is not realistic; thus, the social well-being that should 
derive as a result of individuals seeking their own material gain in 
competition with one another cannot be realized. According to 
Martin Carnoy, “Smith never proves, or even argues that individuals
20 Frieden and Lake, 6.
21 Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984) 24.
22 R. Dan Walleri, "The Political Economy Literature on North-South Relations: 
Alternative Approaches and Empirical Evidence," In terna tiona l S tudies  
Q uarterly  22 (Dec. 1978) 593.
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seeking material gain in competition with one another is not a vice, 
in the sense that it tends to injure others.”23 Consequently, one can 
see that the market does not function as it should and this presents 
problems for liberal theorists. "For it means that the 'invisible hand' 
does not work and that 'someone' has to take into his own hands the 
task of guiding the economy towards certain specific normative 
g o a ls ."24 This means that the interference that liberalism so 
vehemently opposes is needed if the economy is to function properly. 
Regardless of criticism, liberalism has largely shaped the global 
economy and is the basis of many of the developed countries' 
econom ies.
R. Dan W alleri suggests that third world countries are on the 
“periphery” of the global economy. The liberal solution offered to 
them has been further incorporation and integration into the global 
economy through such policies as the promotion of manufactured 
exports and import substitution policies.25 These policies have been 
tried however, and while they have helped some countries improve 
their economic standing, those countries have generally remained in 
the “ sem i-periphery”26 Iran, it can be argued, may be classified as
23 Camoy, 25.
24 Shigeto Tsuru, "Towards a New Political Economy," Economics in the Future: 
Towards a New Paradigm  Kurt Dopfer, ed., (Boulder: W estview Press, 1976) 109- 
110.
25 Walleri, 593.
26 Semi-periphery is a term used by Hooshang Amirahmadi to describe 
countries that are distinguished by their "expanding, but limited, home and 
export markets, technological dependency, and integration into the world 
econom y. Hooshang Amirahmadi, Revolution and Economic Transition: The 
Iranian Experience  (New York: State University o f New York Press, 1990) 1.
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either a peripheral or a semi-peripheral country. Liberalism helps 
explain the world capitalist economy within which Iran must 
operate; however, it cannot fully explain the political and economic 
policies under which Iran has functioned since the White Revolution.
The second approach to be examined includes Marxist and 
dependency theories. Marx described society as consisting of a base 
or substructure and a superstructure. The economic system of 
society is the substructure, whereas the superstructure consists of all 
other social systems, including the cultural and political elements. 
According to Martin Carnoy there are three fundamental elements in 
Marxism. First, Marx viewed the material conditions of society as the 
basis of its social structure and argued that the form of state emerges 
from the relations of production. Second, the state emerging from 
the relations of production does not represent the common good, but 
is the political expression of the class structure inherent in 
production. Finally, the state in bourgeois society is the repressive 
arm of the bourgeoisie which keeps class antagonisms in check.27 
One other important element of M arx’s argument is that in observing 
the relations of production, Marx argued that the basis of the 
capitalist economy is the exploitation of labor by capital.
Consequently, the relationship between these two classes is one of a 
zero-sum  nature.28 Marx argued that eventually the exploitation of 
labor would lead to class consciousness which would result in a social
27 Camoy, 46-47.
28 Frieden and Lake, 8.
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revolution overthrowing the bourgeoisie. This would be followed by 
a transformation of the system to socialism and then to communism.
Marxist theory has been criticized as deterministic, dogmatic 
and static.29 History has not yet borne out the theory of Marxism, 
and in fact, the Soviet Union has arguably been an improper 
application of Marxism since it went directly from a stage of 
feudalism to one of socialism. Marxism is partially appropriate for 
an analysis of Iran because of the strong relationship it proposes 
between the economic and political spheres. However, the 1979 
Revolution cannot be explained entirely in terms of class 
consciousness and dialectical materialism; indigenous cultural factors, 
which Marxism ignores, have to be taken into account when 
examining Iran's revolution. Due to certain cultural aspects in Iran, 
and particularly with respect to Islam, Marxism has not been 
incorporated into Iran's political agenda, and is not likely to be. 
Muslim people who strongly believe in God (Allah) cannot accept a 
theory that is atheistic in nature. In addition, the Islamic principle 
that recognizes the right of private property is contradictory to 
Marxist theory. As a result of these problems and others, including 
the fear of Soviet imperialism, which has carried the Marxist banner 
since the Soviet Revolution, Iran has resisted communist movements 
(with the exception of the Tudeh party which was very careful to 
avoid any connection to Marxism, and which regained some support 
during the 1979 Revolution). Thus, Marxism is useful in this case
29 Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories o f  Comparative Politics: The Search fo r  a 
P a r a d ig m  (Boulder: W estview Press, 1981), 404.
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study due to the strong connections it purports between economic 
and politics, but the political agenda which it proposes is viewed as 
inappropriate for Iran.
Dependency theories, both Marxist and non-Marxist, have also 
made important contributions to understanding the international 
political economy (it should be noted that dependency arguments 
cannot properly be termed "theories" since they do not provide 
predictable generalizations; however, they are useful in describing 
certain phenomena). The main premise of dependency theories is 
that "foreign penetration has created underdevelopm ent."30 This has 
created a situation in which underdeveloped states have been 
exploited by the more developed states. Theotonio dos Santos 
offered a description of dependency that was meant to describe the 
position of Latin America, but which can be applied to other less 
developed countries of the world;
By dependence we mean a situation in which the 
econom y of certain  countries is conditioned by the 
development and expansion of another economy to which 
the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence 
between two or more economies, and between these and 
world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some 
countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be 
self-sustain ing , while other countries (the dependent 
ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, 
which can have either a positive or a negative effect on 
their imm ediate developm ent.31
30 Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein, eds., Latin America: The Struggle 
with Dependency and Beyond  (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company 
Inc., 1974) 26.
31 Theotonio dos Santos, "The Structure o f Dependence," The American  
Economic Review  LX (May, 1970) 231-36, as quoted in Chilcote and Edelstein, 26.
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Underdevelopment is understood to be created by and relative to the 
developed countries, which at an earlier time may have been 
undeveloped but were never underdeve loped .  Since development is 
understood here as a relative state, those countries that are now 
considered developed were never underdeveloped because there 
were no developed states to compare them to. According to Ronald 
Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein, it was the process of the expansion of 
capitalism, through which now developed countries progressed, 
which brought about the underdevelopment of many parts of Latin 
America (and it can be argued many other parts of the Third 
W o rld ).32 As capitalism expanded, parts of Latin America and many 
other areas (including parts of the Middle East) were seen as 
suppliers of raw materials and new markets for finished goods.
In order to explain inequality, dependency theories divide the 
states of the world into two economic categories - the industrialized 
capitalist developed states, considered the “core,” (or center) and the 
developing states, which in turn are dominated by the former within 
the international capitalist system. These latter states are considered 
the “periphery.” There are several different types of dependency 
theories. These types include the M arxist-derived world-system 
theory, the dependencia theories coming from Latin American 
scholars, and the structural theory of imperialism, as argued in 
particular by Johan Galtung. In general, the theories are similar, 
diverging mostly in regards to the solution to underdevelopment.
32 Chilcote and Edelstein, 27.
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Galtung describes the world economy in terms of core and periphery 
and examines both external and internal imperialism.
Rather than focus on class formation, however, Galtung 
concentrates on the exploitation contained in the patterns 
of interaction that have arisen between the center and 
periphery states as a consequence of class interests.33
He views developed nations (core) and the underdeveloped nations 
(periphery) as each containing a core and a periphery, where the 
elites within each nation formed their own core and the periphery 
contained the masses. Galtung argues that there are bonds between 
the cores of the dependent countries and the cores of the developed 
countries. External imperialism is the exploitation of the 
underdeveloped countries (periphery) by the developed countries 
(core), whereas internal imperialism is the exploitation of masses 
within a country (periphery) by that country’s elites (core). This 
typology is helpful in describing Iran, both prior to and after the 
revolution. The internal and external imperialism that has 
dominated Iran will be examined in this study, as will it's effects on 
development in Iran.
While many dependency theorists agree regarding this 
structural argument, there are differences as to whether the solution 
lies in the elites of the underdeveloped nations reforming themselves 
and breaking the ties with the developed nations or if the solution is 
socio-political revolution that overthrows the reigning leaders of the
33 Walleri, 609.
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underdeveloped countries and breaks the bonds of dependency with 
the developed nations.
R egardless of the differences ... m ost dependency 
theorists would probably argue that the particular form 
in which capitalism  has m olded the dom estic class 
structures and external relations of the periphery states 
precludes the possibility of genuine national development 
in the Third W orld within the context provided by the 
present international order.34
While there are many criticisms of dependency theories, 
especially since there is no single agreed-upon solution, the basic 
elements of dependency arguments can be applied to Iran.
According to Hooshang Amirahmadi, by the time of the Iranian 
revolution in 1979, Iran had experienced almost three decades of a 
“dependent capitalist growth path.” This semi-peripheral country, as 
Amirahmadi describes it, had pursued, rather unsuccessfully, 
strategies of im port-substitution industrialization and export 
promotion throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s.35 Iran’s dependence 
on oil sales for the largest share of its revenues made that country 
dependent on the world capitalist economy in general and on the 
world oil market in particular. The major economic boom years of 
1973-74 brought huge revenues to Iran which were mainly spent on 
material and human expansion of the civilian and military 
bureaucracies. This expansion brought several problems including
34 Walleri, 611.
33 Amirahmadi, 1.
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personnel shortages which resulted in sharp increases in wages, and 
policies encouraging private accumulation which brought increased 
demand and thus shortages of producer and consumer goods, leading 
to additional price increases. In addition, the boom made Iran even 
more dependent on the capitalist world market for the sale of its 
single-commodity export. When the economic bust of 1976-77 
arrived Iran was completely unprepared. The boom had extended 
the economy past its “material, human, institutional and 
infrastructural capacities.” In 1975 the country was caught up in 
deficit spending, and with the bust, the economy only worsened.36 
Even after the Revolution and the policies of the new regime, which 
nationalized the oil industry, Iran remains a peripheral country that 
is dependent on the world capitalist market.
The third approach in political economy studies that will be 
evaluated and applied to Iran is economic nationalism. This 
approach concentrates on promoting national economic growth and 
development, primarily through an active state role. According to 
Friedrich List, writing in Germany in 1885, the free trade approach 
advocated by liberalism is only successful if all nations follow the 
principles of free trade. In addition, List states:
I saw clearly that free competition between two nations 
which are highly civilized can only be mutually beneficial 
in case both of them are in a nearly equal position of 
industrial development, and that any nation which owing 
to m isfortunes is behind others in industry, commerce, 
and navigation, while she nevertheless possesses the 
m ental and m ateria l m eans fo r develop ing  those
36 Amirahmadi, 19-21.
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acquisitions, m ust firs t of all strengthen her own 
individual powers, in order to fit herself to enter into free 
competition with more advanced nations.37
Even though List was writing this in 1885, in response to England's 
domination of world trade and Germany's poor economic position, 
this line of argument has become the basis of economic nationalism.
According to R. Dan Walleri, List departed from the liberal 
school in two significant ways. First, List emphasized the role of the 
state in promoting economic growth and development, rather than 
relying on the self-regulating mechanism of the market. He argued 
that the state should eliminate internal barriers to trade, subsidize 
the creation of infrastructure, and promote home industry and the 
export of manufactures. List believed this could be accomplished 
through the utilization of protective tariffs in order for “infant 
industries" to flourish and for the home government to collect 
revenues to further develop the economic sphere.38 According to 
List, under a system of perfectly free competition with more 
advanced industrial nations, a less developed nation "can never 
attain to a perfectly developed manufacturing power of its own, nor 
to perfect national independence, without protective duties."39
Since the first publication of Friedrich List's book in 1885, 
numerous refinements and criticisms of economic nationalism and its 
policies have been added. According to Walleri, economic
37 Friedrich List, The National System o f  Political Economy  (New York: 
Augustus M. K elley Publishers, 1966) xxvii.
38 Walleri, 596.
39 List, 316.
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nationalists seek to encourage domestically owned industries by 
promoting manufactured exports through import substitution. "The 
goal ... is to enhance national power, which is considered 
incompatible with foreign control over key areas of the economy."40 
George Macesich includes among the goals of economic nationalism: 
"as much self-sufficiency as possible, public ownership and public 
enterprise in key economic sectors, and/or intensive regulation and 
control of private and domestic and foreign enterprise."41 T he  
specific policies that states adopt and their level of success obviously 
varies with social, economic and political considerations. Coughlin, 
Chrystal and Wood state that economic nationalism is based on 
protectionist trade policies which have the specific goal of expanding 
the domestic production in protected industries, benefitting the 
owners, workers, and suppliers of resources to those protected 
industries. Protectionist policies include tariffs, quotas, regulatory 
barriers, subsidies and exchange controls. These policies also benefit 
the government imposing them in light of the additional revenues. 
Those hurt by these policies, other than foreign interests, are the 
domestic consumers who have less choice and are hurt by lack of 
competitive pricing, and the other domestic producers who are not 
p ro tec ted .42
40 Walleri, 596.
41 George M acesich, Economic Nationalism and S tability  (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1985) 2.
42 Cletus C. Coughlin, K. Alec Chrystal, and Geoffrey E. Wood, "Protectionist 
Trade Policies: A Survey o f Theory, Evidence, and Rationale," In te r n a t io n a l  
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Pow er and Wealth  by Jeffry A. 
Frieden and David A. Lake, eds., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) 25.
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There are numerous criticisms of economic nationalism and its 
policies. The policy of import substitution was quite popular in Latin 
America in the 1950's, although it was eventually unsuccessful. In 
order to induce industrialization, these countries restricted imports 
of manufactured goods through tariff protection. There were at least 
two undesirable consequences that resulted from these policies:
1) the countries restricted imports to essential foodstuff and raw 
materials, which gave luxury items the most protection - the policies 
were meant to stimulate production for the home market, but the 
luxury items produced were not in high demand in the developing 
countries; 2) the firms that were developing behind the protective 
tariffs were often too inefficient to compete on the world market and 
thus had to remain protected.43 Eventually, the policies were 
designated as unsuccessful and the countries abandoned them. 
According to Melvyn Krauss, while protection is designed to give life 
to "infant industries" it often sets an environment in which these 
industries have no prospect of maturing and in which too many 
people benefit from the protection to give it up. In addition to the 
problems above, Krauss criticizes protectionism due to wasted 
resources, corruption of government officials by the protected and 
vise versa, lack of entrepreneurship and export stagnation.44 
Finally, economic nationalism has also been criticized for
43 W alleri, 597.
44 Melvyn B. Krauss, Development Without Aid: Growth, Poverty  and  
G o v e rn m e n t  (New York: McGraw Hill book Company, 1983) 11-12.
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concentrating on industrialization that is inappropriate and 
unneeded, usually at the expense of agriculture.
In the case of Iran, particularly since the Revolution, economic 
nationalist policies were adopted but have been very limited in their 
success. In the summer of 1979 the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government (PRG) and the Revolutionary Council (RC) nationalized 
banks, insurance companies and major industries, including the oil 
industry which came under the National Iranian Oil Company.45 
There were immediate constraints on the success of these policies 
however. In the years immediately following the Revolution there 
was such factionalism within the leadership that it led to the 
inability on the part of the leaders to “formulate a coherent economic 
policy and regulate its relations with the domestic opposition and the 
international com m unity.”46 There were some significant changes in 
the structure of the economy, including redistribution of resources 
and redefinition of national priorities, but constraints such as 
factionalism, the war with Iraq, and the limited control over the 
production, export and price of oil due to the world market and OPEC, 
left Iran in the position of a peripheral state dependent on the world 
capitalist economy.
The fourth and final approach in political economy is economic 
internationalism. Unlike the liberal and economic nationalist 
positions which "rest on the assumption that the key to progress in 
the Third World lies in a replication of the Western experience,"
45 Amirahmadi, 23.
46 Amirahmadi, 8.
economic internationalism , demands a fundamental transform ation 
of the present international order.47 This view is generally criticized 
as an unrealistic theory, but many scholars concerned with the Third 
World feel that it is at least worthy of some merit. Economic 
internationalism believes the solution to inequality within and 
between nations lies in the redistribution of resources on a global 
level. Economic internationalism argues that “since there is no world 
government to intervene in the international market to correct the 
uneven development among nations, it is essential that international 
institutions be created to deal with problems arising for the 
periphery sta tes.”48 It was with this argument in mind that the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was 
created in 1964 over the objections of the core nations in order to 
deal with the plight of the Third World.
The major objective of UNCTAD has been to secure non­
reciprocal tariff reductions by the core states on manufactured 
exports from the entire developing world. This is viewed as an 
alternative to direct aid programs (which have failed for various 
reasons) and as a method of indirect redistribution.49 N onreciprocal 
trade agreements are designed to allow periphery states to gain a 
larger share of the world market, and consequently to stimulate the 
development of Third World economies. However, due to several 
factors, including the "unlikelihood that the center states will allow
47 Walleri, 599.
48 Walleri, 600.
49 Walleri, 601.
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such a broad and nonreciprocal liberalization in trade" and the lack 
of unity among the developing nations, UNCTAD has not been as 
successful as initially hoped.50
There are several criticisms of economic internationalism.
Some argue that it ignores the realities of the market. In addition, 
many (Marxists and dependency theorists) argue that in order to 
eliminate the mechanisms of neocolonialism between the center and 
periphery states, a radical transformation of the present 
international economic order would be required; this would include a 
massive redistribution of wealth. Since this would obviously hurt 
those in power it is likely that the powerful center states will oppose 
this transformation. In regards to Iran, economic internationalism is 
an approach that could aid in its economic development, but it is 
unlikely that this solution will materialize. Iran has often held an 
anti-imperialist attitude, but its record of disagreement with other 
developing nations is extensive; Iran has contributed to the disunity 
in OPEC and has had problems with the other countries in the Gulf 
area. Consequently, Iran has contributed to the lack of unity that is 
needed to force this redistribution. Despite the efforts of UNCTAD 
and other developmental programs, the prospects for an 
internationalist economic order to evolve are not good.
In examining the evolving political economy of Iran, all four of 
the above approaches must be understood. First, liberalism provides 
the general framework for understanding the international capitalist 
economy within which Iran must function. Second, dependency
50 Walleri, 602.
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theories aid in understanding Iran's position as a peripheral country 
in the world economy, particularly due to its status as a single­
commodity exporter. In addition, protective trade policies, as 
espoused in economic nationalism, were adopted by the Iranian 
government in order to promote economic growth and development. 
Finally, while economic internationalism is unlikely to see its 
solutions implemented on a global scale it is important if only to 
understand Iran's and other developing countries' efforts to dispel 
the inequality between center and periphery states. As following 
chapters examine Iran’s development, the role of these various 
arguments and their applicability to Iran's political economy will be 
d e m o n s tra te d .
3 6
FROM REFORM TO REVOLUTION
This chapter examines Iran from the time of the reform 
program adopted in 1963, referred to as the White Revolution, to the 
revolution of 1979. The chapter analyzes the interaction of the 
environment and the decisions made by the regime, and the effects 
of that interaction on the political economy. The Shah's regime 
enacted a number of reforms in the 1960's in order to weaken the 
power of political opponents and to modernize Iran. These reforms 
have been regarded by many scholars to be the beginning point of 
the popular discontent that led to the 1979 Revolution. Later, a more 
intensive modernization program was pursued following the windfall 
of oil revenues in the early 1970's. At the same time, the Shah chose 
not to pursue any corresponding changes in the political sphere.
Rising expectations were created as a result of modernization, but 
they met with economic decline and the absence of political 
development. Eventually, this contributed to the overwhelming 
popular discontent that led to the revolution.
Over the period of 1963 to 1977, the Iranian regime, led by 
Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, made a number of poor political and 
economic decisions. In this period Iran grew more and more 
dependent on the oil market and the international capitalist 
economy. The country's economy experienced astounding growth
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following the oil price increases in 1973, and at one point Iran's rate 
of industrial growth was the highest in the world.1 However, despite 
this economic windfall, the Iranian regime was either unable to or 
chose not to address the needs of the Iranian people. The Shah 
employed various measures, from reform to brutal repression, in his 
attempt to maintain his power and realize his vision for Iran, but by 
1979 none of his actions had gone far enough to save his regime.
The White Revolution
On June 26, 1963 the Shah put his new reform program, the 
"White Revolution", into effect.2 The White Revolution was a 
program of reform aiming not at transformation of the Iranian 
society, but largely aimed at securing the Shah's position, and 
underm ining his opposition.3 In the early 1960's, the Shah was 
being pressured by the United States to undertake some reform 
measures, since the U.S. believed that Iran would eventually fall into 
communist hands, and the only way to postpone this was through 
reform. American John W. Bowling prepared a report for the 
Kennedy administration which recommended the Shah adopt 
fourteen points of reform, including land reform and relaxation of 
political repression.
1 Nikki Keddi, The Roots o f  Revolution: An Interpretive H istory o f  Modern Iran 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981) 162.
2 Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy o f  Modern Iran: Despotism and  
P seudo-M odern ism , 1 9 26-1979  (New York and London: New York University 
Press, 1981) 225.
3 As such, the use o f the term "revolution" is misleading since it is 
appropriately used to indicate a fundamental transformation in society.
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The Kennedy adm inistration considered land reform  an 
effective deterrent against com m unist expansion or an 
agrarian revolution of the Chinese type and a prerequisite 
for the success of any industrialization program.4
The Shah, feeling pressure from the United States, and seeing an
opportunity to modernize Iran, while strengthening his position,
chose to adopt several points of reform. Originally, the programme
included six points, although over several years more were added
until as many as eighteen were included. Of these, probably the
most important point was land reform.
A program of redistribution of arable land was started by
Prime M inister Ali Amini and his minister of agriculture, Hassan
Arsanjani. Under Amini the first phase of redistribution successfully
distributed land to a significant proportion of the peasantry and
Amini became quite popular. As a result, the Shah saw the prime
minister as a threat and forced both Amini and Arsanjani to resign.5
According to Nikki Keddi, "the best estimate is that something like 9
percent of Iran's peasants got land in this first phase," which is not
insignificant compared to later phases. The reform was continued
after Amini's removal, but it was unequal; some landlords
maintained some of the best quality land whereas peasants received
varying amounts of generally lower quality land.6 The reform was
meant to undermine the semifeudal forms of landownership rather
4 Mohsen Milani, The Making o f  Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to 
Islamic Republic ,  (Boulder and London: W estview Press, 1988) 80.
5 Milani, 84-85.
6 Keddi, 162.
than to distribute land on a more egalitarian basis. The landowners, 
or khans, were seen as a bar to development and to central 
government control of the countryside. The khans  were often tribal 
leaders and had considerable influence over the peasants. They 
could be brutal, but they provided a support structure to the 
agricultural system, including providing seed, irrigation, and medical 
services to the peasants, that the government did not replace in its 
redistribution scheme.
In the second and third phases of the land reform program, 
reforms were much more conservative. Once the central government 
had undermined the landlords' {khans) power, regularizing the 
system was pursued, rather than redistribution.7 Phase Two of the 
land reform program, beginning in 1965, set limits on landowners, 
but provided them with options, including purchasing the peasants' 
rights of the use of land, assuming that the peasants were willing. 
Phase Three was an attempt to eliminate the tenancy relations in 
farming; it coincided with the government's creating farm 
corporations, to facilitate the mechanization of farming. The peasants 
were forced to transfer the use of their land permanently to the farm 
corporations in exchange for shares equivalent to the value of their 
land and other farm assets. The peasants saw this as a reversal, 
reverting them back to their previous status of agricultural 
la b o u re rs .8 Thus, the peasants did not receive the benefits that they
7 Keddi, 162.
8 M.H. Pesaran, "Economic Developm ent and Revolutionary Upheavals in 
Iran," in Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil, Haleh Afshar, ed. (Albany: State 
University o f New York Press, 1985) 28.
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expected from land reform and the removal of the landlords was not 
as extensive as planned. In addition, the regime failed to fill the 
organizational and physical vacuum created by the "half-hearted 
removal of the landlords".9 The government did not provide the 
necessary capital for the peasants who had acquired lands and did 
not create a sufficient infrastructure in the rural regions to assist 
new landowners in managing the land.10 As a result, the agricultural 
sector’s production declined drastically and Iran became a net 
importer of agricultural products.
A large part of the White Revolution was a drive towards 
modernization (viewed by the Shah as obtaining Western 
technology), both in agriculture and in industry. In the later phases 
of land reform W estern equipment and technology were brought into 
Iran. Unfortunately, according to Nikki Keddi, this equipment and 
technology were inappropriate for Iran's soil and were improperly 
u se d .11 As a consequence of this and of the overall restructuring of 
the agricultural economy Iran's agricultural system was badly 
dam aged . During the second and third phases of land reform, very 
few peasants could make a living off the land, so they migrated to 
the cities. This phenomenon and its consequences will be examined 
la ter.
Muhammad Reza Shah also pursued a policy of settling the 
nomads, concurrent with his land reform policy. The nomads were
9 Pesaran, 29.
10 Milani, 86.
11 Keddi, 163.
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not settled through force of arms but instead were deprived of their 
livelihood. Nomadism was not considered "modern" in regard to 
economic and political considerations and as such was to be 
eliminated. "Land reform may never have had primarily economic 
goals; a major aim was to cut landlord power and bring peasants and 
nomads under direct government control, and this was 
acco m p lish ed ."12 Bringing nomads and peasants under government 
control, and lessening the power of the landlords was designed to 
strengthen the Shah and to modernize the rural areas of the country. 
However, the restructuring eventually demonstrated that the 
traditional mode of production performed better than the 'modern' 
system because:
both farm  corpora tions and ag ri-businesses are (at 
d ifferen t levels) purely un institu tional and ahistorical 
inventions, transplanted into a given social fram ework 
from the air. Both these 'modern' systems destroyed the 
technical characteristics and politiconom ic relations of 
Iranian agriculture, and replaced them with com pletely 
alien and ill-adapted technological and institutional forms.
If it is clear why an attem pt to create traditional 
Iranian-type village units of production in California would 
fail absolutely, then it should be equally clear why the 
uncritical app lica tion  of C aliforn ian  in stitu tions and 
technology to Iranian agriculture failed so m iserably.13
In his desire to make Iran into one of the most powerful states in the 
world, the Shah chose inappropriate methods which damaged Iran 
rather than strengthening it.
12 Keddi, 225.
13 Katouzian, 311.
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In addition to land reform there were five other original points 
in the White Revolution. The second most controversial point 
following land reform was electoral reform. This included granting 
women the right to vote and to be elected to the M ajl is  (other 
reforms concerning women's rights would later be added, including 
changing divorce laws). The clergy in particular were opposed to this 
reform. In addition, there were points concerning the nationalization 
of woods and forests, and the creation of a ’literacy corps'. Finally, 
other economic reforms included the denationalization of state 
monopolies in order to finance the land reform programme and 
company profit-sharing for industrial w orkers.14 While these points 
were seemingly in the interest of the Iranian people, they were 
pursued only if they were perceived to be capable of strengthening 
the Shah's position, or at least not weakening it.
There was an early challenge to the White Revolution that 
came from neither the National Front nor the Tudeh  Party, 15 but 
from the religious community. This challenge was unsuccessful but 
it provided the ulama with a learning experience that would be 
invaluable in the 1979 revolution. According to Homa Katouzian, 
there were three religious tendencies that were part of the challenge. 
The conservative branch was against the land reform, women's 
rights', and against the potential power hegemony of the Shah. The 
anti-despotic group within the religious community was not opposed
14 Katouzian, 225.
These two groups had been strong inthe early 1950's and were both still in 
existence, although their power had been seriously reduced.
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to the spirit of the reforms, but was wary of the return of despotism 
and secularism (as under Reza Shah). The radical-democratic 
tendency consisted of advocates that identified with Musaddiq and 
the Popular Movement; they were opposed to the 1953 coup, its 
resulting dictatorship, and also to the threat of despotism.
Katouzian defines despotism as the monopoly of both absolute 
and arbitrary power. She states that it destroys any functional 
distinction between the social classes, because it turns everyone into 
an object of the state.16 As a result of this fear of despotism the 
religious community spearheaded a movement against the regime. 
This movement gained momentum in the holy month of M u h a rr a m  
and on 6 June 1963, massive riots broke out all over Iran. The Shah 
ordered troops to "shoot to kill" and the massacre continued for three 
days. There is no proper estimate of the number killed, but the best 
guess is that the country as a whole had to have lost a minimum of at 
least two thousand.17 At the time of the uprising the Shah was in a 
powerful position, both militarily and politically, and was able to 
quickly meet the challenge. The uprising was not purely religious, 
nor did it come from only a single religious tendency; it was an 
insurrection of the peop le  against the s ta te , which happened to be 
led by the clergy. The common denominator was anti-despotism - as 
it would be in the 1979 Revolution.
16 Katouzian, 227.
17 Katouzian, 227-28.
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Migration to Urban Areas
As suggested previously, the second and third phases of land 
reform did not provide adequately for many peasants; as a 
consequence of the land reform policies and of growing urbanization, 
many peasants migrated to the cities for jobs. The modernization 
program the Shah was pursuing was bringing in industry and the job 
market was broadening, especially in urban areas. In fact, Iran 
experienced a labor shortage; but the jobs available were mostly for 
skilled and semi-skilled labor. The vast majority of the migrating 
peasants had no training for these available jobs and consequently 
many were unemployed.
Between 1962 and 1971, more than two million Iranians 
migrated from towns to the cities. Following 1973, eight percent of 
the rural population left for cities each year.18 The increasing share 
of the population that migrated to the cities is shown below.
Urban Share of Iran's Total Population 
Y ear P e rcen tag e
1956 31%
1966 38%
1975 45%
1980's (expected) 60%
The figures above are based upon 
figures given by Charles I s s a w i . 1 ^
18 H ossein Bashiriyeh, The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962-82  (London and
Canberra: Croom Helm Ltd., 1984) 88.
^  Charles Issawi, "The Iranian Economy 1925-1975: Fifty Years o f Economic
Development," in Iran Under the Pahlavis,  George Lcnczowski, ed. (Stanford,
CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978) 138.
This massive urban migration contributed to numerous problems 
besides the previously mentioned unemployment. A serious housing 
shortage developed in the cities, particularly in Tehran. In addition, 
housing prices and living costs skyrocketed. This must be considered 
in addition to the loss of agricultural sufficiency that accompanied 
the changes in technology and the land reform.
Some of the economic problems mentioned above were 
temporarily offset by the tremendous increase in oil revenues in the 
early 1970’s. The Shah used part of the revenues to alleviate some 
material demands of the population. In this same period the Shah 
made a number of poor economic and political decisions. These 
decisions combined with environmental circumstances and 
eventually led to the downfall of the Shah.
Economic Growth in Iran
According to Homa Katouzian, the Shah combined pseudo­
modernism, pseudonationalism and despotism. His dream, pursued 
by oil revenues and much to his detriment and the detriment of the 
Iranian people, was:
to 'modernize' the Iranian political economy by means of 
investing in heavy industry, creating a consumer boom 
through im port-substitution consum er durables which 
would keep the well-to-do and the educated classes 
quiet, destroying traditional forms of agriculture and the 
nomadic way of life, which were both difficult to control 
politically and a sign of social 'backwardness', and 
importing the latest and most sophisticated technology so
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that all the world would admit ... that Iran was on the 
road to becoming 'the Japan of the Middle East' ...20
This dream was partially realized, due primarily to the incredible
economic opportunities afforded by oil wealth. However, due to poor
economic and political decisions, combined with circumstances both
internal and external to Iran, the Shah's dream was not entirely
realized and in fact, in his pursuance of this dream, he managed to
lead his people to the point of no return, where the revolution
became inevitable.
Up to the 1970's oil wealth had increased gradually. Then in
1973 oil prices quadrupled, due to OPEC, and this led to a sharp rise
in oil revenues for Iran.
As the figures above demonstrate, Iran's oil revenues in 1974 were 
more than seven times that of 1972. The result of this tremendous 
increase in oil revenues was explosive growth in Iran's economy. In
1973-74 the real gross national income grew by 34 percent and in
1974-75, it grew by 42 percent.22 This incredible growth afforded
1970
1972
1974
1975
Iran's Oil Revenues 
I $ 1.1 billion
$ 2.4 billion 
$17.4 billion 
$20.0 billion(estimated)
The figures above are based upon figures given  
by Charles Issaw i.21
20 Katouzian, 237-38.
21 Issawi, 137.
22 Issawi, 137.
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Iran great economic opportunities, but it also resulted in severe 
imbalances in the economy.
For a short period in the 1970's Iran experienced the highest 
rate of industrial growth in the world.23 Per capita income rose from 
$180 per year in 1972, to $1,521 per year in 1974/75. 24 
Immediately following the 1973 oil boom, the Shah adjusted the total 
expenditure for the Fifth Plan (1973-78) to $120 billion, $100 billion 
of which was to come from oil revenues. Compared to the Fourth 
Plan's actual total expenditure of $10 billion, this adjustment was 
astronomical. The Shah dictated this revision of the plan despite 
warnings from econom ists;25 the oil market declined drastically a 
few years later, and the Fifth Plan was characterized by deficit 
spending .
During the 1970's, the Shah decided that the oil revenues be 
spent on a wide array of projects (the number of projects and the 
amount of spending exceeded the revenues by the latter part of the 
decade). These included expenditures on the infrastructure, 
education, ventures abroad, subsidies to various industrial projects, 
welfare projects, and heavy military outlays.26 The table below, 
adapted from Massoud Karshenas, gives an indication of the 
expenditures of the regime between 1970 and 1976.
23 Keddi, 162.
24 Norriss Hetherington, 363.
25 Bashiriyeh, 86.
26 Gail Cook Johnson, High-Level Manpower in Iran: From Hidden Conflict to 
C r is i s  (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980) 96-7.
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Com position o f  central governm ent 
1977. (Percentages) 27
consumption expenditure 1970-
1970 1976
G eneral expenditure 68.9 68.1
General administration 30.9 19.6
Military expenditure 38.0 48.5
S p ecific  expenditure 31.1 3.1.8
Education 14.6 12.2
Health 4.2 4.5
Social welfare 1.1 1.7
Agriculture 2.5 6.6
Transport and communication 3.3 1.1
Miscellaneous 5.3 9.1
Tpttd , 100.0 100.0
(bn Rials) (135.2) (1 1 7 0 .0 )
As can be seen from the table above, in the specific expenditure
category, agriculture and the miscellaneous category benefitted the
m o st.28 Overall however, military expenditures increased the most 
dramatically, from 38.0 percent to 48.5 percent of the central 
government consumption expenditure between 1970 and 1976.
Iran's military expenditures rose drastically over the years of
the Shah’s reign. According to Mohsen Milani, defense expenditures 
rose from $77 million in 1970 to more than $7.8 billion in 1978. In 
1973 Nixon promised the Shah he could purchase America's most 
sophisticated weaponry, with the exception of nuclear weapons.29
27 Massoud Karshenas, Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) 195.
28 Agriculture expenditures mainly consisted o f food subsidies, and the 
m iscellaneous category included art and culture, physical education, 
manpower, urban and rural developm ent, public u tilities, com m erce, mining
and housing, environm ental and regional developm ent.
29 Milani, 166.
W estern eagerness to sell billions of dollars of m ilitary
equipm ent to Iran each year was reinforced  by the
economic drain on the West caused by the OPEC price rise;
arm s p u rch ases seem ed a fin e  way to recy c le
p e tro d o lla rs .30
The military expenditures allowed American military suppliers like 
Grumman, Lockheed and Westinghouse to take over key positions in 
Iran 's econom y,31 and Iran became nearly totally dependent on 
petroleum as its source of foreign exchange. The economic growth 
that Iran experienced at this time was advantageous to some 
Iranians, but it could have been more beneficial to the population in 
general had economic policy been better planned.
The astronomical economic growth and the modernization 
scheme of the regime brought numerous jobs into Iran. The Fifth 
Plan anticipated a serious labor shortage, especially at the 
professional, skilled and semi-skilled levels. Jobs were mainly in 
industry, mining, construction and the service industry. Efforts were 
made to increase female employment and to upgrade the labor force 
through expanded education and vocational training.32 However, in 
general the Iranian population lacked the training for the kind of 
jobs that were being created. As a result, a large number of 
foreigners were hired to work in Iran, particularly in the developing 
industrial sector of the economy. Foreigners, particularly
30 Keddi, 176.
31 Keddi, 176.
32 Issawi, 140.
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W esterners, were paid much more than Iranians, and were given 
benefits that citizens did not receive and could not afford. This 
would later lead to growing resentment of foreigners in Iran and 
would be an issue in the 1979 Revolution.
A great amount of Iran's oil wealth was put towards rapid 
industrialization. Presented with great oil wealth and with domestic 
demand for consumer products as a result of these revenues, the 
Shah chose not to take the slower path of economic growth based on 
labor-intensive industry. Instead, industrial expansion was guided 
toward developing the capital-intensive oil industry first, and 
industries specializing in the manufacturing of consumer durables 
seco n d .33 The oil industry was developed first because it was 
believed that revenues would continue to increase and that this 
increase could be put toward continued modernization. Higher 
incomes and subsidized prices, resulting from increased oil revenues, 
led to increased consumption - while the population grew at a 3 
percent rate, the demand for consumer goods rose by 12 percent 
a n n u a lly .34 In response to this demand, not only was 
industrialization aimed at producing consumer goods, but a policy of 
trade liberalization was also adopted. In 1974, the government 
introduced a wide liberalization on imports; the most popular 
imports included food products, textiles, refrigerators, gas cookers, 
water heaters, furniture item, television sets, radios, and
33 Johnson, 95-6.
34 Bashiriyeh, 101.
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a u to m o b ile s .35 Many of the trade restrictions and high-rate tariffs 
adopted in the 1960's were lifted and/or reduced and certain 
exchange controls were removed in 1974.36 Problems resulted from 
both the rapid industrialization and the liberalization of trade, 
including state maldistribution. Income gaps widened throughout 
the country, including between the rich and poor, and between the 
city and the countryside.
The rapid growth of non-oil exports was a major goal of Iran's 
trade policy, but the "government's export-promotion activities were 
inadequate and ineffective."37 Iran’s economic foundation narrowed 
instead of broadening; this meant that if and when problems 
developed in the oil export sector, Iran would be unable to rely on 
other areas to balance those problems out. In the 1970's oil strength 
and rising prices were uppermost in the Shah's mind. The 
government's concern with this internal balance overshadowed the 
goals of export promotion. The share of the oil and gas sectors in the 
total government revenues rose from 55 percent in the Fourth Plan 
to approximately 78 percent in the Fifth Plan, and their share in total 
current foreign exchange rose from 76 percent in the former plan 
years to 85 percent in the latter.38 This open door to trade and its 
consequent sharp rise in imports, along with rapid industrialization, 
led to dependency.
35 Kavoussi, 458.
3(> Bashiriyeh, 87.
37 Kavoussi, 459.
38 Pesaran, 33.
Iran became dependent on the single-commodity export of oil 
(particularly for foreign exchange), and on the international capitalist 
economy, especially for imports. In turn, the increase of imports 
added to the huge bottlenecks the country was experiencing.39 In 
addition, the country also became increasingly dependent on foreign 
technology and expertise; the growing foreign presence and the high 
wages paid to foreigners added to the problems of housing scarcity 
and increasing costs of living that Iran experienced at this time. 
Dependence on foreign trade and skill allowed for exploitation. For 
example, the Shah signed an agreement with the United States which 
stated that if an American committed a crime on Iranian soil, it was 
up to the US, not Iran, to punish that crime. The lack of any serious 
efforts at non-oil export expansion or import substitution in Iran's 
industrialization played a large role in this increasing dependence. It 
is probable that if either one of these policies had been successfully 
pursued, Iran’s economy would not have fluctuated with the 
changing oil market. Diversifying the economic foundation through 
incremental steps would have meant slower modernization, but it 
would have also allowed Iran to train its citizens, thus reducing 
reliance on foreign workers, and to broaden its revenue base beyond 
dependence on petrodollars. Eventually, Iran was characterized by 
overwhelming dependency, inflation, exaggerated income inequality, 
and unbalanced growth.
39 For example, the storage and transportation o f food items that needed 
refrigeration was inadequate and consequently food rotted before it reached 
the Iranian consum er.
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Economic Problems
A relationship of dependency was developed between Iran and 
the West, especially the United States. According to Galtung's theory 
of structural dependency, the international sphere is characterized 
by core/periphery relations, in which developed states function as 
the core and developing states are considered the periphery. In 
addition, within states there is a core/periphery relationship 
between the elite and the masses. Galtung's theory is quite useful in 
examining Iran during the 1970's. Iran was dependent on the sale of 
oil revenues on the international capitalist market and on the West 
for a variety of imports, including food and intermediate goods for its 
industries. By the time the oil market slowed down in the mid- 
1970's, Iran was already tied to the West. In order to continue the 
modernization program that the Shah envisioned, it was necessary to 
sign trade agreements with the West, especially the U.S., wherein 
Iran agreed to recycle its petrodollars by buying a large amount of 
Western goods in exchange for loans and special deals.
At the same time, there was also a core/periphery relationship 
within Iran. The Shah and the rest of the elite within the state made 
up the core, while the non-elite made up the periphery. Iran thus fit 
Galtung's model of internal imperialism; the state-society 
relationship was one in which the society was subordinate to the 
state. The state controlled the economic sector to a high degree 
through state capitalism, and the distribution of wealth was also 
controlled by the state. The results of this structural dependency 
(both internal and external) were exploitation and uneven 
development. Iran, as a part of the periphery in the international
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scheme, was exploited by W est.40 In addition, despite the Shah's 
vision of a "modern" Iran, the country remained underdeveloped, 
and internally was characterized by uneven development. The rural 
areas were left far behind the urban sectors, and the lower and 
middle classes were not incorporated into the political structure. 
Iran's dependency on the superpowers and its uneven internal 
growth were two of the factors leading to the revolution.
As discussed above, the oil boom led the Shah to direct
revenues to be spent on a wide array of projects. The Fifth Plan 
assumed more oil money would be incoming each year. In 1974-75 
oil revenues dropped sharply and the government faced a deficit of 
$1.7 billion.41 At the same time, higher incomes and subsidized 
prices resulted in increased consumption and demand. Where the 
population grew by a 3% rate, the demand for consumer goods rose 
by 12% annually, and consequently inflation rose rapidly.
Comparative Inflation Figures. 1973-77
Official K avhan
Com pound 93.8% 200%
Annual Ave. 18.0% 50%
The above figures were obtained
from H ossein B ashiriyeh.4 2
40 Iran imported goods that were inoperable and was still forced to pay for 
them, and often had domestic policy dictated by the U.S. government.
41 Bashiriyeh, 101.
42 Bashiriyeh, 101.
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Despite the wide discrepancy, the above figures demonstrate the 
high inflation rate Iran experienced in these years. Price increases 
surpassed wage increases. The cost of living index shot up - in 
1973/74 it went up by 11.2%, in 1974/75 it went by 15.5%, and it 
continued to climb in following years.43 Accompanying the inflation 
and the resulting increases in the cost of living were widening 
income gaps.
Income gaps widened in all major dimensions in Iran, 
particularly after 1974. According to Nikki Keddi, the gaps between 
the top and bottom of the income ladder, between the city and the 
countryside, within the city and within the countryside, all widened. 
Iran still had money, but primarily the rich were subsidized.44 
Looking at the figures for the shares of national consumption in the 
year 1976, it is seen that the top 10% of the Iranian population 
enjoyed more than one-third of the county's consumption.
Conversely, the lowest 10% of the population only accounted for 2-3% 
of the country's consumption.45 During the 1960-70's, the poor in 
Iran did not get necessarily poorer, but the vast increase in the 
wealth of the rich and the conspicuous consumption of the elite was 
seen all around. Overall, the poor may have gained materially in 
these years, but they perceived themselves as becoming worse off in
43 Issawi, 137.
44 Keddi, 174.
45 Norriss S. Hetherington, "Industrialization and Revolution in Iran: Forced 
Progress o f Unmet Expectations," Middle East Journal, Vol. 36, no. 3, (Summer 
1982) 364-65.
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relation to others. This, along with little upward mobility led to 
increasing vocal discontent.
The poor were not the only ones left behind by the elitist social 
order that remained despite the Shah's ambitious modernization 
plan; the expanding middle class was also frustrated due to the lack 
of any serious political reform. Limited upward mobility and little 
prospect for economic improvement in the lower and middle classes 
was prevalent. According to Gail Cook Johnson, the continued 
backwardness of both public and private institutions resulted in the 
failure of industrialization because it did not integrate the emerging 
educated middle and working classes.46 Actually, it is better to 
characterize this not as the failure of industrialization, but to view it 
in terms of modernizing society without concurrently working 
towards political development. The Shah wanted all the technology 
and expertise that could be brought in from the West, and he also 
even wanted some of the Western social characteristics, but he did 
not want any change in the political order that would result in a 
lessening of his power.
The Shah believed that he could make Iran one of the top five 
powers in the world by the twenty-first century. He increased the 
educational standards and the literacy rate of Iran over the 1960's 
and 1970's. The number of universities was increased and the 
quality of education was improved. More people received a 
university education, although it was still a small portion of the 
population, and this led to the expansion of the professional middle
46 Johnson, 95.
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c la ss .47 While improvements in education, especially Western style 
education, were viewed by the Shah as indispensable to 
modernization, he failed to realize that these same educational 
improvements would lead to discontent among the middle class. 
Students came out of the universities expecting good jobs, assuming 
the education they received was adequate for placement. However, 
the vast majority educated in Iran were limited to the lowest 
managerial positions, which underutilized their skills, while the 
foreign-educated, unless they were very well-connected, also did not 
find rewarding career paths.48
The professional middle class was not only frustrated by the 
limited opportunities in the job market; it was also disappointed by 
the lack of political participation allowed it. The emerging middle 
class was given little if any decision-making authority, despite its' 
increasing expertise. The Shah was not willing to co-opt these people 
into the political structure. Mobilization was encouraged, but 
participation in actual political decision-making was very limited.
The modernization of Iranian society and expanding education 
brought expectations of political development that the Shah was not 
willing to fulfill. In fact, the majority of the Shah's opponents that 
were imprisoned and/or executed between 1972-76 were middle 
class professionals.49 Iranian politics came to be dominated by
47 It must be noted that as with many developing nations, ascriptive rather 
than meritorious standards were used for recruitment to positions o f  authority.
48 Johnson, 98.
49 Hetherington, 364.
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repression rather than co-optation. This was a major factor that 
contributed to the revolutionary environment in Iran in the latter 
years of the 1970's. The revolution, it can be argued, was primarily 
motivated by the intelligentsia of the middle class who wanted 
fundamental change, but could not realize it without turning to the 
clergy to motivate the masses.
The Shah further alienated the population by changing Iran 
from a two-party system (M a rd o m  and Iran Novin), to a single­
party system (R a s ta kh iz ). In the mid-1970's the economic crisis 
(mainly a result of the sharp drop in oil revenues) affected the 
foundations of the regime and prompted the emergence of a short­
lived political phenomena, wherein a new single political party, the 
R astakh iz  or National Resurgence Party, was imposed on Iran in an 
attempt at mass mobilization, particularly of the lower classes. The 
apparent motivation was to check the growth of "industrial 
feudalism", the signs of working class unrest, and the inadequacy of 
the ruling party to incorporate diverse interests and needs. What 
emerged was a populist attempt, based on some redistributive 
measures, but which did not make adequate changes.50 The new 
party had no notable economic impact, but did carry potential for 
political conflict.
The Revolution
By 1977, the economic recession, inflation, urban overcrowding, 
government policies hurting the bazaari classes (repression of small
50 Bashiriyeh, 90-91.
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businesses), glaring income gaps, conspicuous W estern-style 
consumption by the elite, a large foreign presence (and influence), 
and lack of political freedom and participation were all widely felt 
throughout Iran. In response to spreading economic discontent and 
to soften growing international criticism of his regime, the Shah 
appointed Jamshid Amuzegar to the position of Prime Minister and 
initiated a liberalization program. Amuzegar initiated a deflationary 
program that resulted in an increase in unemployment. According to 
Nikki Keddi, this increase in unemployment and other elements of 
the economic recession that Iran experienced in the late 1970's came 
after the expectations of the Iranians had been raised, and this 
created a classic pre-revolutionary situation.51
Other authors offer variations on this primarily economic 
"theory" of revolutions.52 Gail Cook Johnson states that the 
government had to convince the populace to accept the fact of slower 
growth and to lower their heightened expectations; the government's 
repressive measures and policies that m aintained unbalanced growth 
led to social revolution.53 In addition, Hossein Bashiriyeh offers the 
Davies theory of revolution, which is also an economic theory. This 
theory argues that the combination of rapid economic growth 
followed by sudden economic decline drives the population into a 
revolutionary "state of mind". Bashiriyeh states that this generation
51 Keddi, 177.
52 These lack validity as theories since the unidimensional focus on econom ics 
cannot account for other factors that have been essential to revolutions.
53 Johnson, 97.
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of economic discontent on a mass scale, in addition to the emergence 
of some conflict of interest between the state and the upper class, the 
revolutionary mobilisation of the masses, the occurrence of political 
alliance between diverse forces of opposition and wavering of the
regime's foreign support all combined to produce the revolution.54
Here, Bashiriyeh moves beyond the unidimensional economic 
argument and provides a more complete understanding of the causes 
of the revolution.
Another argument that has been applied to the Iranian
Revolution is that it was modernizing too quickly and that the
Iranian people and the clergy did not want to modernize.
The "anti-modernization" thesis, however, is extremely 
m isleading and fails to explain why the revolu tion
occurred in the late 1970's rather than in the two
previous decades when the Shah initiated and accelerated
his program of economic modernization. It also fails to 
explain why a num ber of leading m ujtahids tacitly  
cooperated w ith the Pahlavi regim e until the late
1970 's .55
Modernization, defined in terms of man developing his abilities to 
control the environment, was not the cause of the revolution. The 
W esternization and the absence of political development in terms 
ofsatisfying demands were more instrumental factors in the building 
of the revolutionary fervor.
54 Bashiriyeh, 84.
55 James A. Bill, "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran," M iddle East  
Journal,  Vol. 36, no. 1 (Winter 1982) 26.
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According to Mohsen Milani, the Iranian revolution was a 
complex phenomena that involved numerous factors. Some of the 
primary factors leading to the revolution, according to Milani 
included:
1) political repression and the failure to build institutions
2) organizational and mobilizational capabilities of discontented 
g roups
3) Davies theory that revolutions occur when a period of 
prolonged economic development is followed by a sharp 
reversal, which generates relative deprivation and 
unfulfilled expectations
4) the weakening of the link between dependent nation (Iran) 
and its main foreign supporter (U.S.)
5) the broad coalition forged among the opposition forces, 
which united divergent groups
6) the ideology of Shi'ism, which justified the struggle against 
the Pahlavis, united groups and promised a bright future, 
a n d
7) failure of the Shah's regime to repress the opposition56 
Milani has examined the Iranian Revolution in detail, and suggests 
that the complexity of this revolution has been underestimated. He 
suggests that the revolution occurred partially as a result of the 
modernization strategy of the Shah. The modernizing of Iran created 
a pervasive dualism in the economy and the culture, because it was 
incapable of destroying the traditional sector. In addition, it was
56 Milani, 30.
6 2
characterized by uneven development of the economic and political 
systems - the former was modernized without changing the nature of 
the latter. Finally, the modernization drive had a narrow base of 
support and lacked a solid, supporting ideology.57 The Shah 
continued in his push to modernize, alienating a large portion of the 
population, while at the same time he failed to effectively counter 
the opposition. He considered the nationalistic and communistic 
tendencies to be his greatest threat so he sought to secure the 
support of the lower classes through economic growth and 
concessions.
This strategy was based on the Pollyanna belief that the 
lower classes and the conservative ulama were an effective 
deterrent against the menace of the interm ediary groups,
The regim e was thus unprepared to cope with the 
threats of the traditional forces believing, as it mistakenly 
did, that they were destined to be crushed beneath the 
w heels of progress. Consequently, the Shah's entire 
intelligence network allocated most of its resources to 
combating communism and nationalism  of the Mossadeq 
type, thus giving the Islamic forces ample opportunity to 
expand and m obilize.58
By the time of the revolution, Iran had experienced incredible 
economic growth, which was followed by a rapid decline as a result 
of the bust in the oil market in 1976-77. The Shah had already 
overspent, despite warnings from economic advisors, because he had 
counted on increasing revenues. The expectations (economic, social
57 Milani, 127.
58 Milani, 122.
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and political) of the Iranian people had been heightened, and then 
the regime was unable to meet those expectations. Instead, 
repressive tactics were increasingly employed (there are suggestions 
that the Shah's secret police force, SAVAK, sometimes acted without 
his consent). Tensions mounted and certain events became turning 
points that made the revolution inevitable.
The strength of the opposition increased with these events. 
They included the peaceful rally in Qom, organized by the ulama 
because of a newspaper attack on Khomeini; this later resulted in 
bloody confrontations between government forces and ulama 
supporters in seven cities after the police violently put down the 
first rally. Another event which aided in the building of the 
opposition was the Tabriz uprising. A commemoration of martyrs 
was planned to take place in Tabriz but the government ordered 
police to block people from entering the mosques. Some protestors 
were killed and hundreds more were arrested; in response, protests 
in other cities sprung up and more people were killed. Consequently, 
the forty-day commemorations to the honor the dead became 
increasingly more politically potent.59
A third critical event in the development of the revolution was 
the burning of the Cinema Rex in Abadan in August, 1978. More 
than four hundred people who had been locked in the theater were 
killed. The masses believed the government set the fire to discredit 
its opponents. The entire country was ignited by hatred and the
59 Milani, 191.
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government was forced into a defensive position.60 Finally, on 7 
September 1978, demonstrators refused to obey the curfew set by 
the government and the police opened fire on the crowd. In what 
has become known as Black Friday, there was no certain death count 
- the government stated there were 86 dead, but unofficial estimates 
are as high as 3,000.61 Soon after these events, strikes and more 
demonstrations erupted all over the country. By the Autumn of 1978 
it should have been apparent that there was more than an uprising 
going on in Iran, there was a revolution.
The political and economic decisions of the Shah’s regime 
combined with a variety of environmental circumstances contributed 
to the revolution. The land reform program of the 1960's alienated a 
portion of the population, in addition to destroying the agricultural 
economy. It also caused a large number of peasants to migrate to the 
urban areas, where employment was difficult to find. In large part 
the migrating population became urban slum dwellers. The June 
1963 uprising, which was organized by the ulama, was staged to 
protest a number of the reform programs of the White Revolution. 
The uprising was brutally repressed, but it provided the ulama with 
a lesson that would prove to be valuable in the 1979 revolution. The 
White Revolution has been taken as the starting point of the 
discontent and frustration that was to lead to the 1979 revolution.
The 1970's saw a continuation of some of the reforms started 
in the previous decade. This decade also saw a tremendous increase
60 Katouzian, 344-45.
61 Milani, 193.
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in oil revenues for Iran, followed by a slump in the oil market. The 
quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 brought revenues into Iran that the 
Shah spent on a wide array of projects. Modernization and 
industrialization were pursued. The Shah believed that the oil 
money would continue to increase and that he could make Iran one 
of the top five powers in the world using this projected revenue. The 
Shah ignored economic advisors who told him to choose a strategy 
that would allow for slow sustained growth, and instead he opted to 
pursue a path focused on oil wealth and military strength. The year 
1976 witnessed the beginning of the oil slump that severely 
damaged Iran's economy. Iran had gone into deficit spending and 
the Shah was unable and/or unwilling to make the economic and 
political changes necessary to save his regime. By the time he was 
willing to compromise it was too late. A multigroup coalition had 
formed in opposition to the Shah's regime.
The coalition was formed by a number of groups, including the 
Tudeh  communist party, the liberal nationalist groups that had 
evolved from the National Front Party of the 1950's, the Islamic- 
Marxist guerrilla group known as the Mujahedin, and the ulama who 
were divided into at least two groups, one being the fundamentalists 
who followed the Ayatollah Khomeini. The groups other than the 
clergy did not have the organizational skills necessary to unite the 
masses against the regime to overthrow it. What united all these 
groups was the hatred of the Shah and the desire to unseat him. This 
unifying factor was enough to bring about a revolution, but what 
followed was disagreement over how the new system should
6 6
function. Each group had its own ideas for the new government, but 
eventually Khomeini and the fundamentalists overcame the others.
6 7
THE KHOMEINI DECADE
This chapter examines Iran in the first decade of the post­
revolution period. The political economy of this country changed 
in many ways, but it was not entirely transformed. The monarchy 
was changed to a theocratic system, and the new regime focused 
on ideology to the exclusion of practically everything else for 
quite some time. Positions were obtained in the regime through 
loyalty to the revolution and Islam, rather than technical 
expertise or skill. The economic system was also somewhat 
transformed. Usury was determined to be unlawful and 
numerous industries were nationalized. However, the nature of 
state capitalism that had existed under the Shah had meant a high 
degree of state control of the economy, and the nationalization 
program under Khomeini meant similar control. Private property 
remained intact, despite the ideas of some of the more radical 
elements in the new regime, and promised land reform was very 
limited. The political economy of the new regime (and thus the 
development), while perceived by many as very different than 
that of the Shah, in fact, contained a number of similarities.
Despite high hopes coming out of the revolution, political 
development did not progress as quickly as many had hoped. 
Throughout the first decade of the post-revolutionary period the
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leadership had difficulty providing basic necessities for the 
masses. There were housing shortages and many staple food 
items, such as rice and sugar, were rationed. As will be seen in 
this chapter, economic growth was practically stagnant and the 
leadership often resorted to the use of repressive measures 
against any opposition. Higher positions in the regime were 
generally available only to those who held clerical positions and 
had proved their loyalty to the revolution. Participation for the 
masses was limited to voting in elections that generally offered 
very little choice. In the beginning, Khomeini and the rest of the 
ulama offered Islam as an ideology that promised utopia. 
H ow ever,
Khom eini's early prom ise - that subm ission to God 
would create a just society at home, empower Iran to 
defeat external oppressors and reun ite  the Islam ic 
world in a new power bloc - was largely unfulfilled.1
If political development is viewed as the capacity to respond to
the needs and demands of the people, the worsening economic
conditions and the political repression employed during
Khomeini's reign would indicate that the leaders did not deliver
and thus political development did not progress at the pace that
many expected. The decisions of the leadership of Iran and the
environment within which the leadership functioned largely
shaped the political economy and the consequent political
1 Robin Wright, In the Name o f  God: the Khomeini Decade,  New York : 
Simon and Schuster, 1989, 207.
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development. This chapter examines that environment and the 
those decisions and their effects on development.
The Political Environment
The mass demonstrations, strikes by industrial and oil
workers, bazaaris, civil servants and bank employees had the
maximum disruptive effect on the Shah's regime. By December,
1978, the crisis-ridden regime was close to the point of collapse
and in January 1979,
most major economic sectors had come to a complete 
halt; oil exports had practically stopped, the banking 
system was non-functional, only a few large industries 
rem ained operative , channels of d istribu tion  w ere 
clogged, and services had dropped significantly.2
The multiclass coalition that had come together to overthrow the
Pahlavi regime finally forced the Shah and his family out of Iran
in late January, 1979.
The revolution was in part a rejection of existing models of
development and a search for a different, "indigenous" path of
d eve lopm en t.
The ex isting  socialist and cap ita lis t m odels were 
dism issed for their inappropriateness in building an 
Islam ic society , where concerns for trad itions and 
culture are to be integrated into the political economy. 
M oreover, as noted by President Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
"Western capitalism" is "unjust and exploitative," while 
"Eastern comm unism " "kills private in itiatives" and
2 Hooshang Amirahmadi, Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian  
E x p er ien ce  (Albany, New York: State University o f New York Press, 1990) 
90.
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"instigates antagonism  betw een the state  and the
populace."3
Not only was the revolution a rejection of capitalist and socialist 
models of development, it also involved a rejection of the 
despotism of the Shah, economic frustration and opposition to the 
emphasis on Westernization of the regime. The final choice of an 
Islamic system of development was not unanimously endorsed by 
the various members of the coalition, but it emerged as the 
dominant option, mostly due to Khomeini's popularity and the 
fundamentalists' growing power. The Islamic model was also 
appealing because it "demanded national independence, respect, 
and equal treatment in the world system."4 The primary problem 
of using Islam as a model of development is that it, like any other 
model, cannot give all the specifics needed for development, nor 
can it promise success. Islam does not give a comprehensive 
framework for political and economic systems and their 
functioning. The Quran provides certain rules and guidelines and 
the lives of the Prophet and his followers are taken as examples, 
but there are still wide areas of ambiguity and ideological dispute. 
Consequently, disagreements regarding political, economic and 
social issues arose following the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic, many of which are yet to be resolved.
The period immediately following the revolution and the 
Shah's departure from Iran was marked by a struggle for political
3 Amirahmadi, 114.
4 Amirahmadi, 29.
power. The Shah had appointed Shahpour Bakhtiar, a former 
member of the National Front, as Prime Minister in late December, 
1978. Bakhtiar hoped to establish a social democracy similar to 
some in Western Europe, but by the time he came to the position 
he lacked a popular support base (he had been deserted by his 
former colleagues of the National Front), and the struggle between 
his government and the fundamentalists (the revolutionary clergy 
following Khomeini) ended with the military command 
withdrawing their support from Bakhtiar and consequently 
removing the last basis of Bakhtiar's power. 5
Upon Khomeini's return to Iran on February 1, 1979, he 
declared Bakhtiar's government illegal and "promised to quickly 
announce the formation of a provisional revolutionary 
government to prepare the ground for the establishment of an 
Islamic republic."6 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was one of the 
primary figures in the revolution. Khomeini had been a critic of 
the Shah since the early 1960's. In June 1963, Khomeini had 
attacked the Shah in a passionate oratory, claiming that the 
regime was opposed to Islam and to the existence of the religious 
class. Khomeini was arrested and spent ten months in jail.7 His 
continual criticism eventually led to his exile from Iran, where he 
was able to vocalize his opposition to the Shah even more.
6 Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion o f  Power  (N ew York: St. Martin's Press, 
1980) 48.
6 Mohsen Milani, The Making o f  Iran's Revolution: From Monarchy to 
Islamic Republic  (Boulder and London: W estview Press, 1988) 230.
7 Wright, 50-51.
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Eventually, Khomeini was recognized as probably the most 
tenacious opposition to the Shah.
As discontent grew stronger in the late 1970's, Khomeini 
encouraged revolt from his exile in Iraq, and then from France.
Tapes of Khomeini's speeches speaking out against the monarchy 
were shipped from France to Iran, and played at Friday prayer 
meetings. Khomeini was identified by many within the traditional 
lower and middle classes as a humble and pious clergyman. Other 
groups in the coalition against the Shah, especially the liberal 
nationalists, believed that Khomeini would serve the purpose of 
rallying the masses to revolt, and then he would return to his 
existence as a simple religious teacher, probably in Qom. There 
were a number of factors that allowed Khomeini to take over the 
revolution. He represented strong, charismatic leadership, 
juxtaposed to the Shah's indecisiveness. His genuine charisma 
came from his impassioned eloquence and his absolute sense of 
righteousness. Khomeini was a great communicator; he appealed 
to the masses on a level they understood. In addition, he 
employed an ideological framework that dated back thirteen 
centuries. These factors gave the revolution legitimacy and 
forcefulness that the other groups of the coalition were unable to 
p ro v id e .8
It is perhaps the extraordinarily simplistic approach of 
Khomeini that helped to make his ideas so attractive.
All that was needed, he stated, was "conviction and 
ethical solutions'; it is only then that the country could
8 Wright, 58-59.
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achieve "prosperity and mental exaltation and solve its 
social problem s."9
Contrary to the ideas of the other groups within the coalition,
Khomeini did not return to his simple life as a religious teacher.
Instead, he became the leader of Iran for more than a decade. For
years he had written of Vilayat-i faqih, or "leadership of the
jurisprudent." This neo-platonic theory proposes that an Islamic
republic be established, in which the ulama (clerical
establishment) is considered the proper body to interpret laws
and guide society, and that the most learned ayatollah should be
the final voice in this republic. When the revolution ended and
the country was left to choose its leadership, Khomeini's charisma
combined with the organizational abilities of the ulama created a
constitutional theocracy in Iran that has lasted far longer than
many believed possible.
Apart from Khomeini's leadership abilities and charisma,
one of the most important factors in the ulama's gaining of power
after the revolution was its organizational abilities. Unlike the
other groups in the coalition against the Shah, the ulama had a
built in network from which to rally the masses. The clergy had
continual contact with the masses through the mosques and were
able to influence the masses because of the centrality of religion.
Khomeini's fundamentalist network primarily consisted of his
religious students that had become clergymen with their own
mosques throughout the country. During his exile Khomeini
9 Haleh Afshar, "The Iranian Theocracy," Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil, 
Haleh Afshar, ed. (Albany, New York: State University o f New York Press, 
1985) 225.
maintained contact with a number of these students and during 
the revolutionary buildup he sent messages to these mujtahids 
who in turn relayed them to their congregations at Friday prayer 
meetings. Shi'ism as a centuries-old ideology had a stronger hold 
over the people than the slim offerings of the other groups in the 
coalition. The clergy became the power broker during and after 
the revolution because of its ideological connection to the masses 
and its organizational network. The other groups did not offer a 
strong alternative nor did they have the link to the masses. 
However, the triumph of the fundamentalists was not simply 
realized with Khomeini's return to Iran, but was a slow process 
that took nearly two years.
Within a short time of his return Khomeini asked Mehdi 
Bazargan to head the provisional revolutionary government (PRG) 
until a new constitution could be drawn up and elections could be 
held. At the same time, paralegal organizations created by the 
fundam entalists during the revolution were increasing their 
power. The formation of the PRG and the continuing existence of 
the paralegal organizations of the fundamentalists (such as the 
Revolutionary Guard, the komitehs  and the Islamic Republic 
Party) created a dualism of power in Iran. Milani refers to the 
paralegal organizations of the fundamentalists as a "state within a 
state." Immediately following the revolution there was a struggle 
for power between the fundamentalists, the Islamic liberal 
nationalists and the secular liberal nationalists; soon, however, the 
fundamentalists defeated the nationalists and by 1983 the
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fundamentalists had secured pow er.10 According to Milani, the 
consolidation of power by the fundamentalists occurred over four 
years, in six discernable stages:
1) the fundamentalists created a state within a state through 
the paralegal organizations, which weakened the power 
of the PRG
2) the constitutional basis for a theocracy was laid
3) the new constitution was passed (defeating the orthodox 
ulama and the secular nationalists)
4) the fundam entalists defeated the Islamic nationalists
5) the Cultural Revolution was launched and the Mojahedin's 
violent threat was neutralized, and
6) Consolidation of power was completed and Islamization of 
the society was continued.11
These six stages were not systematically planned by the 
fundamentalists in their search for power, but were adopted as 
the need arose.
The paralegal organizations of the fundamentalists 
developed into strong institutions over time. The power struggle 
between the PRG and the Revolutionary Council, formed by 
Khomeini and the fundamentalists, developed into a struggle 
between President Abol Hasan Bani Sadr (who became president 
with Khomeini's support following Bazargan's resignation) against 
the Islamic Republic Party (IRP). The IRP and other paralegal
10 Milani, 240.
11 Milani, 240.
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organizations consolidated their power and became governmental 
institutions within a short period of time. Neither Bazargan nor 
Bani Sadr had the popular support base to neutralize the paralegal 
organizations and to strengthen their own governmental 
in stitu tio n s .
During this same time period a constitutional basis for a 
theocracy was created. In March 1979, a referendum was held 
which asked voters - "Do you favor an Islamic Republic or a 
monarchy?" No other choices, such as a social democracy, were 
given, and the government claimed 98.2 percent of the more than 
15.7 million votes were cast for an Islamic Republic. The result 
was that May 1, 1979, was declared the first day of the 
"Government of Allah on Earth." The PRG drafted a constitution 
and elections were held for an Assembly of Experts (AOE) to 
revise the constitution. The fundamentalists won many seats in 
the AOE and thus gained a great deal of strength. The AOE was 
given three months to revise the constitution, which in the end 
turned out to be a very different version than the one submitted 
by the PRG.12
The final draft of the constitution consisted of 12 chapters 
and 175 articles. The constitution abolished monarchy and 
created a unique presidential system. In addition, the constitution 
revolved around the concept of the Vilayat-i faqih  or "leadership 
of the jurisprudent." The position of the fa q ih  (jurisprudent 
leader) is understood to have unlimited power, no term length
12 Milani, 261-62 .
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limitations and the divine authority to rule, which means he may 
intervene in the affairs of any branch of the government. The 
constitution recognized Khomeini as the faqih and designated that 
his replacement would be either a single individual or a three to 
five member council. In addition, the constitution adopted an 
official foreign policy of nonalignment.
The constitution not only covered the structure of 
government and the foreign policy, it also incorporated an Islamic 
vision of social justice. In general terms the constitution promised 
to achieve independence, uproot poverty and fulfill human needs. 
More specifically, the goals of the constitution included: securing 
basic needs for all, including housing, food and health care; 
securing full employment for all; providing opportunities for self- 
improvement of individuals; preventing profiteering from the 
labor of others; prohibiting monopolistic, speculative and usurious 
dealings; forbidding extravagance in economic matters; learning 
from experts in science and technology; preventing foreign 
economic dependence; and achieving self-sufficiency in production 
of food and industrial products.13 In addition, Article 44 of the 
constitution divides the economic system into three sectors - 
public, private and cooperative. The constitution was written in 
the Summer and early Fall of 1979, and disputes arose 
immediately, particularly regarding the Vilayat-i faqih.  Despite
13 Amirahmadi, 114.
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the disagreements a referendum was held and the Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran was adopted on 3 December 1979.14
Following the adoption of the constitution, the new 
government concentrated on defeating its remaining opponents. 
Early on the regime used purges to "Islamize" the state. Purges 
were used to clean out the armed forces (2,000-4,000 men were 
purged, mostly due to suspected coup plots), the National Front 
(also suspected of coup plots) and the state bureaucracy.15 In 
addition to eliminating these threats, the regime also concentrated 
on possibly the worst threat to the regime, the left-wing guerrilla 
group known as the Mojahedin.
The Mojahedin is an opposition group which developed a 
three-phase strategy to overthrow the Khomeini regime. The 
Mojahedin first intended to destabilize the regime through 
eliminating key figures and exposing the regime's vulnerability.16 
Second, the group chose to directly confront the regime through 
demonstrations and strikes, hoping to mobilize the masses.
Finally, the Mojahedin believed that mass uprisings would come 
about as a result of the first two steps and that these would bring 
the government toppling down. The elimination of key figures 
and the demonstrations took place, but the third step did not
14 Amirahmadi, 114.
15 Milani, 288.
16 Hundreds o f officia ls and guardsmen were killed in assassinations and 
bombings in this first phase.
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materialize. The government met the opposition with executions, 
violent suppression and terror for more than eighteen m onths.17
Because of their miscalculation, the Mojahedin's violent 
encounter with the Islamic Republic produced the exact 
opposite of what they had hoped to realize: It proved
the invulnerability of the Islamic Republic to guerrilla 
warfare, exposed the weakness of the opposition in 
general and the Mojahedin in particular, invigorated the 
Islamic Republic's security system, and further 
solidified the fundam entalists' position.18
The government responded to the Mojahedin and other 
opposition with violence and suppression. The violence and terror 
reached a peak in 1981/82, and then at the end of the latter year, 
it began to wane. Influenced by some of the more moderate 
elements within the regime, Khomeini issued a declaration to curb 
the worst excesses of the revolutionary organizations responsible 
for the violence against the opposition. The declaration banned 
entering homes, making arrests, conducting searches, and 
confiscating property without legal authorization. The 
revolutionary organizations were reigned in, but their authority 
was by no means taken away.19 The revolutionary organizations 
were some of the primary support bases of the regime, and 
Khomeini was not about to alienate them.
17 Shaul Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic  
R evo lu tion  (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990) 228.
18 Milani, 299.
19 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs, 229.
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The final step in the fundamentalist clergy's struggle was 
the consolidation of power. After Bazargan resigned as head of 
the provisional government, Aboul Hasan Bani Sadr was elected as 
the first president, primarily because he was backed by Khomeini. 
His term lasted less than a year and then Khomeini accepted his 
resignation (there had been disagreements between the two, 
particularly over the American hostage situation). Following Bani 
Sadr's resignation, the Islamic Republic Party was able to gain 
strength, particularly during the elections of October, 1981.
Islamic Republic Party candidate, Ali Khamenei, was elected 
president and other IRP candidates won the Prime M inister and 
Interior M inister seats. Many appointed positions were also 
replaced with IRP men, even down to the township and district 
leve ls .20
C onsolidation of power, institu tion  building, and 
Islamization of the society by the fundamentalists in the 
first four years of the Islam ic Republic proceeded 
s im u lta n e o u s ly  w ith  the  e lim in a tio n  o f th e ir  
op p o n en ts .21
The consolidation of power by the fundamentalists was not 
entirely a smooth path, however. Opposition groups, particularly 
the Mojahedin, managed to inflict serious wounds to the regime, 
especially through assassination of key figures, and the 
fundamentalists themselves were divided over a number of 
issues. The factionalism that developed among the
20 Bakhash, The Reign  o f  the A ya to llahs ,  2 2 4 -2 5 .
21 M ilani, 304.
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fundamentalists has presented obstacles to forming policy since 
the Islamic Republic was created, and is still problematic over a 
decade later.
One of the key elements to understanding the political 
economy of Iran during the Khomeini years is the international 
environment and Iran's foreign policy within that environment.
In the first years of the regime, the foreign policy pursued was 
based on m ilitant Islam, nationalism, regional ambitions, the war 
with Iraq and the slogan of "Neither East nor West." Iran was 
trying to establish independence and to pursue a policy of 
nonalignment as far as the superpowers were concerned. In 
actual policy Iran attempted to export the revolution, particularly 
to other Persian Gulf countries, to establish and maintain distance 
from the superpowers, and to better relations with the Third 
World and Europe.22
The American Hostage Crisis
One of the most important events in the Islamic Republic's 
foreign policy was the American hostage crisis. On 4 November 
1979, looking for a pretext to force the Shah out of the U.S. and to 
oust the liberals (Bazargan and the PRG) from the revolutionary 
government, a previously unknown group calling itself the 
Students Following the Line of the Imam (SFLI), occupied the 
A m erican
22 Bakhash, The Reign  o f  the A ya to llahs ,  217.
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Embassy in Tehran and held 52 American's hostage. The hostages 
were held for more than a year. The U.S. reactions over this time 
period included a failed rescue attempt and more successful 
economic sanctions against Iran. The U.S. froze Iranian assets in 
the U.S. valued at almost $12 billion, it imposed trade embargoes 
against Iran which Western Europe and Japan also imposed, and it 
manipulated the international oil market through Saudi leverage. 
Iran was still quite dependent on the capitalist world economy in 
general (for food items and industrial inputs) and on oil 
production and sales in particular, and consequently the U.S. 
economic sanctions were very damaging to Iran. Both Bazargan 
and Bani Sadr tried to convince Khomeini to allow them to take 
over the hostages and to resolve the situation, but Khomeini 
refused and declared that it would have to wait until the Maj l i s  
(parliament) was elected and could resolve the conflict. This 
particular dispute weakened both Bazargan and Bani Sadr, and 
was a primary cause of both of them leaving office.
After the Majl i s  elections and more than a year of the 
hostages being held, the situation was finally resolved by the 
Algerian Accord. In exchange for the release of the hostages the 
U.S. agreed to not intervene in Iran's internal affairs and to 
prevent the hostages and their families from bringing lawsuits 
against the Iranian government. The U.S. also promised 
cooperation with the Islamic government in bringing lawsuits in 
U.S. courts to extradite the Pahlavi family's wealth. Finally, the 
U.S. released frozen Iranian assets; $7.98 billion was transferred 
to Iran's escrow account in the Bank of England, while $3.67
83
billion was transferred to New York Federal Reserve to cover 
Iran's debts to American banks.23
The results of the hostage crisis and its resolution for Iran 
were both advantageous and damaging. The accord was entirely 
negotiated by the more radical elements within the Iranian 
regime which gave ammunition to the more moderate elements in 
their power struggle. In addition, the hostage situation was 
disadvantageous to Iran and its government because the U.S. 
sanctions badly damaged the country's economy and it hurt 
relations with countries other than the U.S.. The taking of the 
hostages made it difficult for the new regime to get any support at 
the international level, especially when Iraq attacked Iran in 
1980. Conversely, the hostage crisis also held advantages for the 
new Iranian regime. The fundamentalists were able to weaken 
the provisional government during the crisis and were able to 
consolidate their own power. Also, the new regime was perceived 
internally as capable of humiliating a superpower, especially after 
the failed U.S. rescue attempt, and consequently its image and 
power was strengthened. The U.S. hostage situation is only one 
dramatic example of how intertwined foreign and domestic policy 
are in Iran. The factionalism that developed in the regime is 
interrelated with both these policies and they all affect one 
another in policy-making and power struggles.
23 M ilani, 289.
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Factionalism and Economic Policy
While the fundamentalists were able to eliminate the 
opposition and to consolidate their own power, the individuals 
within this group were not entirely in agreement on a number of 
issues. Factions developed regarding particular issues and 
individuals shifted between categories depending on where they 
stood regarding single issues.
Almost immediately after the Revolution, a dis locat ion ,  
or n o n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  developed betw een the 
leadership  and its ideology, leading to ideological 
factionalism within the state. This dislocation occurred 
when the core middle-class leadership faction tried to 
present a middl e -c las s  interpretation of the c ro s s - c l a s s  
and universal Islam. Others within the power bloc, 
however, disagreed and forwarded alternative radical 
( lo w e r -c la s s )  and c o n s e rv a t iv e  ( u p p e r -c la s s )  
p e rsp ec tiv e s .24
Amirahmadi's description of the factionalism that developed is 
open to criticism; especially problematic are his classifications 
according to socioeconomic standing and his failure to point out 
that individuals did not always stay within one category, such as 
radical, but shifted according to the issue. However, he is correct 
in pointing out that there are three main factions that have 
developed and rivaled for power in Iran since the revolution.
Various labels have been applied to these factions, some 
more accurate than others. One of the factions has been referred 
to as the conservatives or hojat i -yes.  The conservatives believe in 
less government intervention in the economy, free enterprise, the
24 A m irahm adi, 98.
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sanctity of private property and in moderation in the export of 
the Islamic Revolution and in foreign policy.25 The core support 
for the hojat i -yes  are wealthy merchants, landlords and some 
high-ranking clergy. The conservatives also oppose public 
planning, state ownership and state management of the economy. 
They are against cooperatives and planned industrialization. 
Conservatives favor the development of agriculture and the 
expansion of services. This faction opposes land reform, the 
increase of direct taxes, limits on the private sector and policies 
against profiteering. However, while this group is in favor of a 
more open economy (the conservatives do not seem to want many 
changes from the economy operated under the Shah), it can also 
be quite culturally impermissive and ideologically strict.26
Ironically, the conservatives have been referred to as 
liberals in some of the literature (this may be because they are in 
favor of liberal economic policies, i.e. free trade, which are 
conservative in the sense that they are a continuation of the 
status quo from the Shah's regime). In addition, some writers 
refer to this faction as non-interventionist. Non-interventionists 
believe that the unregulated "Islamic" market economy, relying on 
the private sector, is best for economic growth. Government 
intervention should only be a last resort and should only be
25 Milani, 305.
26 Amirahmadi, 118-21.
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tem p o ra ry .26 Regardless of what title is applied, this faction 
experienced its peak of power immediately following the 
revolution, from 1979-81. During the leadership terms of 
Bazargan and Bani Sadr, the conservatives (or /to /a ri-yes/libe ra ls) 
were able to block some of the major socioeconomic reforms, that 
others tried to pass. Even after their most powerful period during 
the first two years of the new regime, the conservatives were able 
to maintain some strength in the government, particularly 
through positions in the Council of Guardians.
The second faction that developed in the Islamic Republic 
has typically been referred to as the radicals, or the maktabis .
The radicals favor centralized economic planning, nationalization 
of major industries, limits on private property, aggressive export 
of the Islamic Revolution, and minimal relations with the United 
States. Their arguments generally focus on social justice and 
redistribution of wealth. Their support comes primarily from the 
lower and lower-middle classes, along with many of the 
revolutionary organizations.28 The radicals, or maktabis ,  advocate 
public ownership and management of large enterprises and 
nationalization of foreign trade. However, they are not entirely 
against free markets or small private holdings.
The radicals advocate major land, tax, and socioeconomic reforms. 
In addition, they are sympathetic to agriculture, for consumption
26 Ali Rahnema and Farhad Nomani, The Secular M iracle: Religion, Politics  
and Economic Policy in Iran (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1990) 
256.
28 M ilani, 305.
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not export, and are opposed to the expansion of the service sector 
of the economy. Radicals have been characterized by their goal of 
self-reliance and their confrontational foreign policy, particularly 
in regards to the U.S. and the war with Iraq.29
After weakening the conservatives in 1981, the radicals 
became the dominant faction within the regime and maintained 
their strong position until 1984/1985. They were particularly 
powerful in the Maj l i s  (Iranian parliament). The radicals pursued 
the war with Iraq, refusing to consider a cease-fire or resolution 
until Saddam Hussein of Iraq was removed as the president of 
that country. In domestic policy, the radicals tried to push 
through land and tax reforms, but the laws were often struck 
down by the more conservative Council of Guardians, a council 
responsible for ensuring that laws did not violate the principles of 
Islam. The constitution, which was adopted in 1980, had several 
articles that justified socioeconomic reforms and land reform. The 
Majl i s  pushed through a Law for the Transfer and Revival of 
Land but Khomeini suspended it due to the upheaval that was 
caused by suggestion of any land reform. In addition, the radicals 
tried to increase direct taxation and tried to persuade the 
wealthier individuals in Iran that they should voluntarily pay 
more in religious taxes. However, the tax system in Iran lacks a 
strong collection history and very little was changed by the 
radicals. In their years in power, the radicals were more 
influential in foreign policy and cultural issues than they were in
29 Am irahm adi, 18-21 .
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the economic sector. The radicals had the misfortune of being in 
power when Iran experienced some hard times, particularly 
setbacks in the war, and as a result they were blamed for many of 
Iran's problems and their power was weakened.
The third and final faction is often called the pragmatist or 
moderate faction. This group falls in between the other two and it 
is led by the current president of the republic, Hashemi 
Rafsanjani. The pragmatists seek to find a compromise between a 
laissez-faire and a state interventionist economy. The 
pragm atists/m oderates advocate a mixed approach to the 
economic system. They believe in a controlled market economy, 
guided and regulated by state planning and limited public 
ownership and management, with a complementary role played 
by privately organized cooperatives. The pragmatists find their 
support base among a wide range of classes and institutions. The 
newer middle-class, the technocrats and a number of the religious 
"intelligentsia" are supportive of the moderate faction.30 The 
pragmatists defend oil-led industrialization as the proper basis for 
rapid economic growth and advocate controlled free trade and 
guarded openness to the international economy. They are 
generally less ideological than the other two factions and more 
flexible in their interpretation of Islamic law.
The pragmatists began to gain power through Khomeini's 
support in 1984-85 and have generally been the dominant faction 
since that time. The setbacks in the war with Iraq and the
30 A m irahm adi, 118-21 .
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economic problems that Iran was facing at that time under the 
radicals convinced Khomeini to support the pragmatists in their 
policies. The pragmatists believed that Iran had to procure
weapons and parts for its American-built systems if it was going
to continue its fight against Iraq. It was the pragmatist faction 
that was responsible for the arms-for-hostages deal, which 
temporarily renewed Iran's relationship with the U.S. as its arms
supplier. In addition, the pragmatists have tried to turn the
economy around and move it toward rapid growth, focusing on a 
strategy of improving trade relations, especially with other 
developing nations, Europe and Japan. The postwar proclamations 
by Khomeini supported the policies of the moderates, particularly 
his endorsement of factionalism and his call for a limited market 
economy and controlled free international trade.31 The 
pragmatists have managed to stay strong since the cease-fire with 
Iraq and since Khomeini's death, but their power may suffer the 
same deterioration that the other factions faced. It all depends on 
the circumstances of the time.
W hereas radicals are unfortunate to have held power 
during a period of general economic decline, 
conservatives are having a difficult time defending a 
more or less a la Shah model that failed to benefit the 
majority. Under these circumstances, the centrists 
(pragmatists) are finding it easier to defend a mixed 
ap p ro ach .32
31 One o f the only exceptions to Khomeini's pragmatic leanings at the end 
o f his rule, was the Rushdie incident, in which he declared that Salman 
Rushdie's book Satanic Verses  was blasphemous and that the author should 
be assassinated for his anti-Islamic writing.
32 Amirahmadi, 124.
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Most of the members of the three factions that hold 
positions within the regime come from traditional middle class 
backgrounds. However, the ideological conflicts within this middle 
class leadership are often mistaken for interclass political 
co n flic ts .33 In addition, it is difficult to label an individual as 
belonging to a specific faction, since individuals shift depending on 
the issue. For example, a person may be regarded as a radical 
when the issue of private property is raised, but he may be 
considered a pragmatist in regard to openness to the 
international economy and foreign relations. As with any country 
adjusting to life after a revolution, there are questions of how to 
best approach the political and economic systems. In Iran, the 
shift in political power among the factions can generally be 
identified with periods of economic changes.
As following sections will demonstrate, there was a general 
decline in the economy, especially after 1984 when the recession 
began. As a result, those in power, the radicals, were hurt 
politically, and the power shifted to others, the pragmatists:
This new mood of pragmatism did not imply political 
liberalization, a deemphasis on Islamic orthodoxy, or 
greater tolerance for political opposition ... Rather, the 
new mood suggested a desire by the religious leaders to 
restore economic and administrative order and a 
readiness on their part to allow the technocrats to look 
after the economy, while the clerics retained power,
33 A m irahm adi, 118.
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controlled politics, saw after ideology, and made basic 
decisions.34
The political economy of Iran following the revolution up until 
Khomeini's death was affected by a number of factors and 
underwent various political, economic and social changes.
However, it is important to understand that up until his death 
Khomeini was the final arbiter in the republic, due to his charisma 
and his position as faqih.  Apart from Khomeini, other factors that 
have affected the political economy of Iran include the dispute 
over land reform, the economic structure and policies adopted, oil 
policy and the war with Iraq.
Land Reform
Land reform has been a particularly divisive issue in the 
Islamic Republic. With the revolution and the breakdown of civil 
authority following the revolution, land seizures began to take 
place in the countryside. The three groups which initiated these 
seizures include the revolutionary government and its 
organizations, the landlords and the peasants. Mostly the 
peasants seized land early on: "They were spurred on by the
breakdown of authority and the absence of landlords, and 
Khomaini's call on the farmers to plant extensively in the first 
year of the Islamic Republic."35 The seizures led to extensive 
battles within the government over the sanctity of private
34 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs,  231.
35 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs,  197.
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property versus the social justice of redistribution of wealth. In 
general, two government institutions represented the two sides of 
land reform: the Majlis generally argued for land reform and 
redistribution, whereas the Council of Guardians struck down 
reform measures in favor of the right to private property.
In September, 1979, the provisional government received 
approval of the Revolutionary Council for a Law for the Transfer 
and Revival of Land. The bill was very limited in nature, and 
basically left the private sector untouched. Then in 1980, the 
constitution was approved, including articles providing legal 
justification for more extensive land reform. Following this, a 
huge dispute broke out and Khomeini ended up suspending the 
land reform bill and the articles on land reform.36 The suspension 
resulted in havoc across the countryside, since seizures and 
distribution had already begun.
Then again in December 1982, another land reform measure 
was approved by the Maj l i s , only to be struck down a short time 
later. The measure did not aim at redistribution, but at ensuring 
more extensive leasing under forms of contract, such as 
sharecropping, rental and partnerships. Landlords were allowed 
to hold up to three times (in some cases four times) the size of an 
average family farm and were allowed to lease the rest of their 
holdings, giving children of landlords priority. However, in 
January, 1983, the Council of Guardians struck down this measure
36 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the A ya to llahs ,  200.
9 3
for violating Islamic and constitutional principles.37 Land reform 
attempts continued to go back and forth in the government, 
leaving a legacy of disputes.
The doctrinal and constitu tional disputes over 
land and property rem ained unresolved. Because of 
u n au tho rized  se izu res, law s approved  and then 
suspended, very large amounts of land rem ained in 
d ispu te  betw een landow ners and v illagers, p rivate  
citizens and the government.38
The ideological dispute revolves around the question of 
whether Islam weighs more in favor of private property or social 
justice (meaning redistribution of property and other wealth). 
Islam recognizes both, but the government of Iran has not been 
able to find an acceptable balance between these two. In practice, 
it is difficult to find this balance in most societies. Khomeini, as 
the f a q ih ,  had the power to make a final decision on the matter 
but he chose instead to vacillate between the two sides, never 
satisfactorily deciding the matter. Had he made a decision, there 
is no certainty that his choice would not have weakened his power 
and led to instability in Iran. There were many reform efforts on
the part of the Majl is ,  but almost all of them were defeated by the
Council of Guardians.
One exception to this pattern is the Temporary Cultivation 
Law of 1986. In October of that year, the Majl i s  approved a bill to 
transfer ownership of so-called "temporary cultivation
37 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs, 209-10.
38 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs, 211.
9 4
agricultural land" from owners to cultivators who had actually 
been working the land. The land seizures that followed the 
revolution created widespread disorder and landlord-peasant 
disputes. In order to deal with these problems the Supreme 
Judicial Council issued a decree in 1980, leaving the cultivation of 
disputed lands in the hands of those who had cultivated the land 
the previous year. This arrangement was renewed each year and 
the land was referred to as temporary cultivation land. By 1986, 
the regime had to face the pressure of settling the status of these 
lands, so they passed the temporary cultivation law.
In its final form, the law provided that ownership of
agricultural land throughout the country, which as of 
March 20, 1981, was in the hands of the non-owner
cultivators, would be transferred perm anently to the 
cultivators, provided they were landless or land-poor, 
lacked an adequate source of incom e other than 
agriculture, and were resident in the locality.39
The law was by no means aimed at a comprehensive 
redistribution of land; rather, it was passed to settle the status of 
the particular lands that fell under the category of temporary 
cultivation lands. In fact, landowners were still allowed to keep 
some land if they were considered "needy" (sometimes this
amounted up to three times the amount of land considered
necessary for maintaining a rural family).40 Nevertheless, the law
39 Shaul Bakhash, "The Politics o f Land, Law, and Social Justice in Iran, " 
Middle East Journal 43 (Spring, 1989) 190.
40 Bakhash, "The Politics o f Land, Law, and Social Justice in Iran," 191.
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still revived the whole argument of private property versus social 
justice, which in all probability could only have been resolved by 
Khomeini, but was not.
Khomeini, it turned out had spoken in favor both of 
social justice and of a strict interpretation of Islamic 
law. He had denigrated the large landow ners as 
exploiters of the peasantry and also warned against 
unlawful attacks on private property, had approved the 
1980 land reform law and then suspended it, had sided 
at times with the Council of Guardians and the narrow 
interpreters and at other times with the Majlis and the 
broad interpreters on m atters of property and Islamic 
law ... Khomeini's rulings and views, in other words, 
although considered authoritative, lent them selves to 
varying in terpretations.41
Khomeini was cryptic not only when it came to land reform, 
but also regarding other issues. His support of the political 
factions varied, as did his stand on economic questions, such as 
the degree of state versus private control that Iran should adopt. 
In describing Khomeini’s political style it has been said that he 
would "go with the wind." When a controversy arose in the 
republic, Khomeini would usually wait to see which side would 
emerge as stronger and then would go with that side. While he 
can be criticized for not taking more decisive stands on certain 
matters, it may be that his choice not to step in and personally 
resolve problematic questions may have contributed to his power; 
whereas if he had taken one side of a controversial matter, he 
may have been weakened. If he had made a number of
41 Bakhash, "The P olitics o f  Land, Law, and Social Justice in Iran," 198.
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unpopular decisions, rather than avoiding conflict, he might have 
weakened his own position.
The Econom y of the IR I
The economy of Iran, during the ten years that Khomeini 
guided the country, was characterized by both dependency on the 
international capitalist economy, and by an active state role and 
policies that suggest economic nationalism. As will be further 
examined later, Iran has been unable to fully break its 
dependency and become entirely self-reliant, as was hoped in the 
beginning of the new republic. Iran is highly dependent on its oil 
sales on the capitalist world market for foreign currency, which it 
depends on for the imports it desperately needs, the most 
important of which is food. One example of Iran's dependence on 
the world oil market is seen in the years following 1984, when the 
world experienced an oil glut and oil prices declined rapidly;
Iran's economy was hurt and the recession which the country was
entering was intensified. At the same time, the new government
was still insisting that it was possible for Iran to become self-
reliant and was adopting policies that were protectionist in nature; 
thus, the rhetoric and the policies were suggestive of economic 
nationalism. The economy of the Islamic Republic was affected by 
a number of factors during its first ten years, including the 
economy inherited from the previous regime, the structure and 
policies that the new government adopted, the international 
environment, oil production and price, and the war with Iraq.
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The revolutionary government inherited some staggering 
economic problems from the Shah’s regime. Months of strikes had 
reduced the government's revenues (i.e. oil exports, customs 
duties, etc.). By the time the provisional government came to 
power, the treasury was nearly empty and the government ended 
up having to print money in order to survive. In addition, the 
banking system was near collapse, due to massive withdrawals, 
huge capital flight, and many outstanding loans which would 
never be repaid. The departure of nearly all the foreign 
technicians meant numerous incomplete projects were abandoned. 
Finally, the Shah and his government had drawn up a $47 billion 
budget for 1979-80, with a projected deficit of $15 billion; Iran 
had already begun to accumulate a deficit before the new 
government even had a chance to take over.42
Conversely, there were some economic advantages inherited. 
The oil industry, despite months of strikes, was still relatively 
intact. In addition, foreign exchange reserves (prior to the
hostage crisis) were not insignificant, totalling $13 billion.43
Finally, the foreign debt which the new government inherited was 
relatively small. However, these advantages were not enough to 
outweigh the problems the economy was facing:
The crisis was, ... , sym ptom atic of an econom y
characterized by deep dependency on oil and imports, 
lopsided developm ent across its social, sectoral, and 
spatial com ponents, disarticulated relationship between
42 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs, 175-77.
43 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs, 177.
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its consum ption and production systems and among 
economic sectors, and asymmetrical integration with the 
capitalist world system.44
The clergymen coming to power were adept at mobilizing the
masses, but they had very little experience in dealing with
national economic problems.
In addition to these problems, Iran also had a poor export to
import ratio. According to World Bank figures, between 1973 and
1983, Iran had "an average yearly negative rate of exports of
about 17 percent and an average positive rate of imports of about
3.5 percent."45 These figures represent a deterioration in terms of
trade for Iran. The ten year span overlaps both regimes, so the
poor record cannot be blamed solely upon the IRI. The poor trade
ratio indicates that Iran is dependent on imports which it has not
balanced out through exporting its own goods.
As examined previously, factionalism developed within the
regime almost immediately after the Shah was overthrown; this
factionalism was primarily caused by differences of opinion
regarding the economic system. Recalling the descriptions of the
radicals as opposed to the conservatives, the main difference
between these two is their position concerning the role of the
state in the economy. Factionalism has prevented any consistency
in economic policies and has blocked the formation of any
comprehensive development strategy. As a result, this has had a
44 Amirahmadi, 21.
45 Shahrough Akhavi, "Institutionalizing the New Order in Iran," C u r r e n t  
H is to r y  86 (February 1987) 56.
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negative impact on the economic performance of the country. 
Lacking specific goals and strategies for the economic 
development of the nation, the Islamic Republic leadership has 
focused on solving immediate problems. Looking to Islam and the 
Quran, the leaders have found some guidelines, but the Quran is 
not an economic treatise and it is subject to a wide variety of 
interpretations. This has led to a lack of unified positions and 
frequent policy reversals. Khomeini himself, the final interpreter, 
was consistently vague in his interpretations regarding economic 
matters. In order to properly analyze the economic performance 
of the IRI, it is important to examine the structure and policies 
adopted since 1979.
The initial goals of the new government were economic self- 
reliance, a restructuring of consumption patterns and realizing 
social justice.46 The structure of the economic system was divided 
into three sectors by the Constitution of the IRI. The first is the 
public sector. Included in the public sector (meaning state 
controlled) are all major industries, foreign trade, major mines, 
banking, insurance, power production, dams and major water- 
carrying networks, radio, television, postal, telegraph and 
telephone services, and air/sea/land/railroad transport. The 
second sector is the private sector of the economy. Portions of 
agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade and services which 
supplement the activities of the other sectors are included here. 
The final area is the cooperative sector. This includes cooperative
46 Am irahm adi, 163.
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(private and public) companies and organizations in both rural 
and urban areas.47 These three sectors were designed to 
complement one another and lead to economic growth, but instead 
there have been political and ideological conflicts and practical 
difficulties concerning the divisions.
The policies adopted by the regime have varied. Overall, 
the policies seem to fall under the heading of economic 
nationalism. Economic nationalism is a strategy in which the state 
plays an active role in promoting domestic economic growth and 
development. A major component of the policies of economic 
nationalism is protectionism. Economic nationalism advocates an 
entirely different position from liberalism - whereas the former 
encourages state control and regulation the latter demands the 
least governm ent intervention possible.
The new regime in Iran adopted several policies increasing 
the state's role in the economy, particularly during the period 
when the radicals were the dominant faction.
the government took over large sectors of the economy 
through nationalization  and expropria tion , including 
b an k in g , in su ran ce , m ajo r in d u s try , la rg e -sca le  
agriculture and construction, and an im portant part of 
foreign trade. It also involved itself in the domestic 
distribution of goods. As a result, the economic role of 
the state was greatly swollen and that of the private 
sector greatly diminished by the revolution.48
47 Amirahmadi, 114-15.
48 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs,  166.
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The nationalization of large sectors, control of domestic 
distribution of goods, limitations on imports and subsidizing 
certain industries and goods are all indicators of an active state 
role in the economy and thus of economic nationalism. A further 
analysis of the policies adopted and of their effectiveness will 
indicate that the leadership of Iran did not go all the way in 
adopting economic nationalism as part of its strategy for economic 
development, and that some of the policies it chose were 
inappropriate for the nation.
The new government nationalized banking, insurance and 
most of the industry within the country. Industry that fell within 
one of three categories was brought under the ownership and 
management of the state: (1) "heavy" industry - metals,
automobile assembly, chemicals, shipbuilding, aircraft 
manufacture and mining; (2) industries owned by fifty specifically 
named individuals and one family, who allegedly acquired their 
wealth through influence with the Shah's regime; and, (3) 
industries facing economic difficulty, whose liabilities exceeded 
their net assets.49 In addition, large amounts of property were 
expropriated illegally by revolutionary organizations that evolved 
into government institutions, such as the Foundation for the 
D isinherited .
The leadership not only took ownership of large sectors of 
the economy, it also placed controls over various areas. Foreign 
trade was brought under strict control, and debate raged over
49 Bakhash, The Reign  o f  the A ya to llahs ,  179-80 .
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whether it should have been nationalized. In addition, price 
controls were placed upon numerous areas.50 Sometimes the 
government would subsidize certain producers/m erchants to 
balance out the price controls, but often there were no subsidies. 
The new regime was not entirely consistent with the policies it 
chose. Protectionism is generally geared toward "infant 
industries" in order for them to develop and flourish, so that they 
may be competitive on the world market. However, Iran did not 
adopt a comprehensive policy for protecting specific industries 
and expanding its exports. The leadership seems to have decided 
that state controls would be the best thing for the economy, but 
then they did not move far beyond this decision in addressing 
economic growth and development.
The government plays a strong role in distribution, 
production, export and import of goods. "According to one Iranian 
economist, some 68 percent of the total labor force worked for the 
public sector in 1983."51 As with many other developing nations 
this is an indication of the weak private sector. Similar indicators 
of government control can be seen by looking at other figures. For 
example, nationalization and expropriation by the end of 1982, 
resulted in the Iran National Industries Organization controlling 
between 500 and 600 industries, and employing more than 
150,000 people. The Foundation for the Disinherited, an arm of
50 Patrick Clawson, "Islamic Iran's Economic Politics and Prospects," M id d le  
East Journal 42 (Summer 1988) 379-80.
51 Milani, 308.
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the government, shows similar figures. During the same time 
period, it was in charge of:
1) 200-300 factories
2) 100 construction companies
3) 150-200 commercial firms
4) 91 poultry, livestock and agricultural enterprises,and
5) 90,000 employees5 2
The degree of state control over economic sectors is extensive, but 
the state has not played the role of the intelligent entrepreneur.
It has controlled the economy, but it has not helped it grow 
significantly .
Not only has the state controlled various industries, it has 
also limited foreign trade, in order to avoid foreign debt. The 
figures for civilian non-oil imports, between 1981 and 1986 are 
given below:
Year_____________________________Civilian Non-Oil Imports
1981 (early) $16 billion
1981-82 less than $10 billion
1982-83 $11.8 billion
1983-84 $18.1 billion
1984-85 $13.6 billion
1985-8 6____________________________________ $12.4 billion
The above figures were taken from Patrick Clawson's article 
entitled "Islamic Iran's Economic Politics and Prospects."5 5
As indicated by the figures above, imports were significantly 
decreased between 1981 and 1983, then they were increased for
52 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs , 184.
53 Clawson, 381-82.
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one year, then decreased again. The marked increase in 1983-84 
is due to the improved standing in the war with Iraq at that time 
and the improvements in the oil market. Neither factor could be 
sustained for very long however, and consequently, imports were 
restricted in the following years. Iran is a country that is quite 
dependent on imports; it does not produce a sufficient amount of 
food to feed its population and its industries are dependent on 
imports for raw materials and intermediate goods. Thus, the 
restrictions on imports were successful in avoiding foreign debt, 
but at the same time, they were damaging to industrial growth.
In addition to nationalizing various economic endeavors, 
expropriating certain properties, and controlling or limiting 
numerous areas of the economy, the new government of Iran also 
started subsidizing the costs of basic needs items, especially food, 
in order to mitigate rapidly rising prices and declining real 
income. Inflation had risen so high that many families were 
spending a majority of their income on food alone. The 
government found itself in the position of spending practically all 
its income on current needs and very little on development of 
projects aimed at modernization and economic growth. "By the 
end of 1987, the share of current expenditures rose to 82 percent 
of the general budget, while that of development expenditures 
declined to 18 percent, an extremely unhealthy budgetary 
a llo ca tio n ."54 Annual budgets have been adopted instead of 
national planning and leaders have generally limited themselves
54 A m irahm adi, 166.
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to coping with immediate problems, without looking to future 
developm en t.
The active state role of the new regime was adopted, at least 
in part, in order to promote economic growth and development. 
The initial goals of the regime included self-reliance and 
achievement of social justice. In order to achieve these goals, the 
new leaders chose many strategies reminiscent of economic 
nationalism. However, they did not entirely adopt economic 
nationalism. Factionalism has prevailed in the Islamic Republic, 
and as such, a mixture of approaches has been adopted for the 
political economy, rather than a single comprehensive approach.
If economic nationalism had been fully adopted there is no 
evidence that it would have been any more successful than the 
mixed approach that was inadvertently taken. The general idea of 
economic nationalism and protectionism is to subsidize the 
creation of an infrastructure and to promote home industry and
the export of manufactures. This is designed to allow "infant
industries" to flourish and to increase domestic economic growth. 
The Islamic Republic seems to have the same goals as economic
nationalism suggests, but it does not have a comprehensive plan
for reaching these goals (nor does economic nationalism lay out 
the exact strategies a state must choose in order to be successful). 
The new leaders wanted to expand exports beyond oil, but this 
did not materialize. They limited imports in order to reduce 
foreign debt, but they were unable to substitute domestic 
products in place of the limited imports. In addition, the 
domestically produced goods and imports maintained were often
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consumer products rather than durable goods. Finally, the goal of 
enhancing national power, which is considered incompatible with 
foreign control over important areas of the economy, was inherent 
in the slogans and philosophy of the IRI, but it encountered 
practical difficulties. The factionalism which has dominated the 
political economy of Iran has meant differing economic 
philosophies have competed for dominance, but no single 
approach has won.
This mixture of approaches has led to mixed results. 
According to Shaul Bakhash, the result of nationalization was not 
so much redistribution of wealth and increase of economic 
opportunity, but rather, the fattening of the "already overfed 
leviathan - the government."55 The economy has sustained severe 
damage over the years, but at the same time, the regime has 
lasted for more than a decade, surviving the poor economy and 
the war with Iraq, without any serious threats to its authority. In 
fact, the factionalism within the regime has been more 
troublesome than most outside attempts to gain power. One of the 
most important controversial issues within the regime revolves 
around the degree to which the state should control the economy. 
Just as land reform brought up the question of social justice 
(intervention) versus private property, so do other economic 
sectors raise the issue of social justice and state intervention 
versus free enterprise and nonintervention in the economy.
During his rule, Khomeini made proclamations regarding the
55 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the A ya to l la h s , 184.
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economy, but these did not provide the other leaders with a final 
solution.
Khomaini's intervention did not resolve the issue of the 
relationship between the private and public sectors or 
the underlying question of how social justice is to be 
achieved under an Islamic republic. The proponents of 
private enterprise and state control, private property 
and d is trib u tiv e  ju s tic e , and narrow  and broad  
interpretations of Islamic law confronted one another 
over v irtu a lly  every  m ajor p iece  o f econom ic  
leg isla tion .56
Final answers to these debates may never be found. Within and 
outside of Iran, people will debate the merits of various policies 
regarding state intervention in the economy. The mixture of 
approaches has resulted in mixed performance, which has various 
ind icators.
Of the indicators used to judge the economic standing of a 
nation, probably the most used is Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Gross Domestic Product is the market value of all goods and 
services produced in final form by residents of a nation. The GDP 
of Iran has been fluctuating since 1976, generally falling into 
three periods. From 1977 to 80, there was a sharp decline in GDP, 
followed by strong growth from 1981 to 83, then another sharp 
decline from 1984 to 87. The strong growth during the period of 
1981 to 83 is mostly due to the improved oil market and the 
increased revenues Iran experienced during this time. Over the 
entire period of 1979-87, the GDP of Iran registered an annual
56 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the A ya to llahs ,  248 .
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growth rate of -0.7 percent.57 The negative growth rate has 
meant financial problems for the general population, and for the 
middle-class in particular. The table below gives figures for gross 
domestic product between 1977 and 1984.
Gross Domestic Product in constant 1974 prices (billions o f  rials)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
A g r ic u ltu r e 340.9 352.6 356.3 362.9 404.0 436 .0 429.0 446 .7
Oil and gas 1,363 929.8 767.6 330.5 273.6 526.8 531.1 452.5
I n d u s tr ie s 645.6 553.9 511.9 520.2 534.5 590.7 683.1 705.1
S e r v ic e s 1,753 1,620 1,560 1,475 1,504 1,546 1,833 1,871
GDP 3,922 3,266 3,070 2,568 2,639 3,040 3,417 3,421
Per capita GDP 
(1000 rials) 112.9 91.3 83.25 67.53 67.31 75.17 81.98 80.0  
...........5
As the chart indicates, there was a large decrease in oil and gas 
and in the industrial sector between 1977 and 1981, which then 
experienced a slow increase. In addition, the service sector saw a 
decline, but then in 1983/84 made a strong recovery. Overall, the 
GDP and the per capita GDP showed a similar decrease in the 
immediate post-revolution years and then somewhat increased; 
however, none of the increased figures were enough to match the 
1977 pre-revolution figures. According to Amirahmadi's 
examination of Iran's GDP, "Per capita GDP has declined by 47 
percent (in 1974 prices) between 1979 and 1987, at an average
57 Amirahmadi, 133-37.
5 * Rahnema and Nomani, 280. The above chart is a modified version o f that 
given by Rahnema and Nomani.
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rate of 5.2 percent per year."59 This decline has reduced the 
purchasing power of the middle and lower classes, and has 
blurred the line between them. According to some scholars, Iran 
has become a two-class society consisting of the rich and the poor, 
with the middle-class having virtually blended into the lower- 
class. The poor performance in the GDP is an indicator of the 
declining economic power of the country.
In addition to GDP, the Gross Domestic Expenditure (GDE) has 
also declined in post-revolutionary Iran. The average annual GDE 
showed a 15.9 percent decline (at fixed 1974 prices) during the 
1979-86 period, when compared to the figure for the 1976-78 
period. In addition, the overall GDE indicator averaged an annual 
growth rate of -0.3 percent for the 1979-86 period.60 This is even 
more significant when inflation over the years is taken into 
account (meaning prices are higher, so the same expenditure 
amount buys fewer goods). The decline in both production and 
expenditure are general indicators of decreasing economic 
capability. An examination of the expenditures on consumption as 
opposed to productive investments demonstrates more clearly the 
declining economic performance of Iran. In 1985, the percentage 
of GDE that went to consumpt ion  was 71.8 percent (as compared 
to 64 percent in 1976). In 1985, the percentage of GDE that went 
to i nves tment  was 18.5 percent (as compared to 31 percent in
59 Amirahmadi, 194.
60 Amirahmadi, 155.
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1976).61 While figures for other developing and developed 
countries are similar, this nevertheless represents a definite 
decline in Iran’s investment since the previous decade, and due to 
Iran’s reconstruction needs increased investment is one of the 
highest priorities.
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (GDFCF) is the 
investm ent in domestic capital generally geared toward 
infrastructure and production. GDFCF includes among other 
things, investm ent in machinery, construction, m anufacturing and 
mining. As the figures discussed above, regarding consumption 
and investment suggest, the drop in gross domestic fixed capital 
formation (GDFCF) has been disproportionately higher than the 
drop in GDE, meaning a higher share of GDE is going to 
consumption and largely nonproductive savings. The GDE has 
shown a growth rate of -0.3 percent for the 1979-86 period, 
whereas the GDFCF has demonstrated a -8.5 percent growth 
ra te .62 What this indicates, is that the drop in the GDFCF is 
disproportionately higher because the share of expenditures being 
made into investment and production are declining at an even 
faster rate than GDE is declining. Both the public and the private 
sectors have decreased investment, particularly in construction
6 1 Amirahmadi, 156. The figures for Iran’s investment versus consumption
are similar to those o f other countries. According to statistics from the
Europa World Year Book, consumption and investment figures for several
countries for 1985/86 are: Argentina - consumption 86 percent,
investment 13 percent; Egypt - consumption 83 percent, investment 15
percent; France - consumption 80 percent, investment 19 percent; and
Japan - consumption 70 percent, investment 28 percent.
^2 A m irahm adi, 154.
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and machinery, especially since the beginning of the recession in 
1984. This decline in investment and increase in consumption 
demonstrates an unhealthy budget that is not planning for future 
economic growth.
The decline in the post-revolutionary GDFCF is due to a 
number of factors (which are also partially responsible for the 
lack of significant growth in Iran's overall economy). Included 
among these factors are the declining oil revenues, the war with 
Iraq, private capital flight, the establishment of revolutionary 
institutions (increased public spending and increased 
consumption), the lower profit rates and longer turnover times in 
productive sectors (which has deterred many from investing in 
productive areas), and the unsettled political environm ent.63 In 
summarizing the economic difficulties which Iran faced after the 
revolution, Shaul Bakhash wrote:
The government's economic problems were exacerbated 
by the war w ith Iraq, an inflated and inefficien t 
governm ent sector, the erosion of p rivate  sector 
confidence, the drop in both private and public sector 
investment, and a steep decline in oil revenues.64
The economy of Iran, as has been demonstrated through this 
discussion on its structure, policies and performance, has not 
achieved the goals set out by the post-revolutionary leaders; self- 
reliance and social justice do not yet characterize Iran. While self- 
reliance was an often mentioned goal of the republic in the early
63 Amirahmadi, 161.
64 Bakhash, 245.
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years, with the pragmatic faction gaining power, the focus has 
been shifted to self-sufficiency, rather than self-reliance. One of 
the primary blocs to achieving significant economic growth (and 
thus working closer towards self-sufficiency and social justice) has 
been the declining oil market. Iran has been very dependent on 
oil revenues and consequently has suffered from the world oil 
glut and policies in OPEC that have maintained low oil prices.
Oil and Post-Revolutionary Iran
Early in the post-revolutionary period the new regime 
adopted a new oil policy. The leaders terminated the oil 
consortium's control of Iranian oil production, export, and 
marketing. They then transferred control of these areas to the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which was combined with 
other oil and gas related publicly owned companies and came 
under the control of the new Ministry of Oil. The goals of the new 
policies were to reduce the level of oil exports and prolong the life 
of the country's oil reserves, gradually reducing Iran's 
dependence on oil exports. During the revolution the oil industry 
had symbolized foreign control of Iran; the revolutionaries had 
opposed foreign control through oil, and had promised economic 
independence for Iran. The new oil policy was meant to realize 
this independence.
Soon however, obstacles to the new oil policy mounted. The 
recession from 1977, continued through 1980, and the domestic 
political struggles barred plans for the rejuvenation of the 
economy. The Iraqi invasion caused heavy damage to all sectors of
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the economy; the Iraqis destroyed major refineries, which meant 
decreased exports and decreased state revenues. The state could
not prune the defense budget as much as it had intended to, due
to the Iraqi invasion, and consequently could not apply that 
money to other sectors of the economy. In addition, the new 
leaders demonstrated an inability to promote non-oil exports 
(such as natural gas and copper) and to collect taxes (which was 
historically the case in Iran). Finally, the most formidable 
constraints were found in the world oil markets and within
O PEC .65 The Saudis, through U.S. manipulation, managed to reduce
world oil prices and later, to flood the market. Within OPEC they 
barred Iran’s demands for higher oil prices, and outside they sold 
over their quota. As a result of all these factors, Iran's oil 
production and revenues were damaged.
Iran's oil revenues have fluctuated since the revolution, but 
overall there has been a general decline. Following the revolution 
and the start of the war with Iraq, Iran's oil revenues sank to 
their lowest value in post-revolutionary Iran (1980). Then in
1982-83, Iran experienced a strong recovery, primarily due to 
Iran's improved standing in the war and an improved world oil 
market. Figures vary between $20 and $23 billion for this year. 
However, in 1983-84, there was a sharp decline in prices on the 
oil market, and Iran could not offset this, despite increasing her 
exports. The year 1984 marked the beginning of a recession for 
Iran, which was largely due to the decline in oil revenues. In
65 A m irahm adi, 174.
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1983-84, oil revenues fell $3.7 billion below projected earnings, 
and in 1984-85, they fell $6 billion below projected earnings. 
Finally, in 1986, Iran experienced a very sharp decline in its oil 
revenues. The predicted revenue was $15 billion, whereas the 
actual revenue was less than $6 billion.66
Finally, in 1987, Iran experienced a slight recovery, as can be seen 
from the above figure. According to Shahrough Akhavi, Iran's oil 
revenues were damaged due to the oil market becoming softer 
and to the drop in oil prices, especially after 1983; prices dropped 
from the 1979 high of $34 per barrel to $14 per barrel in 
February, 1987. Worse for Iran, the quantities it has been able to 
produce and sell have declined sharply due to the war - from 
more than two million barrels per day in 1982, down to less than 
800,000 barrels per day in late 1986.68 The recovery that began 
in 1987 has brought hope, but revenues continue to fluctuate, and 
Iran has not been able to reduce its dependence on oil enough to 
fully recover its economy without a strong increase in oil 
rev en u es .
66 Bakhash, 245.
67 Amirahmadi, 224-25. Figures adapted from Amirahmadi’s statistics.
68 Akhavi, 55.
Iran’s Oil Revenues (^billions')
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
$20 
$16.7 
$14 
$ 5.8 
$10.7 67
Iran's dependence on oil has been evident for well over two 
decades. The Shah's regime failed to diversify economically and 
thus allowed Iran to develop a greater dependency on oil
revenues and the international oil market they were subject to.
Despite the promises of the revolution, this situation changed very 
little. When the post-revolutionary leaders came to power they
opted for a policy of gradually  reducing this dependence;
however, the previously discussed obstacles blocked this policy. 
Modern sectors of the Iranian economy are all dependent on 
earnings from oil. According to Amirahmadi, “Some 90 percent of 
the state’s foreign exchange earnings come from crude oil exports 
that pay for various kinds of Iran’s ever-increasing industrial and 
food im ports.”69 Most of the raw materials, and many 
intermediate products of Iranian industry must be imported, 
which is impossible without the foreign exchange earnings from 
oil revenues. In addition to foreign exchange, the single 
commodity of oil also provides a high percentage of the total 
public income. In 1983-85, oil revenues were responsible for 
48.2 percent of the total government revenues.70 This is 
significantly high considering the tax increases and the amount of 
public ownership and management that the new regime had 
established by this time.
The constraints on Iran's control of its production, export 
and price of its oil are largely determined by changes in the world
69 Amirahmadi, 70.
70 Rahnema and Nomani, 287.
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market economy (international oil market) and within OPEC. 
Unlike the early 1970's, when OPEC was unified in its goals and 
strategies, Iran is unable to lead the other OPEC powers to reduce 
their exports and increase their prices; Iran is unable to use oil as 
a tool of its policy. The superpowers, especially the US, have 
manipulated the oil markets (mostly through Saudi leverage), and 
have retaliated against Iran for demanding changes at the 
international level. Since Iran holds a valuable product and is 
dependent on the export of that product, a situation is created in 
which the superpowers have been able to exploit Iran. This was 
particularly true in the 1970's, and is still evident in post­
revolutionary Iran. The declining oil prices might have been 
advantageous for the new leaders in their attempts to reduce 
dependency on oil, but they lacked a planned shift for the 
economy and the eruption of the war threw the economy into 
such turmoil that reducing dependence became less of a priority.
As demonstrated by the figures above, Iran's oil revenues 
(considered here on a per capita basis) declined significantly 
between 1977-78 and 1986-87; the 1986-87 level is even lower
71 C law son, 372-73.
Oil Exports 
(per capita basis)
Considering inflation 
(1986 prices)
1972-73
1977-78
1986-87
$130
$650
$110
$450 
$1,050 
$110 7 i
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than the level in 1972-73, before the boom in oil prices. 
Considering inflation, the decline is even more shocking. In 1986 
prices, Iran's oil exports on a per capita basis were almost ten 
times more in 1977-78 than they were in 1986-87. These few 
figures give a general overview of the decline in oil revenues that 
Iran has suffered.
Declining oil revenues have resulted in a declining share of 
the oil sector in Iran's GDP. The average annual contribution of oil 
to the the GDP over the 1979-87 period has dropped by 56 
percent when compared to the 1976-78 period.
Noticeable changes have also occurred in the sectoral 
composition of GDP as exem plified by the significant 
decline in the share of the oil sector and consequent 
im provem ents in those of agriculture, industries, and 
se rv ices.72
The improvements in the agricultural and industrial share of GDP 
are more a reflection of the decline in oil than any significant 
increase in actual production in these sectors. Services, however, 
have shown an increase that is more than proportional to the 
decline in oil.73 The service sector, private and public, traditional 
and modern, has grown to be the largest economic sector in the 
Islamic Republic. “In 1984, it accounted for about 55 per cent of
72 Amirahmadi, 138-39.
73 This shift to a more service- oriented econom y is unhealthy for Iran. 
Service econom ies are generally less able to provide for needs than 
industrial econom ies, and are dependent on foreign imports.
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the constant Gross Domestic Product and about 45 per cent of the 
labour force, compared with 31 per cent in 1977.”74
The decline in oil revenues combined with Iran's continuing 
dependency on these revenues has been damaging to Iran's 
economy. The continuing dependency on oil is problematic, but 
this dependency does not seem to fall into the same category of 
structural dependency that the Shah's regime did. Galtung's 
structural model of dependency, which argues that dependency 
creates both internal and external imperialism, was applicable 
during the Shah's reign. However, in post-revolutionary Iran, 
while external imperialism can still be demonstrated, despite 
efforts to cut exploitative ties to the outside, internal imperialism 
is not as apparent as it was in the 1970's. The internal core­
periphery relationship in post-revolutionary Iran shows less 
evidence of core ties to the outside and of core exploitation of the 
masses. The masses were Khomeini's base of support and as such 
were not in the same position as they were under the Shah.
Unlike the obvious economic gap between the elite and the masses 
under the Shah’s regime, the post-revolutionary leadership has 
generally maintained a lifestyle that does not demonstrate the 
same conspicuous consumption and exploitation of the masses.
Despite this difference in the internal situation, Iran remains a 
peripheral country that is dependent on oil exports and the 
capitalist world market. If Iran's leaders expect to change this 
they will have to increase their own production capabilities in
74 Rahnem a and N om ani, 279.
non-oil sectors so as to reduce imports, and expand their exports 
beyond the single commodity of oil. This diversification would 
allow Iran to become more self-reliant and would reduce Iran's 
openness to exploitation , since it would take more than 
manipulation of the oil market to damage Iran's economy. The 
improvement in oil revenues in 1987, and the end of the war in 
1988 may open new possibilities for this to happen. The 
emergence of pragmatism in various sectors may lead to 
improved policy formation that may stimulate economic growth 
and allow for significant development (at least in terms of 
delivering economically). One stumbling block to growth and 
development that has been evident in the post-revolutionary 
years, other than oil, has been the war with Iraq. Iran's war 
policy has changed as has its policies in other areas.
In fact, the pattern that has emerged in nearly every 
aspect of Iranian policy - foreign and dom estic - has 
been ex trem e rheto ric  in pub lic  p ronouncem ents 
balanced by calculated flexibility and utter realism  in 
practice, at least in those areas regarded as critical to 
survival. The war in particular has imposed a sense of 
realism and practical lim itations.75
The Economics of the Iran-Iraq War
The Iran-Iraq war resulted in a variety of damage to Iran, 
including vast human, infrastructural and economic loss. The war 
affected Iran, especially causing political and economic changes.
75 Gary Sick, "Iran's Quest for superpower Status, Foreign Affairs  65 
(spring 1987) 700-701.
120
On 22 September 1980, Iraq attacked Iran, probably believing 
that the new regime would be unable to organize and withstand 
the attack. Iran surprised Iraq, and many others, however, by not 
only surviving the initial attack, but pulling together and 
retaliating. In the first years of the war, military expenditures 
were gradually increased. In 1980, Iran spent $7.7 billion on 
military expenditures, then $8.5 billion in 1981, and $9.6 billion in 
1982 .76 The war fluctuated over the years - early on, Iraq was 
stronger, then in 1982, Iran dominated, and after that there were 
short term shifts, but generally it was a stalemate. In 1984/85, 
Iran made the arms-for-hostages deal, hoping to gain the 
advantage, but the U.S. aided Iraq after the news of the deal was 
leaked. By 1988, Iran could no longer continue the war and was 
forced to accept the UN cease-fire.
The economic costs of the war to Iran have turned out to be 
astronomical. Numerous different figures have been published 
regarding the war, and war-related activities, but many are 
within close range of one another. From 1979/80 to 1983/84, the 
IRI's military imports were stable at approximately $2 billion per 
an n u m .77 "By 1983-84, the war and war-related activities were 
absorbing almost one-third of the budget."78 Official figures of
7(> Amirahmadi, 42.
77 According to Patrick Clawson (p374), this is significantly less than the 
Shah’s arms imports o f  $4.1 billion during the 1977-78 period, but the lesser 
figure must be considered relative to the stockpile o f military imports that 
had been established by the Shah.
78 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs, 245.
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war costs often were less than this, but these figures often left out 
many of the war-related costs that were part of the budget. 
According to R.K. Ramazani, the costs of the war have been 
estimated at $5 billion per year up to 1985; this represents one- 
third of all government expenditures at that time. In addition, 
Ramazani, estimates that by 1985, there was a total of $150 
billion in war damages.79 A quote from the Iranian minister of 
Planning and Budget suggests the extent of the war expenditures 
up to 1986:
the war expenditures rose from 18 percent o f the 
general budget in 1359 (1980) ... to 32 percent in 1365 
(1986) and 34 percent in this year's (1987) budget bill,
... These figures ... are only a portion of the actual war 
expenditures as other resources of executive bodies 
[were] also deployed for requirements of the fronts, not 
stated in any official figures or statistics.80
According to Amirahmadi, the war actually accounted for 41
percent of the general budget and 52 percent of the government's
operating expenditures in 1987.81 Considering these figures, it is
difficult to believe that in the years before this, the war only
accounted for one-third of the budget and expenditures.
The total costs of the war, over the eight years that it was
fought, are difficult to estimate. Damage was done to so many
sectors that it is uncertain if the entire costs can be counted.
79 R.K. Ramazani, “Iran Burying the Hatchet,” Foreign P o l icy  60 (Fall 
1985) 61.
80 Amirahmadi, 164-65.
81 Amirahmadi, 165.
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Estimates have been made however, and some must be presented 
if an analysis of the effect of the war on Iran's political economy is 
to be made. Between September 1980 and December 1986, the 
costs of damage to Iran's infrastructure alone were estimated to 
be $369 billion; this figure does not include oil revenue lost, but 
does include material damages to the oil sector. An estimate of 
the total economic costs during the same time period, including oil 
revenue and GNP losses, is $542 billion.82 However, official 
Iranian government figures "estimated that the economic cost of 
the war's first five years was $309 billion."83 Comparing the 
figure given by Kamran Mofid for the first six years of the war 
and the official figure for the first five years, there is a large 
discrepancy ($233 billion); this discrepancy is more than would be 
suspected for the one year difference. It is likely that there was 
some underestimation on the part of the Iranian government, 
which may not have included some losses to oil and the GNP.
Others have estimated the war costs for the entire eight 
years. Amirahmadi has based his estimates primarily on Iranian 
official figures, and has discussed where these figures are both 
under and overestimated, and has tried to balance them out. 
Amirahmadi's estimate for the damage inflicted on Iran's 
economy by the war, from beginning to end amounts to $592 
billion. This includes $210 billion of damage which was inflicted 
on machinery, buildings, equipment, materials, and similar
82 Kamran Mofid, “After the Gulf War,” World. Today 45 (March 1989) 49.
83 Clawson, 373. Compare this to Iran’s GNP for 1985 o f $176.6 billion.
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national wealth. In this total estimate, both direct and indirect 
costs are counted. Considering the direct costs to be 35.5 percent 
of the total, Amirahmadi has concluded that this amount is greater 
than 19 years of oil revenue, at the 1987 earning level.84 The 
reconstruction costs that Iran is facing are astronomical. However, 
economic changes are not the only challenges that Iran had to face 
as a result of the war - there were also political changes.
One of the most dramatic changes in Iran, due to the war, 
was the arms-for-hostages deal with the U.S. Iran desperately 
needed weapons and parts for its US-built weapons systems. The 
pragm atists within the Iranian regime, with Khomeini's support, 
negotiated a deal with the United States, in which Iran received 
intelligence briefings on both Iraq and the USSR, in addition to
1,500 TOW missiles and components for its U.S.-built Hawk air 
defense system .85 Some of the radicals leaked the news of the 
deal with the US, partially hoping that they could later use this to 
unseat the pragmatists. However, with Khom eini’s intervention 
the pragmatists were able to maintain their power. Khomeini's 
version of the arms deal stated that those hostile to Iran
have apparen tly  com e back today and presen ted  
them selves meekly and humbly at the door of the 
nation wishing to establish relations ... Right now, all 
big countries are competing to establish relations with 
I ra n .86
84 Amirahmadi, 64.
85 Sick, 703.
86 Sick, 704.
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The arms deal did not cause dramatic changes in the Iranian 
leadership, but it had the potential to have done so if Khomeini 
had not stepped in.
Another cost of the fighting was a war-sick population that 
lost hundreds of thousands of its people and was growing weary. 
In April 1985, anti-government demonstrations broke out in a 
section of Tehran and quickly spread to other areas. This was the
first popular manifestation of unrest in many years - it
demonstrated a simmering resentm ent among the masses. 
Ordinary people were demonstrating against the government and 
the war. The government contained the demonstrations quickly, 
but the signs of war fatigue and resentment rem ained.87 The 
factionalism within the regime was apparent at this time and the 
radicals had already lost a substantial amount of power to the 
pragmatists. The radicals were unfortunate to have dominated 
the political scene when the war was going poorly and their 
policies left no room for negotiation.
In the Summer of 1988, Iran accepted the U.N. Security 
Council cease-fire. There were a number of reasons for accepting 
at this time:
1) the Iranian population was war-sick,
2) the costs of the war (possibly as much as $592 billion)
had severely damaged Iran's economy, and
3) Iran was extremely isolated in the international arena.88
87 Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs, 240-41.
88 Iran’s international isolation is best demonstrated by the USS V in c e n n e s  
incident. An Iranian civilian aircraft carrying more than 200 people was
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The cease-fire stipulations did not favor Iran, but the leadership 
accepted despite this. Khomeini stated that agreeing to the cease­
fire was like drinking a cup of poison, but that it was necessary. 
Hindsight suggests that Iran should have accepted the Arab peace 
plan of 1982, but at the time the leaders believed that the war 
against Iraq could be won. The cease-fire of 1988 brought the 
end of eight years of fighting and the possibility of rebuilding the 
Islamic Republic.
During Khomeini's more than ten years as the leader of Iran, 
the country underwent several major changes. The constitutional 
structure of the state was changed from a monarchy to a republic. 
The ruling elites were no longer the monarch and his loyalists, but 
rather, the clergy. There was a significant transfer of ownership 
of property and wealth from the private to the public sector. And, 
the state extended its role into virtually every sphere of public 
and even private life.89 In addition, the country withstood a war 
with Iraq and declining oil revenues. Despite social and economic 
problems and the political opposition and factionalism, the IRI 
lasted more than a decade under Khomeini’s leadership, and 
remains relatively stable two years after his death.
shot down by the US ship, the USS V in cen n es  - the United Nations refused 
to the condemn the US for its actions.
89 Shaul Bakhash, “After the Gulf War,” World Today  45 (March 1989) 46.
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Additional Economic Challenges
The war with Iraq, the declining oil revenues, the attempts 
at land reform and other socio-economic reforms, and the political 
factionalism all presented challenges to the IRI. In addition to 
these there are other economic problems that Iran's post­
revolutionary leadership has had to face. According to Ramazani, 
the economic ills which Iran has had to face include pervasive 
black-marketeering and corruption, the exodus of half of all 
Iranian physicians (leaving 15,000 doctors for more than 40 
million people), an unofficial inflation rate of 35 percent, and 
dwindling foreign reserves.90 These are not the extent of 
problems the leadership has faced.
Inflation began before the revolution and continued into the 
post-revolutionary period. Inflation has been most devastating to 
the poorer section of the country - many families spend as much 
as 40-45 percent of their income on food alone.91 In 1987, there 
was a sudden jump in prices, especially in food, health, household 
items and education, necessities that the poor are finding 
impossible to afford. The government has tried to control 
inflation through increasing taxes, rationing goods, cutting 
expenditures, placing imports under government control, and 
subsidizing prices, but none of these have been successful.92 
Inflation has caused prices to soar, while salaries have remained
90 Ramazani, 61.
91 Amirahmadi, 173.
92 Amirahmadi, 182.
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low. The buying power of the middle-class has been decreased so 
much, some analysts claim that Iran has become a two-class 
country of rich and poor.
In addition to inflation, Iran has also suffered from a shift in 
the sectoral composition of its GDP. The expansion of the services 
sector has only partially compensated for the relative decline in 
oil. In the 1979-87 period, the service sector showed an annual 
growth rate of 0.2 percent. The service share of GDP increased 
from 45 percent before the revolution to 54 percent in the post­
revolutionary years.93 This trend is considered harmful because 
it diverts scarce resources away from the more productive sectors 
of the economy. In addition, services pay lower wages than do 
more productive sectors, so the workers suffer.
While the service sector increased its actual output, the 
industrial sector showed an increase in its share of the GDP, also.
The slight jum p in the industrial sector of the GDP 
reflects the decline in the share of the oil sector rather 
than a real increase in industrial value added, which has 
rem ained sluggish throughout the postrevo lu tionary  
years, with the exception of the 1982-83 period.94
The 1979-87 period saw an average growth rate of only 0.06 
percent per year, experiencing a significant contraction from
1984-87, as a result of the continuing decline in rates of capacity 
utilization and capital formation. In fact, the industrial sector
93 Amirahmadi, 139.
94 Amirahmadi, 144.
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suffered not only from these problems, but also from Iran's 
industrial dependence "on the world capitalist economy for over 
57 percent of their raw materials and 63 percent of their spare 
p a rts ."95 The slow growth of the industrial sector has done very 
little to aid the GNP, and has done even less for the employment 
problems Iran is facing.
The labor force of Iran has increased rapidly, while the 
em ploym ent opportunities have decreased.
The above figures are official government figures. As can be seen, 
the year 1986 is shown to have a decreased unemployment 
figures, compared to 1984. However, unofficial statistics place the 
1986 unemployment rate at 28.6 percent, and indicate that there 
is also a sizable underemployed population.97 The population of 
Iran has grown at such a rapid pace and planning has been so 
lacking, that employment opportunities have quickly fallen 
behind. In 1986, 11.1 million people, or 23.3 percent of the 49.8 
million persons in Iran, were employed. This means that 2 out of 
9 people were employed and were supporting the rest of the
Unemployment Rate in Iran
1976
1984
1986
10% 
18.7% 
14.1% 95
95 Amirahmadi, 144.
96 Amirahmadi, 187.
97 Amirahmadi, 188.
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p o p u la tio n .98 These staggering figures must be changed if Iran is 
going to recover economically.
Besides the problems of lacking a strong industrial base, 
diverting resources to nonproductive sectors, especially services, 
inflation and a high unemployment rate, Iran also faces obstacles 
such as a lack of skilled labor, a suffering educational system, 
inadequate healthcare and housing, and an uneven distribution of 
wealth. As of Spring 1986, government released data reported 
that 20 percent of the population received half (50 percent) of the 
country's national income, while the remaining 80 percent is left 
to divide the residual 50 percent of income.99 Ironically, many of 
those who expected the most change from the revolution are the 
same ones who have become poorer since the revolution, 
including the urban poor, farm laborers, construction and industry 
workers, and government employees. Mohsen Milani argues that 
Iran is a stronger state since the revolution, particularly because 
of the support from the lower classes and the lower-middle 
c la s se s .100 This may be a valid argument, but it might not be the 
case in the future if Iran's leaders fail to forge a path of economic 
grow th .
Despite all the economic problems, the political opposition 
and factionalism, the war, and the state intervention into citizens’
98 Rahnema and Nomani, 273.
99 Shahrough Akhavi, “Elite Factionalism in the IRI,” M iddle E ast Journal  
41 (Spring 1987) 198.
100 Milani, 307.
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private lives, Khomeini and the IRI survived much longer than 
many experts believed possible. A primary reason for this 
survival was Khomeini's charismatic leadership. He was 
supported by the masses, and was the final arbiter in the regime. 
He designed the theory of Velayat-e faqih ,  or "leadership of the 
jurisprudent," around which the 1979 constitution revolves. In 
addition, Khomeini spoke of international relations in terms of the 
oppressors and the oppressed. He demanded independence for 
Iran, and changes at the international level that threatened the 
superpowers, especially the United States. The IRI has been based 
on an active state role in the economic sphere, including 
nationalization of many industries and greatly increased 
regulation of the private sector.101 Khomeini's economic leanings 
seemed to be toward redistribution and social justice, although he 
avoided taking a controversial stand in regards to this and other 
problematic issues. Many believed that his death would bring 
serious turmoil to the IRI, and possibly even mean the end to rule 
by the clergy. Khomeini's death on 3 June 1989, however, was 
followed by a relatively smooth and rapid transition of power. 
Since then, the leadership of the IRI has remained quite stable 
and has focused its energies on economic reconstruction.
101 As suggested previously, the degree o f state control and regulation has 
been a subject o f intense debate in the IRI. An acceptable balance between 
the private and public sectors, between free enterprise and state 
ownership/m anagem ent has not yet been found.
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POST-KHOMEINI IRAN AND BEYOND
The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, a little 
over a decade since he had triumphantly returned to Iran from exile. 
For years it had been predicted that his death would bring an 
upheaval in Iran that could possibly mean the crumbling of the 
Islamic Republic. In fact, Khomeini's death seemed even more 
damaging at the time because just three months earlier he had 
unceremoniously removed his chosen successor, Ayatollah Hussain 
Ali Montazeri. Contrary to the predictions however, a new successor 
was chosen quickly and the transition was quite smooth.
This chapter begins with a review of previous chapters and 
then: 1) examines the political economy and the development of Iran 
in the two years since Khomeini's death, and; 2) speculates on future 
prospects. This thesis has analyzed how the environment (domestic 
and external) and decisions have interacted to shape the political 
economy of Iran, which in turn has affected the degree of 
development of this country. For example, chapter two viewed Iran 
during the 1960s and 1970s, which were partially characterized by a 
huge increase in oil revenues, then a decline and and by the Shah's 
modernization program. This chapter analyzed the political and 
economic factors that led to the 1979 revolution. In chapter three 
Iran was examined in view of an environment shaped by the 
revolution, the war with Iraq, and declining oil revenues; this
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environment affected the decisions made by the regime, which was 
characterized by factionalism, but which Khomeini dominated. 
Development in the sense of delivering economically and politically 
was not realized to a large degree in either of these two periods.
This chapter looks at Iran since Khomeini's death. The current 
environment is different in that the war with Iraq is over and oil 
revenues have increased somewhat. The pragmatic or moderate 
faction, led by President Rafsanjani, has generally prevailed in the 
past two years, and policies have focused on postwar reconstruction. 
Practical economic decisions are taking priority over ideological 
fervor and the changes in the political economy that are taking shape 
at the present time may allow for further development in Iran.
The past two chapters have offered that Iran's political 
economy has been characterized largely by dependency. This 
dependency, particularly on its single commodity export of oil and 
on a variety of imports for survival, has allowed outside powers to 
exploit Iran (especially the U.S. in the 1970's) and has been 
detrimental to the country's development. Despite the efforts and 
promises of the revolutionaries, the Islamic Republic was unable to 
break the ties and become self-reliant. Dependency occurs in 
different forms and degrees. Due to the increasing international 
interaction practically all countries are dependent on the 
international capitalist market for sale of their own products and for 
purchasing needed goods. However, while most developed countries, 
such as the United States,Western Europe and Japan, have enough 
power within the international system to make it practically 
impossible to exploit their dependency on the international market,
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many developing countries are not strong enough to protect 
themselves from exploitation. Their dependency, especially in the 
case of primarily single-commodity export countries, makes it easy 
for developed countries to hurt them economically; and due to the 
overlap of the two sectors, being capable of hurting a country 
economically, means having the capabilty to hurt a country 
politically. Exploitation by developed countries has often been for 
the purpose of finding raw materials or broadening markets. During 
the Cold War, developing countries were also used as pawns between 
the US and the USSR. Finally, developing countries are sometimes 
damaged economically at the international level when they demand 
changes at the international level, such as global redistribution or 
increased power for the Third World. Dependency may be 
characterized as a phenomena to which all countries are subject, but 
developing countries are more easily damaged by their dependency 
than are developed states.
However, the nature of dependency can be changed, and 
therefore its detrimental effects can be reduced. In Iran's case, the 
foreign loans and aid that it is seeking, if used wisely, can help 
reconstruct the country and build a solid economic foundation that 
will allow Iran to become more independent. In turn, the regime, if 
it so chooses , can provide for the development needs of the 
population. Only careful planning and proper strategies on the part 
of the government can move the country toward a more developed 
status; even with these, there are an undiscernible number of 
variables that can intervene and set back even the most carefully 
laid development plans.
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The Khomeini Legacy
Since 1986 there has been a general movement towards 
pragmatism in Iranian policy. The moderates led by Rafsanjani 
gained more power, deemphasizing ideology and arguing that the 
very survival of the revolution depended on repairing the country.
In 1988 the cease-fire with Iraq was accepted and the government 
worked to lessen its international isolation. Khomeini called for a 
limited market economy and controlled free international trade. He 
also stated that Iran should seek relations with all other nations, 
excepting the United States, Israel and South Africa. However, later 
in that same year Salman Rushdie’s book, Satanic Verses, caught the 
attention of Muslims throughout the Middle East, including Khomeini, 
who called for the author's assassination for his blasphemy. This 
incident immediately led to a reversal of the trend toward 
comprom ise and m oderation.1 Iran's relations with Britain and most 
of the Western world were severed as a result of Khomeini's death 
sentence for Rushdie, and some economic sanctions were adopted. 
Khomeini's death less than a year later did not lead to a revocation of 
the death sentence, but since then relations between Iran and the 
W est have improved.
According to journalist Robin Wright, Khomeini failed at critical 
junctures and left a legacy of problems for his country. Despite his 
absolute authority as the faq ih ,  Khomeini's "vacillation and delicate 
balancing of Iran's political factions often resulted in policy paralysis
1 Miron Rezun, "The Internal Struggle,the Rushdie Affair, and the Prospects 
for the Future," Iran at the Crossroads: Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade,  
Miron Rezun, ed. (Boulder: W estview Press, 1990) 213.
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on key issues rather than reform."2 In addition, Khomeini's self- 
righteousness and inflexibility cost Iran the loss of international 
acceptability, which was desperately needed in the latter years of 
the war with Iraq. Khomeini's personal and political grudge against 
Saddam Hussein prevented any mediation of the unwinnable war 
between Iran and Iraq, and cost tens of thousands of lives. 
Economically, he failed his own constituency, the mostazafin  (the 
disinherited), who were even more impoverished at the time of his 
death than they had been under the Shah. Finally, he left the Islamic 
Republic very vulnerable by leaving the position of his successor as 
fa q ih  completely open.3 Despite the problems that existed at the 
time of his death and the difficult legacy he left behind, the Islamic 
Republic has survived more than two years since Khomeini's death 
and has surprised many with its stability.
The Islamic Republic has undergone a number of changes since 
Khomeini's death. The political environment is still characterized by 
factionalism, but the pragmatists have greatly strengthened their 
position in the past two years. Their focus on repairing the damage 
that Iran has sustained and building the economy has appealed to 
the masses. The economy has somewhat improved and long-term 
planning is now being considered rather than simply responding to 
immediate economic problems as was the case in the past. An 
important strategy in developing the economy is improving trade
2 Robin Wright, In the Name o f  God: The Khomeini Decade  (N ew  York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1989) 207.
3 Wright, 207-8.
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relations with the developed world and lessening Iran's isolation.
The decisions of the current administration and the environment 
within which those decisions have been made is the primary subject 
of this chapter.
The Political Environment
Contrary to the expected conflict, there was an unexpectedly 
quick choice of successor to Khomeini. Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei 
was chosen to be the next f a q ih  or supreme leader of Iran, despite 
his lack of certain qualifications. Khamenei has proven to be a less 
controversial figure than Khomeini was, and he has continually 
supported the moderates in their policies. The moderates have also 
gained strength through recent elections and constitutional 
am en d m en ts .
On 28 July 1989, Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
was elected to the office of president and a number of constitutional 
amendments were approved. The 1979 constitution had been a 
reaction to royal autocracy and despotism, and thus focused on 
distribution of authority and divided powers. The 1989 constitution 
represented a reaction to the problems created by this division and 
distribution. It provided for greater centralization and concentration 
of authority. The 1979 constitution had allowed supreme leadership
to be exercised by a council of three to five jurists. The 1989 
amendments revised this and stated that supreme leadership could 
be exercised only by a single individual. The amendments also 
downgraded the qualification for the faq ih .  These amendments 
allowed a cleric of less eminent scholarly standing to hold the office
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of supreme jurisprudent and thus almost implied a separation 
between spiritual and political leadership of the community. 4
For a decade Iran's clerical leaders had insisted that the 
legitim acy of the state derived from divine m andate 
granted not only to the community of Islamic jurists but 
specifically to the supreme jurist of the age, in light of his 
superior learning, grace, and sanctity. Thus, the post- 
Khomaini period seems likely to be characterized not only 
by leadership by clerics of diminished scholarly authority, 
but also by a diminution of the basis of legitimacy on 
which the Islamic Republic was founded.5
The supreme leader's powers were further defined to set general
policies and decide issues which cannot be resolved in ordinary
ways; this was meant to end the debate over issues such as trade,
investment, social justice and general economic policy.6 T he
downgraded qualifications for the fa q ih  and the strengthening of the
moderate faction has meant a greater degree of commitment to
practical considerations in policy-making. In addition to these
changes, the constitutional amendments also strengthened the office
of the president, centralizing his authority and eliminating the office
of prime minister, which has aided President Rafsanjani in building
his power.
The political environment since Khomeini's death has remained 
characterized by factionalism between two camps, the radicals and 
the pragmatists, the latter of which has proven the stronger of the
4 Shaul Bakhash, The Reign o f  the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution  
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., Pubs, 1990) 284.
5 Bakhash, 294.
6 Bakhash, 285-94.
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two. President Rafsanjani, who is the leader of the moderate faction, 
was a loyal student and supported of Khomeini for years. He began 
strengthening his political position several years before Khomeini's 
death. He was the Speaker of the Majlis for several years and was 
partially responsible for procuring weapons during the arms-for- 
hostages deal. He has acted as the leader of the pragmatic faction 
since it first gained power in the mid-1980s, and has since become 
one of the most powerful men in Iran. In order to repair the 
damaged economy, Rafsanjani has sought to improve relations with 
the developed states, especially Western Europe and Japan, and has 
even broached the subject of renewing relations with the United 
States. His primary focus thus far in his presidency has been 
reconstruction and economic growth.
Since Khomeini's death, the moderates have tried to finalize a 
peace settlement with Iraq and to begin postwar reconstruction. The 
total damage inflicted on Iran by the war from beginning to end in 
economic terms has been approximated to be $592 billion.7 
According to various Iranian officials the direct costs of 
reconstruction are now being estimated at more than $600 billion, 
and President Rafsanjani has declared that additional expenses bring 
the total cost to one trillion dollars.8 There is a possibility that these 
figures have been somewhat inflated in order to get more money for 
reconstruction, but there is no doubt that the reconstruction will be
7 Hooshang Amirahmadi, Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian  
E x p er ien ce  (New York: State University o f New York Press, 1990) 64.
8 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 45, 11 Jan 1991, 2.
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incredibly expensive, especially since the government hopes to see a 
great deal of economic growth through reconstruction.9
President Rafsanjani has been able to push many of his policies 
through and to strengthen his faction in the past two years. The 
October 1990 elections for the Assembly of Experts were notable 
because the moderates controlled the selection process. As a result 
they were able to axe most of the radical candidates from the 
b a llo t.10 The Assembly has the power to replace the person holding 
the position of faq ih ,  which is currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 
Khamenei has supported Rafsanjani and the policies of the 
moderates for the past two years and consequently, he could be in 
danger if radicals were to control the Assembly. The Majlis is also 
dominated by moderates, although the radicals do hold some seats. 
The moderates seem to be unified by the need to get the Iranian 
economy into gear and the fear that the revolution will be destroyed 
if the regime "cannot stop the ever-rising inflation and create jobs."11 
The regime is doing what it believes will boost the economy, but the 
economic environment in Iran at this time is problematic, and there 
are no easy solutions.
The Economic Environment
As discussed in chapter three the Iranian economy was in poor 
shape at the time of Khomeini's death.
9 The moderates favor oil-led  industrialization for econom ic growth, which the
radicals oppose since they view this as remaining tied to the West for oil sales
and they believe this w ill inhibit any m oves toward self-reliancy.
10 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 37, 16 Nov 1990, 2.
11 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 39, 30 Nov 1990,1.
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Iran's per capita income fell from 114,000 rials in 1978 to
55,500 in 1988, or from $US 1,425 to $US 688, according to 
official sources using 1974 fixed prices. The reason for this 
decline lies partially with its 3.4 percent population growth 
rate, one of the highest in the world.12
This decline is also due to the war and the decline in oil revenues,
and to the lack of policies aimed at economic growth adopted by the
Khomeini regime. The acute economic problems that Iran is facing
also include an inflation rate as high as 60 percent and a 25 percent
unem ploym ent ra te ,13 meaning out of the 12 million person labor
force in Iran, 4 million are unemployed.14 In addition, not only is
unemployment high, but the sectoral composition of employment is
poor. During the past decade it has moved in favor of the service
industry, which is characterized by less productive activities and
low-paying jobs. The effect is depressed production and per capita
income, which continues to produce more problems in the economy.
So long as the structure of the econom y rem ains 
unchanged, the postwar reconstruction rem ains dorm ant, 
population control policies are lacking, the developm ent 
budget rem ains low, and inflation is unacceptably high, 
little  can be done to rem edy unem ploym ent and the 
structural imbalance in em ploym ent.15
The economic problems Iran is facing have been somewhat offset by
increased oil revenues due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and they
12 Dilip Hiro, "Iran in the 1990's," Middle East Insight 7 (1990) 44-46, 45.
13 Hiro, 44.
14 Masoud Kavoossi, "Labor Relations in Iran: The Islamic Challenge," M id d le
East Insight 7(1990) 71-75, 72.
^  Amirahmadi, 192-93.
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may be further reduced if Iran is able to obtain the loans it is 
currently seeking.
The August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq brought political 
and economic gains to Iran. Within two weeks of the invasion Iraq 
conceded practically all of Iran's territorial and political demands. In 
addition, the first few months after the invasion saw increased oil 
revenues for Iran, which helped pull the government out of the 
budget deficit. Oil revenues for 1990 amounted to more than $15 
billion and the same level was targeted for 1991.16 The pragmatists, 
especially President Rafsanjani and Foreign M inister Velayati 
maneuvered Iran's position during the build-up and the war, 
choosing their actions in terms of what would best benefit their 
reconstruction efforts. Iran remained neutral despite the radicals' 
calls to join Iraq in its fight against the West. The pragmatists were 
also alarmed at the huge Western military presence but they chose 
to stay out of the fighting for several reasons:
1) The eight year war with Iraq had left thousands dead
2) Iran hoped to replace Iraq as the dominant power in the 
Gulf region.
3) Reconstruction depends on aid from the West, which would 
certainly not have been forthcoming if Iran had joined Iraq.
As a result of its neutral position, Iran has seen a number of 
benefits .
Christian Science Monitor, 16 May 1991, 8 col. 2. This is a significant 
increase over the oil revenues o f the mid-1980's when Iran hit a low point of 
$5.8 billion in 1986.
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The diplomatic relations that had been broken with many 
nations due to the Rushdie affair were reestablished during the Gulf 
war. The European Community lifted all its economic sanctions 
against Iran and the United States lifted its ban on US-based 
companies buying Iranian oil. In addition, Britain and Iran resumed 
ties despite the lack of a resolution to the Rushdie incident. Finally, 
there is renewed interest by the West to aid and invest in Iran. The 
French agreed to help rebuild Kharg Island (Iran's main oil shipping 
terminal which was badly damaged in the war with Iraq), and France 
has signed a contract allowing Iran to assemble Peugeot automobiles 
in T ehran.17 The pragmatists are hoping that this renewed interest 
by the West continues to grow and that reconstruction funds will 
quickly follow.
The current Five Year Plan expects resumption of work on oil 
refineries, petrochemicals, steel production, construction materials, 
motor vehicles and consumer goods plants. "Sharp differences, 
however, emerged within the leadership on what roles the domestic 
private sector and foreign capital and expertise were allowed in this 
e n d ea v o r."18 The radical faction argues that no foreign capital or 
expertise is needed since they would increase Iran's dependency and 
would impede the country's movement toward self-sufficiency. This 
faction also maintains that the private sector's role need not be 
increased. The pragmatic faction believes, however, that domestic 
resources are not enough for reconstruction and that foreign
17 New York Times, 10 Dec 1990, sec. A, 8.
18 Bakhash, 278.
143
assistance is needed. In addition, this faction argues that
encouragement of the domestic private sector is necessary for Iran's
economic growth. "Their goal is to transform this highly centralized, 
heavily subsidized and stagnant system into a vibrant, decentralized, 
free-m arket econom y."19 Prior to his death, Khomeini had called for 
a limited market and controlled free international trade, and he had
allowed Rafsanjani to pursue economic relations with various
countries, including the Soviet Union.
Since his death, the moderate faction has been able to push a 
number of their policies through the Majlis. Various changes have 
been made in the Plan since October 1990.
To allow an influx of foreign capital, the Rafsanjani 
administration decided last October (1990) to allow Iranian 
firm s to sign agreem ents d irectly  w ith non-Iran ian  
companies. This applies to both private and public sectors, 
and has opened up immense possibilities for Iranian joint 
ventures with Western firm s.20
Then in November 1990, the government, in an effort to promote
non-oil exports, announced that it would free private firms to import
various raw materials and spare parts with foreign exchange they
earn from their own exports, rather than relying on the government
for foreign exchange. In addition, in May 1991, the government
announced that it plans to sell an estimated $80 million worth of
shares in state owned industries by the end of the current Iranian
year (March 1992). The sales to the private sector are aimed at
19 New York Times, 9 April 1991, sec.A, 10.
20 Hiro, 45.
1 4 4
encouraging greater industrial investment and productivity. This is a 
serious reversal from the early years of the Islamic Republic when 
nationalization of industries was the goal of the regime. Finally, 
some regulations are being changed in order to allow more foreign 
investment in Iranian industry. The current Five Year Plan calls for 
as much as $3 billion of foreign investment in heavy industries and 
allows foreign investors to own up to 49 percent of the shares in an 
Iranian industry.21 These reforms are aimed at boosting the 
economy and helping Iran rebuild itself.
In addition to these reforms the government has also moved to 
borrow money from abroad for reconstruction. In November 1990, 
the Majlis authorized the Islamic Republic to borrow $17.5 billion 
from abroad over the next five years for reconstruction and 
development programs. The surge in oil revenues due to the August 
1990 invasion of Kuwait helped bring last year's oil revenues up 30
percent from the previous year. Oil exports for 1990-91 amounted
to$16.5 billion and this income has helped Iran out of its $2 billion 
d e fic it.22 However, it will take more than increased oil revenues to 
fully finance Iran's reconstruction. Borrowing from foreigners is 
very controversial, largely due to the historical experiences and 
ideological divisions. The radicals object to loans from outside, but 
Rafsanjani and the rest of the pragmatists are looking for a jump 
start to the failing economy. Some argue that the problem is not the 
borrowing from abroad, but the management of the funds once they
2 1 International Iran Times, Vol. XXI, no. 11, 31 May 1991, 1.
22 International Iran Times,  Vol. XXI, no. 11, 31 May 1991, 1.
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make it into Iran. The Iranian government has been criticized for 
excessive waste and some believe that a sound administrative 
system is needed to correctly utilize the money and channel it in the 
proper direction.
Thus far, the administration has borrowed only a partial 
amount of that approved by the Majlis. The World Bank approved a
$250 million loan for Iran for repairing the damage done to the Gilan
and Zanjan provinces by the June 1990 earthquake.23 In addition, 
according to central bank Governor Mohammad Hossain Adeli, Iran 
has borrowed more than $12 billion in foreign loans to finance the 
five-year development plan which began March 1991. Adeli stated 
that Iran is seeking the $17.5 billion in foreign loans authorized by 
the Majlis and another $10 billion in trade credits. Despite Adeli's 
assurances that Iran has nailed down 70 percent of the loans, news 
reports suggest that foreign bankers are not attracted to Iran, and 
that the loans may be slow in coming. The money Iran has received 
so far has been borrowed from banks in France, Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Canada, Japan and Luxembourg.24
Borrowing could very well mean increased dependency,
particularly in the short run. However, if the funds are used
appropriately, which includes sound administration and elimination 
of the excessive waste of which the regime has been accused, Iran 
may be able to change the nature of its dependency and lessen it. 
Iran's Gross National Product (GNP) increased by 4 percent in 1989
23 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 37, 16 Nov 1990, 1.
24 International Iran Times, Vol. XXI, no. 11, 31 May 1991, 1.
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and by another 8 percent in 1990.25 This is a positive sign. If Iran 
diversifies its economic foundation and moves to manufacture those 
goods which it now imports whenever feasible, Iran would increase 
its self-sufficiency (and become more self-reliant). It appears that 
the Rafsanjani administration is working to realize economic growth 
and that development projects are on the agenda.
The administration proposed an 18.79 trillion rial budget for 
this fiscal year (March 1991- March 1992). This is a 43 percent 
increase over the previous year, which at the official exchange rate 
of 70 rials to the US dollar means a $268 billion budget for this 
y e a r .26 In proposing this budget increase, the Rafsanjani 
administration argued that the "market oriented" policies have 
turned the economy around and that the budget reflects the 
economic progress of the past year. The budget is based on projected 
increases in oil revenues and plans to sell many of the state owned 
enterprises. The proposed increase has been delegated to a number 
of areas, including current expenditures, such as wages and 
equipment of the bureaucracy, health and education, development 
projects, reconstruction, and defense and security.27 While progress 
has been made over the past year, and the proposed increase is 
probably necessary for further development, there are still 
numerous economic problems that this country is facing.
26 New York Times, 9 April 1991, sec. A, 10.
26 At an unofficial exchange rate o f 1000 rials to the US dollar, which is oess 
than the black market rate, the budget would be only $18.8 billion.
International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 42, 21 Dec 1990, 2.
27 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 42, 21 Dec 1990, 2.
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There are various indicators of productivity and the state of 
the economy. The output of factories is one important indicator. The 
factories operated by the Heavy Industries Ministry measured at 
only 30 percent of capacity for 1989/90, and were as low as 26 
percent the previous year. Finance Minister Mohsen Nurbakhsh told 
officials that the first three months of fiscal year 1990-91 showed 
marked increases by a number of factories, but gave no figure for 
the overall economy. However, even with 100 percent increases the 
overall capacity would only be brought up to 60 percent, which is 
still considered a low figure. Some factories have shown exceptional 
increases, such as those producing automobile tires, refrigerators and 
freezers, and glass, but continued increases are needed.28
Apart from production figures there are also indicators of 
overall economic standing of the population. The Iran Statistics 
Center reported that the average urban family spent approximately 
49 percent of its income on housing and 35 percent on food, leaving 
only 16 percent for clothing, transport, entertainment, health, 
savings and all other expenses.29 The administration has reported 
that there has been progress over the past year, as indicated by the 
rise in GNP, but this growth must continue if Iran is going to realize 
its reconstruction and development goals. One variable that impacts 
Iran's economic growth is its relations with other countries, 
particularly trade relations.
28 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 26, 31 Aug 1990, 2.
29 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 26, 31 Aug 1990, 2.
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Due to the high degree of economic interaction between the 
domestic and international level, trade relations are important for 
practically all states, especially if they intend to experience economic 
growth. In order for Iran to recover economically the administration 
must pursue increased trade relations and foreign aid/loans. The 
pragmatic faction is currently fighting the isolationist tendency of the 
past decade and attempting to broaden its economic relations in 
order to put the country on the road to reconstruction.
Foreign Relations
Iran's foreign relations since the revolution have been shaped 
by a contest between ideology and pragmatism. Ideology has meant 
international isolation and a continuance of the war with Iraq, 
whereas pragmatism has meant a concerted effort on the part of the 
government in latter years to improve relations with the outside 
world, to end the war and to begin postwar reconstruction. As 
indicated previously, the pragmatic faction has been dominant in the 
past few years, but the radicals still hold some important positions 
and cannot be discounted. Improved foreign relations are seen by 
the pragmatists as a necessity for reconstruction. Iran does not have 
the necessary capital to begin vast reconstruction and improved 
trade relations and foreign loans are seen by the pragmatists as the 
only way to find this capital. Supreme jurisprudent Khamenei has 
stated that Iran "should use foreign resources ... we cannot prolong 
the issue of reconstruction for 100 years."30 As a result of the
30 R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations," M iddle East  
Jo u rn a l  43 (Spring 19489) 213.
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government's efforts, relations with many states have been 
im proved .
Since the early years of the republic, Iran has sought to expand 
its relations with developing nations. In particular, relations with 
Turkey and Pakistan have been expanded. In 1985 these three 
countries formed the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO); the 
ECO was formed to encourage trade, technology transfer, and other 
economic exchanges among the three countries.31 In addition, Iran 
and Turkey have plans to build a pipeline through Turkey to Europe 
for Iranian natural gas.
Improved relations with the advanced countries are also being 
actively pursued, with the notable exception of the United States. In 
November 1989, Iran made a deal with Germany and France in 
which the National Iranian Oil Company agreed to sell 300,000 
barrels of oil per day for 18 months to a consortium of West German 
and French companies and banks in exchange for $800 million in 
cash to be provided immediately. At $15 a barrel the deal was 
worth approximately $2.6 billion.32 In addition, Germany and Iran 
have signed a dozen development project plans recently, which are 
expected to inject more than a billion dollars of capital into the 
Iranian economy. Germany and Iran have announced differing 
versions of these plans, but it appears that improving port facilities 
and building transport facilities are two of the major projects. Iran
31 R.K. Ramazani, "Iran: Burying the Hatchet," Foreign P olicy  60 (Fall 1985) 
65-66 .
32 Hiro, 46.
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has also improved relations with Japan, which has formally 
announced that it will resume economic aid to Iran for the first time 
since the revolution.33 Iran is now actively pursuing better relations 
with advanced states in hopes of realizing more economic growth.
No matter how virulent much of their rhetoric still is, the 
Iranian leaders finally have come to believe that the very 
survival of the revolution is at stake and that mounting 
domestic problems can be eased only by breaking down 
the walls of Iran's international isolation.34
Years of international isolation did not see a break in the
dependency of Iran, nor increased self-sufficiency. The large
modern industries in Iran remained dependent on the world market
for 65 percent of their input and the regime experienced foreign
exchange shortages because of its isolation.35 People lived under an
often repressive regime much as before the revolution and for many
their economic situation worsened.
The leaders of the Islamic Republic were, of course, still 
claiming that they were defending the oppressed people of 
Iran, but at the same time, the m easures these people 
dem anded for the am elio ra tion  of th e ir econom ic 
conditions were forgotten . As far as the existing  
d istribution of econom ic resources was concerned, one 
could find few d ifferences betw een pre- and p o st­
revolutionary Iran .36
33 International Iran Times, Vol. XXI, no. 12, 7 Jun 1991, 1.
34 Ramazani, "Iran: Burying the Hatchet," 69.
35 Amirahmadi, 87.
36 Mansoor M oadel, "Class Struggle in Post-Revolutionary Iran," I n te r n a t io n a l  
Journal o f  Middle East Studies 23 (1991) 328.
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Not only were economic conditions quite similar to the pre­
revolutionary period, but often political circumstances for the 
population were also similar. As before, mass mobilization was 
relied upon and interest articulation was severely limited. Currently, 
the regime is focusing on economic growth, but eventually political 
development will have to be addressed, especially if the pragmatists 
intend to remain in power. This will mean delivering what the 
population demands; in particular, political participation will be 
demanded, and the administration will have to find a way to allow 
for this participation.
Prospects for the Future
This final section analyzes the future prospects for Iran's 
political economy and development. Nearly three decades have been 
examined in order to understand the interaction between the 
economic and political spheres in Iran. This historical analysis is 
necessary because it provides a basis for comprehending Iran's 
current political economy and level of development. With this basis 
practical economic and political suggestions can be made for future 
development in Iran. Understanding the consequences of decisions 
in the past will allow the current leadership to make more informed 
decisions. Obviously environmental factors will not be the same as 
before, but nevertheless a historical basis provides some foundation 
from which to begin.
Since Khomeini's death, probably the most important event 
influencing Iran's political economy has been the war between the 
Allied Forces, led by the United States, and Iraq. Iraq's invasion of
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Kuwait increased oil prices which allowed Iran to increase its oil 
revenues and pull itself out of a budget deficit. Following the 
invasion, Iran's neutral position in this war brought it benefits that 
otherwise probably would have been long in coming. First, the war 
weakened Iran's most powerful competitor for regional dominance. 
After the eight year war Iran was hardly strong enough to prevent 
Iraq from increasing its power in the region. However, with the 
defeat of Iraq at the hands of the allied forces, Iraq cannot establish 
regional hegemony any time soon while Iran is placed in a much 
better position to dominate the Gulf region. In addition, Iran's 
neutral position in the war was rewarded with renewed relations 
with Western countries and economic agreements. Had Iran joined 
Iraq in its fight against the allied forces, which the radicals called for, 
the war would have been much different. Many in the West realized 
this and chose to encourage Iran's neutrality. President Rafsanjani 
maintained a neutral role in the buildup and the war because of his 
concerns for reconstruction. Reconstruction depends on assistance 
from the advanced countries, particularly Japan and W estern Europe, 
and economic assistance would not have been forthcoming had Iran 
joined Iraq. The European Community lifted all economic sanctions 
against Iran and many of the Western nations renewed their 
relations with Iran. Currently, the government is trying to encourage 
W estern investment in Iran.
The political strength of the pragmatists, especially Rafsanjani, 
has increased since the war and economic benefits are in evidence. 
Within the past few months, several individuals and newspapers 
have vocalized support for President Rafsanjani. In a speech against
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the United States, Supreme Guide Khamenei did not attack Rafsanjani 
for any rapproachment with the US, but instead ordered the 
President's critics to shut up and stated:
It is the duty of all to support the respected President ... 
and the government, which, with God's blessing, is being 
run today by one of the most brilliant figures of the 
revolution and one of the most efficient brains and arms of 
the country.37
This overwhelming endorsement for the president by Khamenei, was 
followed by statement from the Islamic Republic's Supreme Court in 
which Chief Justice Hossain Moqtadai stated that those threatening 
the regime can and will be punished. In addition to the statements 
from these two powerful men there was also "orchestrated praise" of 
Rafsanjani and the administration from various publications. The 
timing suggests that these incidents were not coincidental, but were 
organized by the moderates as a major offensive against the 
ra d ic a ls .38 The moderates are in a strong position and are currently 
trying to build upon their strength. If they are able to address the 
economic needs of the population quickly, the chances of the radicals 
usurping power will decrease substantially. However, in the long 
term the government, whether run by moderates or radicals, must 
solve a number of problems if Iran is to develop economically and 
politically.
37 This quote o f Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei was taken from the 
International Iran Times, Vol. XXI, no. 12, 7 Jun 1991, 1.
38 International Iran Times, Vol. XXI, no. 12, 7 Jun 1991, 1.
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As in the beginning of the Republic, there is still disagreement 
regarding the degree of state control of the economy as opposed to 
private enterprise. Under the moderates, many of the state owned 
companies are being released for private ownership and the 
government is seeking new ways to encourage the private sector. 
According to Hooshang Amirahmadi, a combination of state 
intervention and private sector encouragement is needed.
Clearly the situation calls for increased public intervention 
and investm ent, particularly in R&D, infrastructures, and 
industries. However, the success of such intervention and 
investm ent policy would depend on how efficiently it is 
implemented. This is why effective investm ent planning 
has become indispensable to the country. To redirect 
investm ent toward industries, the governm ent m ust also 
introduce incentives for the private sector and implement 
it with vigor and rigid discipline.39
The government hopes that providing incentives for the private
sector will allow for economic growth. This in conjunction with
effective planning could lead to the reconstruction and modernization
goals of Iran.
According to Homa Katouzian, for long-term peace, stability and 
progress, the Iranian political economy is in need of numerous 
changes. Katouzian provides a list of long-term politico-economic 
requirements and strategies for Iran. The requirements include:
1) creation of an alternative export sector to reduce 
dependence on oil,
2) promotion and diversification of domestic output, 
reducing the country's dependence on imports of
39 Amirahmadi, 162.
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consumer goods, intermediate products and capital 
m ach inery ,
3) sustained growth rate of national income and living 
standards consistent with the country's politico- 
economic capacity to absorb, and
4) a direct and indirect redistribution of income, education, 
health and other social goods to the poorer classes of the 
com m unity .40
To accomplish these goals, Katouzian gives a list of strategies, some of 
which are more comprehensive than others.
Katouzian suggests that there must be investment in many of 
the local, labour-intensive industries and attempts at their 
renovation and modernization. In addition, there must be 
investment in basic consumer products, old and new, which are 
objects of consumption of the masses, such as textiles, appliances, 
education, health services, and housing. Investment in industries in 
which the country can reasonably compete in the regional, as well as 
world market, is also suggested. While the author proposes 
increased investment in many areas (some of which will produce 
more capital), she does not discuss where the initial capital is to come 
from. Is an oil-led industrialization strategy, such as the moderates 
propose, the proper strategy or is something different needed? In 
addition to the above strategies, Katouzian also argues that a 
complete redistribution of land among the peasantry with the 
provision of financial, technical and other extension services is 
necessary. While this proposal would aid in the redistribution of 
wealth in the country which is vital to long-term stability and 
progress, land distribution has been a very controversial issue for
40 Katouzian, 370.
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many years and it is unlikely that the powerful landowners that 
have defeated previous attempts at redistribution will turn over 
their property any time soon. In particular, if Iran remains a 
republic governed by Islam, which recognizes private property, 
redistribution will be difficult; even if the government changes,
Islam will still remain an important factor in Iran and thus will 
complicate redistribution. Katouzian also suggests strategies 
including investment in universal free education and health facilities, 
development of the country's existing technology and skills, and 
rational and realistic attempts at the extension of the heavy 
industrial and engineering base.41 Katouzian’s list of requirements 
and strategies for Iran is valuable for long-term planning, but there 
are areas that need more specifics if they are to be used by the 
ad m in istra tio n .
Over the past decade the administration has used quick fixes to 
economic problems, rather than long-term planning. Practical 
domestic economic planning is needed for reconstruction and 
economic growth. An overall evaluation of the resources of the 
country and the goals must be made. Once these are determined, 
strategies can be adopted to move towards these goals. For example, 
economic growth is obviously one goal. Some of the most plentiful 
resources in Iran include natural gas and minerals. One growth 
strategy would be to invest in developing these resources, focusing 
on labour-intensive methods of development, which would also aid 
economic growth by lowering the unemployment rate. The
41 Katouzian, 370-71 .
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Rafsanjani administration has started long-term planning and has 
tried to develop strategies that are conducive to this planning. 
However, policy decisions must be continually evaluated as the 
environment changes. A brief examination of Iran's resources will 
allow for strategy suggestions that may move the country towards its 
goals.
Iran has numerous resources, many of which have not been 
used. The most obvious natural resource is oil. Iran has large oil 
reserves, and now that the war with Iraq is over, the damaged oil 
production and transport facilities are being repaired so that Iran 
may increase its oil revenues. The invasion of Kuwait boosted oil 
sales, and during the crisis the United States lifted its ban on US- 
based oil companies buying Iranian oil. The pragmatists intend to 
realize economic growth through oil-led industrialization and have 
partially based budget increases on projected oil revenue increases. 
However, there are drawbacks to Iran's oil resource.
First, for more than two decades Iran has depended on oil sales 
for the majority of its state revenues and for most of its foreign 
exchange. The decline in oil prices in the late 1970's and the oil glut 
on the market in the mid-1980's severely damaged Iran's economy.
In addition, OPEC can and has manipulated the oil markets to Iran’s 
disadvantage. Certain members have ignored their quotas and 
flooded the market, thus driving prices down, and Iran's calls for 
reduced quotas for all members have been ignored. Separate from 
these problems, Iran is also at a disadvantage because while it 
exports crude oil it has to import refined oil, which is a drain on 
revenues. The Abadan refinery is scheduled to reopen soon, but it
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will not be able to provide the quantity necessary for domestic use, 
so imports will continue.42 If the oil resources are used wisely and if 
the world market is favorable over the next few years, Iran may be 
able to use the revenues to expand its oil production (including 
building refineries to provide enough refined oil for both domestic 
use and exports), and to develop other industries that will lessen 
Iran's dependence on the oil market.
One of the industries that is being developed is petrochemicals. 
Iran plans to produce 9 million tons of petrochemicals in 1993, which 
will allow the country to begin exporting these resources for the first 
time. Currently, Iran is importing as much as $2 billion worth of 
petrochemicals each year, but by 1993 Iran's domestic needs will be 
covered by 80 percent of its production and the remainder will be 
e x p o rted .43 Petrochemicals are a resource that holds vast potential
for development. However, Iran has to develop more than its oil and
petrochemical resources. A diverse economic foundation is necessary 
for sustained economic growth.
Another resource that has great potential and has not been 
developed is natural gas. Iran has the second largest natural gas 
reserves in the world. Some quantities are being exported, especially 
to Eastern Europe, but there are vast reserves that could be 
developed. Iran and Turkey have signed an economic pact in which 
they agreed to construct a natural gas pipeline from Iran across 
Anatolia, which may eventually supply parts of Europe with gas. In
42 International Iran Times, Vol. XXI, no. 4, 12 Apr 1991, 1.
43 International Iran Times, Vol. XXI, no. 13, 14 Jun 1991, 2.
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addition to natural gas, Iran also has various mineral resources that 
could be mined and used for domestic purposes or could be exported. 
Among these, copper is the primary mineral reserve. Little effort 
has been made to develop copper or any other minerals in Iran, 
although their production could provide Iran with materials that are 
currently imported and their export could bring needed foreign 
exchange reserves.44 Long-term planning and proper investment in 
the production of these various resources would aid Iran in 
safeguarding its economic growth.
There should also be increased investment in many of the local 
labour-intensive industries. These industries, such as carpet- 
weaving and shoe-making, have a basis in Iranian culture and if 
expanded could provide increased employment.
Apart from these resources, Iran also needs to examine its 
agricultural sector. Up until the 1960's Iran was primarily an 
agrarian society. By the 1970's, due to population growth and 
unsuitable land reforms, Iran had become an importer of agricultural 
products. An ambitious program of reform should now be 
considered, in which technology appropriate for Iran’s agricultural 
lands could be adopted and methods of improving crops analyzed. 
Land redistribution among the peasants and provision of financial, 
technical and other extension services, as suggested by Katouzian,
44 The capital and skilled labor required to begin mining and production o f  
various minerals can be quite high, which may the reason that these 
resources have not been developed. However, investment in this area would 
provide jobs, would increase productive activity and could provide long-term  
s e c u r ity .
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should be a long-term goal. The controversy over land redistribution 
will obviously surface, but this does not mean that the other 
strategies for improving Iran's agricultural sector should not be 
p u rsu e d .45 The current administration must focus on moving away 
from the service industry, towards a production-oriented economy 
for sustained economic growth and development.
Intelligent economic planning requires goal setting, both short- 
and long-term, resource analysis, and the adoption of adequate 
strategies. Even with these, both the domestic and the external 
environment can change without notice, and planning must adjust. 
The goals of the current administration are numerous. Primary 
among these goals is securing the basic needs of the population, 
providing food and housing in particular. Lowering the 
unemployment rate and the inflation rate is necessary to ensure that 
basic needs can be met and sustained. Reducing the high population 
growth rate would allow these needs to be met with a greater degree 
of ease in the future. Reconstruction is also a goal. The damage from 
the war with Iraq and from the earthquake that shook the northern 
provinces in June 1990, is extensive. Reconstruction includes 
repairing infrastructures as well as rebuilding numerous industries. 
Factories, oil drilling rigs, and transport facilities are areas that the 
administration is currently focusing on rebuilding. Once progress
45 Land redistribution could be approached in an incremental manner, in 
which the redistribution spanned a number o f  years. During this period,
peasants could be trained to understand the best uses for their land so that
once the transfer was complete, there would not be a span in which lack o f
technical skill would mean reduced output.
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towards these goals is made, the administration can focus on 
m odern iza tion .
The current administration must avoid the W esternization that 
characterized the modernization program of the Shah.46 
Modernization, recall from chapter one, is defined as man increasing 
control over his natural and societal environment. It involves 
technological and organizational changes.
Modernization must be based on what is appropriate for Iran if 
it is to be sustained. The technological dimension will focus on 
industrialization and technology transfer. Industrialization should 
focus on goods consumed by the masses and products which Iran can 
sell competitively on both the regional and the world markets. 
Consumer products might include housing, textiles, and agricultural 
products. Products for external markets that could be developed 
include natural gas, petrochemicals, copper and other minerals. 
Current exports should also be expanded. The organizational aspect 
of modernization in Iran will involve specialization of structures and 
functions. As knowledge and control over the environment 
increases, it is necessary to create roles/functions and structures that 
specialize in particular areas. This generally translates into increased 
bureaucratization. Modernization allows man to increase his control
46 Given the hatred o f the W est, particularly the US, that has been prevalent 
since the revolution, it is not likely that excessive Western cultural traits will 
be adopted. However, the technology that Iran may eventually import should 
be examined in terms o f  its appropriateness for that country, rather than its 
use in other countries (recall this was a problem in the land reforms under 
the Shah).
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over the environment, but it also brings with it demands and 
expectations that often race beyond the ability to satisfy them.
In order to gain control over the natural and societal 
environment increased education and training are necessary. 
Education and training must be pursued to realize increased 
technology and higher level organization. For example, to modernize 
the industrial sector, engineers and trained workers are imperative. 
Iran will have to expand its training to produce skilled workers and 
will have to further develop its educational standards. Free 
education to expand literacy must be accompanied by an expansion 
of college level educational opportunities in diverse areas. However, 
while education helps increase control over the environment, it also 
produces economic, social and political expectations and demands 
which are difficult to meet.
James Bill and Robert Hardgrave wrote that "development is 
most usefully understood in terms of a system's response capacity in 
relationship to demands."47 Modernization means increased 
demands on the system, but even without a planned program of 
modernization, demands will be made. Development understood in 
terms of response capacity, or the ability to satisfy these demands, is 
an ambiguous concept. It is easier to point out when demands are 
not being met than it is to deliver on demands. Under the Shah, 
modernization was pursued without regard to the social and political 
demands of the population. Economic concessions were made in
47 James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative Politics: The Quest 
fo r  Theory  (Lanham MD and London: University Press o f  America, Inc., 1981) 
67.
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hopes that this would be enough to satisfy the population. As the 
revolution of 1979 indicated, this was not enough. During the 
revolution, in which there was a coalition of groups, each of which 
had its own ideas on how the system should run, numerous promises 
were made to satisfy the demands of the population. In particular, 
Khomeini promised the m ostaza fin , or disinherited, that their 
condition would improve. The Islamic Republic was designed to 
produce the rule of Islam in Iran, which Khomeini argued would 
satisfy the needs of the faithful. However, with the revolution, the 
war with Iraq, and the decline in oil revenues, the Islamic Republic 
has not been able to meet many of the needs or demands of the 
people. Rather, the economic conditions of many have worsened and 
repressive tactics have often been employed to quiet any elements 
critical of the regime. Since Khomeini's death, the regime has focused 
on improving the economy and thus meeting the economic needs and 
demands of the population. However, the administration must keep 
in mind that once economic headway is made, political demands will 
be made. Satisfying demands for increased participation in the 
political process will eventually be necessary.
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CONCLUSIONS
The central issue addressed by this thesis has been the effect 
of the political economy on development in Iran. Development has 
been defined in terms of response capacity or the ability to satisfy 
the needs/demands of the population. Development in terms of 
delivering includes fulfilling economic and political requirements. 
Economic demands include basic needs, such as food and shelter, and 
relative needs. Relative economic demands generally increase as 
modernization takes place. For example, as the population becomes 
more aware of what technology is capable of, demands increase 
(some examples of relative luxury demands include appliances, 
automobiles, and other goods that are designed to make life easier). 
Political demands are also part of development. Once basic needs are 
met, the population begins to demand avenues for social mobility 
and for political participation. Political participation need not come 
in one specific form, but a developing society must provide methods 
for the population to at least articulate its interests if that society is 
going to progress.
Development is not solely affected by the interrelationships 
between economics and politics; there are social and cultural factors 
that obviously play a role in development also. The scope of this 
paper however, has been limited to the relationship between 
development and the political economy in Iran. The dependent 
variable of development has been examined in terms the interaction
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of economic conditions, political decisions, and global and domestic 
factors.
This thesis has traced the political economy of Iran from the 
1960's through the present. The political economy is a product of the 
interaction of the decisions and the environment within which the 
political and economic systems function. The economic and political 
systems of a society are determined by a number of factors. Three 
of the most important factors in these systems are the decisions of 
the leadership within society, the domestic environment and the 
international environment. These three factors interact and produce 
changes, both negative and positive, in the political economy. This 
political economy in turn, helps determine the degree of 
development which society attains. If environmental circumstances 
are favorable and practical economic policies are adopted, economic 
growth is the result. Similarly, political development can be made if 
favorable economic conditions are maintained and the leadership of 
society responds to the economic and political demands of the 
popu lation .
This paper has focused on the environmental conditions and 
decisions that have inhibited development in Iran. By pointing out 
the factors that contributed to a lack of development for this society, 
it was possible to suggest alternatives that may improve prospects 
for development. While economic growth was strong in the early 
1970's, the Shah's regime did not direct revenues toward long-term 
economic development, and the upward trend did not last long. 
Neither did the Shah respond to increasing demands for cooptation 
into the political process, especially by the middle class. Largely as a
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result of these economic and political factors the Shah's regime was 
overthrown in the 1979 revolution.
A similar analysis was made of the post-revolutionary period 
in Iran, in which environmental conditions, including the war with 
Iraq and the soft oil market, largely prohibited economic growth. In 
addition, the administration often employed repressive tactics to 
control the political process. Mass mobilization rather than 
participation was the focus. Finally, the past two years were 
examined and an analysis of prospects for future development was 
offered. Practical use of domestic resources combined with a 
willingness to politically coopt a larger share of the population are 
important steps towards economic growth and political development.
Further political development, in all likelihood, will involve 
providing channels for individuals and groups to articulate their 
interests. Demands will most likely include increasing social mobility 
and providing for increased political participation. There are no 
proven models of political development. Western democratic- 
pluralism is often viewed as the final product, but numerous 
arguments have been brought against this viewpoint. Iran will have 
to find a balance between ideology and pragmatism if the revolution 
is to survive and the country is to progress. Iran holds a great deal 
of potential that make its long-term prospects good if proper 
planning and resource management are employed.
This case study of the interrelationships of political economy 
and development obviously does not address a number of questions: 
1) What are the social and cultural (including religious) factors in 
development? 2) Is the same relationship applicable to countries
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other than Iran? 3) Is there a specific approach to political economy 
that would guarantee economic growth and political development? 
While this is not a conclusive list of the questions that could be 
addressed in conjunction with this thesis, it suggests directions for 
further research.
The goal of this study was to gain insight into the 
interrelationships of politics and economics and their effect on 
political development, specifically within Iran. It has been argued 
that the economic and political systems in society are products of the 
interaction of decisions and environmental conditions. Hopefully, 
what has been presented is an unbiased examination of Iran's 
political economy, followed by practical suggestions for future 
deve lopm en t.
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